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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS.

PART 28.

JAN.-JUNE 1981.

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART XXVIII

JANUARY TO JUNE 1931

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

PART XXVIII.

CHAPTER I.—ARABIA.

[E 42/2/25]

No. 1.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received January 3.)

(No. 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, January 2, 1931.

IF the visit of the Prime Minister of Iraq were made on the understanding and with the object mentioned in Bagdad telegram No. 809, it would fit in satisfactorily with the result of the discussion here recorded in my telegram No. 112. I have no reason to suppose that Ibn Saud's attitude has modified, though I have had no opportunity of taking further soundings since my return. Fuad pressed His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires several times during my absence for information as to the present position of the matter. I must, however, attach two qualifications to my agreement in present proposal, viz. (a) that Nuri must be prepared at the outset to show some readiness, in negotiations concerning extradition treaty, to meet Hejazi Government over the question of tribal offenders, e.g., by offering to accept as basis of discussion proposal put forward in letter of the 26th July from Fuad Hamza to Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs; (b) that Nuri must be in a position to secure that the "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement, when signed, is speedily ratified.

As regards (a) Ibn Saud would probably revert to his earlier attitude of refusing to disassociate the two agreements, if Nuri adopted uncompromising or even altogether non-committal position at the start. Although technically there may be a difference between the present position and that of 1928, it would seem to be equally reasonable in the present circumstances to make some concession of the kind which Iraq then contemplated, and to which His Majesty's Government agreed. In any case such action is essential if good relations are to be established. When Nuri proposes his visit it would be well that he should refer to this question or the Hejazi Government's complaint that Fuad's letter has been ignored will be justified. It is all the more necessary to show as much goodwill as possible on this point owing to dangerous repercussion of Saseo regarding Ibn Mashkur. As regards (b), signature is less important than ratification, and, until Iraq Parliament has passed treaty, Ibn Saud will not ratify it.

In my view claims question need not worry us at this stage. In the event of Nuri Pasha's coming to Jedda, the matter can be left to the two parties to thrash out, subject to your views as to line to be taken on question of Nejd claims for damage caused by Royal Air Force.

There is another matter which may affect whole situation, namely, statement made to Bagdad press in October by Nuri that he proposed to promote some kind of combination of Arabian States, including the Hejaz and Nejd, Iraq and Transjordan, and that he intended to pay visits during the winter to the capitals for the

purpose of branching the subject. I know very little of this and have no information to (a) what attitude of His Majesty's Government may be to so far reaching and important a scheme, or (b) what Ibn Saud, who must have seen announcement in press, feels about it.

If Nuri's visit is really proposed with a view to reconnoitre the ground for a federation or triple alliance, some diplomatic preparation would seem to be needed. My own view is that scheme is at present incapable of realisation, so far as it involves the inclusion of the Hejaz-Nejd. Even if it has approval of His Majesty's Government from standpoint of their own interest, Ibn Saud's gravest suspicion might be awakened by any attempt to spring it on him. I should be very grateful to learn your views for my guidance if necessary.

Whilst commending no preceding paragraphs to your serious notice, I think 'Bon-Voisinage' and Extradition Agreements should be put in train with least possible delay. I trust therefore, that Nuri will reply as soon as possible and preferably by telegram to letters of last July providing always that due attention is given to points referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this telegram. Presumably, some communication will simultaneously be addressed to Ibn Saud by Faisal, if only for courtesy's sake.

(Repeated to Bagdad No 2)

E 81 81 251

No. 2.

Mr Hope Gill to Mr. A. Henderson.---(Received January 5, 1931)

Jedda, December 18, 1930

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jedda report for the months of September, October and November. I much regret that, under the heavy pressure of other work on myself and a reduced staff, I have found it impossible to render these reports monthly.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosure to Cairo, Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, Bagdad, Basra, New Delhi, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Aden, Addis Ababa, Lagos, Khartum, Port Sudan, the senior naval officer in Red Sea sloop, and the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan.

I have, &c.
C. G. HOPE GILL.

Enclosure in No.

Jedda Report for September, October and November 1930

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I—Internal Affairs

1. Local Government

IBN SAUD visited Jedda on the 1st September, ostensibly to open a customs warehouse, in reality to see the Polish munitions landed by the steamship 'Cracow' (August report, section 13). He also witnessed a closely guarded exhibition shoot with a Polish gun adapted to camel transport. Overcome by the pleasant climate of Taif and its neighbourhood until the 20th October when his Court and Government removed to Mecca for the winter.

At the end of September His Majesty enjoyed another week's gazelle shooting in the Rukba plain, but for the rest of the time he has been hard at work. A picturesque account of the personal side of his rule was published in the Mecca 'al-Qura' of the 3th September. His subjects were there assured that their every petition, whether from high or low, rich or poor, received their attention and potentates—which would be all the more pleasing were it quite true.

As a result of the deliberations mentioned in the August report (section 1) a number of new appointments were announced at the beginning of September. KHALID bin 'Abd al-Qadir' was appointed first assistant to the Amir Faisal, Viceroy of Mecca, but later resigned the post and was replaced by Sheikh Ibrahim Abdurrahman al-Fadhl (see section 3 (c) below). Sheikh Yasin ar-Rawaf late Hejaz Nejd agent in Syria, was appointed as second assistant to the Viceroy, his brother Mohammed Id-ar-Rawaf, being named to replace him at Damascus. Nalib Bey al-Adhwa, another of the numerous political refugees in this country, was appointed first Director of Military Organisation (see section 26 below).

A new Hajj Committee of eight members has been formed to make preparations for the coming pilgrimage. The Majlis-at-Tujjar, a kind of mixed chamber of commerce and commercial court, has been revived, and is now composed of six members, to whom is added an Aleim of the Sharia Court to advise on points of law. A Projects Committee has also been formed to study questions of electric light and water supply and mineral exploitation. The fruits of their labours have not yet been made public.

As a result of German enterprise, however, fifty automatic telephones have been installed for the Sultan and the Amir Faisal's residence in Mecca.

2. Religion

The intransigence of the Wahabis was recently experienced by some poor pilgrims in Mecca, while performing their seven rounds of Tawaf. They were hauled before a grandson of the great Abdul Wahhab, who compelled them to complete their performance bareheaded. The only possible consolation was to be found in the fact that the Turks (who were not allowed to wear hats) were not allowed to wear hats.

3. Finance.

The financial position of the Hejaz-Nejd Government has steadily deteriorated during the past three months. An increasing number of important Government debts are outstanding, and Ibn Saud's cash reserve, which, at the beginning of the year, was said to amount to £100,000, is now believed to be practically exhausted.

(b) The Government of India are still owed something over £50,000 for arms and ammunition supplied to enable Ibn Saud to suppress the 1929 rebellion in Nejd. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires was instructed in November to press for a firm undertaking to liquidate the debt by the end of next February.

The Eastern Telegraph Company's monthly account with the Hejaz-Nejd Government is six months, and over £4,000, in arrear, semi-official representations having as yet failed of other effect than a reference of the matter to the Dey.

To-morrow, if Allah will

The Hejaz-Nejd Government has for some months received the duties on imports and exports from the Red Sea ports. These duties are payable to the Government of the Hejaz-Nejd, but they are not paid to the Government of the Hejaz-Nejd. The duties are theoretically payable at sight, but in practice months go by before they can be met.

(c) The important Hejazi firm of "R. A. Alfazal," with its head office in Bombay, has gone out of business owing £30,000 to a leading bank there. The bank is advised that a criminal action for false declaration of value lies against him, but its partners have retired to influential positions in the Government at Mecca (e.g., see section 1 above). The matter has, therefore, been taken up

but with little prospect of success. The Nejd firm of Qusaibi is also said to be in difficulties. Ibn Saud's private bankers, in fact, seem to be in as bad a way as their patron. The Kaimakam of Jedda, Haji Abdullah Ali Rida, one of the few wealthy men left in the country, is keeping out of reach by a prolonged absence in Egypt.

The Hejaz-Nejd Government has been anxiously looked to by this Hejazi nation of lodging house keepers, of toutage and of other petty trades, for an indication that it will be an exceptionally poor one. The heart of Islam is now beginning to feel the reflex actions of world conditions. The most important section of the pilgrimage, that from the Dutch East Indies, has already started but advices from Java put it at 18,000 at most this year, as against 30,000 last year. It is still too early to estimate the Egyptian and Indian pilgrimages, which last year numbered 17,000 and 12,000 respectively, but the conditions prevailing in both countries are calculated to reduce those figures considerably.

Ibn Saud is faced with the prospect of a very lean year. There are some who foresee his complete bankruptcy.

4. Commerce.

Efforts are being made to open up and organise the Hama coast to trade through the Persian Gulf, and probably to pilgrim traffic also. A strong committee, under Mohammed-at-Tawil, left for the Hama on the 28th September to study the possibilities on the spot. Its recommendations will no doubt aim at a short-circuiting of Bahrain and its transit dues.

5. Wireless.

The Hejaz-Nejd Government signed with the Marconi Company at the beginning of October a contract worth £37,000, payment to be made by instalments extending over three and a half years. The company have undertaken to supply and erect within eighteen months eleven land stations and four mobile sets. The former are to comprise two principal six-kilowatt stations at Mecca and Riadh, and nine subsidiary stations at Tabuk, Qaryat (Kaf), Hail, Qasim, and other places. The mobile sets are to be mounted on Ford one-ton trucks. The contract marked the successful conclusion of Mr. Philby's negotiations of the past year on behalf of the Marconi Company (June report, paragraph 30).

A wireless school has been opened in Jedda, and four of its most promising pupils have been sent to the Marconi Company's works in England to complete their training.

6. Aeronautics.

See air matters (sections 21 and 22 below)

7. Hejaz Railway

A petition, presented in 1929 to the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations by the Amir Shakhb Arslan, the noted Syrian Nationalist, who is in close touch with Ibn Saud and Ihsan al-Jabri, was considered by the commission on the 9th September. The petitioners complained, amongst other things, that in spite of its Waqf character, the Hejaz Railway had been taken out of the hands of the Moslem peoples to whom, as a religious property, it belonged, and they asked that it be handed back to a commission elected by Syria, Palestine and Transjordan, which would control it in concert with the Hejaz-Nejd Government.

The Mandates Commission, however, maintained a previous decision to the effect that the railway, as property of the Ottoman Government, fell to be dealt with under article 5 of the Treaty of Lausanne; that the steps taken by the mandatory Powers for its control and exploitation were not of a nature to conflict with the religious aspirations of the Moslem populations; that they, in fact, tended to create a situation as analogous to pre-war conditions as was now possible. The commission added that the interested Moslem populations would do well to associate themselves with the efforts made by the mandatory Powers to solve the problem to the best interests of all. The commission's conclusions were approved by the Council of the League. No reaction has yet been noted in this country.

8. Roads.

The "Umm al Qura" is doing its best to educate its public to take an interest in the development of internal communications. The distances over what are called motor roads are published from time to time. They are indifferently given in miles or kilometres, an indication that they are the records of pioneer journeys measured by the speedometer of the particular car used.

9. Land Registration

The Ministry of Finance published an order on the 12th September instituting a system of land registration in the immediate vicinities of the towns of Mecca and Jedda. This is the first step to be taken in this connexion by the Hejaz-Nejd Government.

The ownership of land in the Hejaz is confined to Hejazi subjects, while in Nejd it is open to all.

11—Frontier Questions

10. Transjordan

(a) Although Mr. MacDonnell had arrived at Amman at the beginning of July to prepare for his investigation (August report, section 7), and telegraphic communication had been established, the investigation did not get under way until the 1st September. The investigator spent the 3rd to the 13th September examining the Hejaz-Nejd claims with the agent, who found that he had to make no less than 250 amendments to the 226 Hejaz-Nejd claims, amendments which affected place, date, raiders, raided loot and casualties. Eleven claims moreover were found not to lie against Transjordan tribes at all. These facts are mentioned to illustrate the care with which the Hejaz Government had investigated every detail of every claim, as they insisted in June, an investigation which they considered rendered any further investigation on the spot by Mr. MacDonnell a work of supererogation.

The opening meeting was held at Amman on the 15th September. Trouble and discord soon arose. The Hejaz-Nejd agent suggested on the 16th that he

agreed on the 27th October with His Majesty's Government and the Transjordan Government that the arbitration should be regarded as covering all raids made prior to the 1st August and that no claims should thereafter be made concerning them. Since the 1st August the Transjordan Government have registered protests caused the Ibn Jazi incident of the 24th), two on the 26th October and one on the 30th October, involving a total of some 1,100 camels. In the same period the Hejaz-Nejd Government have protested against twelve raids by Transjordan tribesmen, two in August three in September (the 1st, 2nd and 23rd) four in October (the 10th, 11th, 20th and 31st), and three in November (the 1st, 8th and 18th), involving five men and one woman killed and about 1,180 camels, taking a herd to average fifty.

(c) The results of His Majesty's Government's enquiry into the frontier situation, with particular reference to raiding (August report, section 7 (c)), were considered at an inter-departmental meeting held at the Colonial Office on the 26th August. The following recommendations were submitted on the 12th September for Treasury sanction:—

- (i) The Bedouin Control Board to be retained
- (ii) A Secret Service Fund of £2,000 per annum to be placed at the disposal of the officer commanding the Arab Legion.
- (iii) A British intelligence officer to be appointed to the Arab Legion;
- (iv) The mobile reserve to be mechanised, and
- (v) Three small intelligence posts to be established on the frontier at Mudawwana, Arrak and Imhash.

These decisions having been taken, a memorandum was drawn up by His Majesty's Government in reply to the Hejaz-Nejd Government's note of the 28th July and to portions of Ibn Saud's letters of the 23rd July and the 13th August to Sir A. Ryan (August report, section 7 (c)). The frontier situation was reviewed in detail. The Hejaz-Nejd Government were reminded that it was the policy of His Majesty's Government to encourage co-operation, exchange of information, and consultation on the part of the authorities of Transjordan and the Hejaz-Nejd that any real improvement in the control of raiding could be achieved. In order to remove any misunderstanding as to the extent of the efforts made on the Transjordan side to effect such an improvement, His Majesty's Government made a comprehensive and up to date statement regarding the control measures taken and contemplated in Transjordan. These measures included:—

- 1) The Bedouin Control Board.
- 2) The mechanisation of one company of the Transjordan Frontier Force.
- 3) The closing to Bedouin of an area lying between the eastern and southern frontiers of Transjordan and Bair, Jaffar and Tell Shalem.
- 4) The stationing of armoured car detachments and aircraft at the few water points in the southern desert of Transjordan and intensive reconnaissance work by aircraft.
- 5) A declaration by the Amir Abdullah as to the punishment of tribes who raided or instigated raiding or withheld information about raids.
- 6) Powers of arrest given to British detachments patrolling the frontier area and stationed at the water-points.
- 7) The appointment of a British intelligence officer on the establishment of the Arab Legion with powers to ensure respect for the decisions of the Bedouin Control Board of which he would be a member, and
- 8) The establishment of two advance intelligence posts at Arrak and Imhash (Bir Nam) the stationing of an intelligence detachment in the old Turkish fort near Mudawwana, and their provision with wireless apparatus.

The results of the enquiry into the frontier situation, with particular reference to raiding (August report, section 7 (c)), were considered at an inter-departmental meeting held at the Colonial Office on the 26th August. The following recommendations were submitted on the 12th September for Treasury sanction:—

occasions on which loot had been restored by the Transjordan authorities was given. With regard to the Hejaz-Nejd Government's charge that the raids into its territories were a series of hostile attacks conducted on a large scale, with a view to aggression, His Majesty's Government and the Transjordan Government had

In reply to the Hejaz-Nejd Government's disclaimer of responsibility for the future if the then frontier situation were to continue, His Majesty's Government drew their attention to the extreme gravity of any such refusal of responsibility. Such an attitude would not only constitute a denial of obligations clearly recognised by international law and custom, but would be entirely at variance

His Majesty's Government were unable to admit any such disclaimer of responsibility. Finally, Ibn Saud's attention was once more drawn to the importance of bringing into operation article 3 of the Hadda Agreement, whereby he had undertaken that constant communication should be maintained between the local authorities

their best to establish contact, but Ibn Saud, on his side, had not only done condition of any improvement of the frontier situation must be that the Hejaz-Nejd Government should lend their whole-hearted co-operation.

This memorandum was delivered by His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires on the 23rd October. Only a rather inconsequential interim reply has as yet been received, in which bitter complaint was made that, of two reports on a frontier incident, His Majesty's Government invariably accepted the one emanating from the British-controlled sources in preference to that of the Hejaz-Nejd authorities confidently vouched for by Fuad Bey himself.

A solitary attempt at co-operation followed and failed. On the 27th October His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires received and passed on at once to Amman a telegram from Mecca stating that a raiding party had started in the direction of Transjordan, and in the afternoon of the 28th October there to deal with it. As a matter of fact, the party had made two large raids on the 28th October, and were already safe home again with the loot.

In a note, dated the 16th October, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs transmitted a message from Ibn Saud to His Majesty's Government which dealt chiefly with the MacDonnell investigation but also made a somewhat pointed reference to the dangers which he expected would arise from the meeting of Transjordan and Hejaz-Nejd Bedouin when they went eastward and mingled in search of autumn pasture.

11. Iraq

(a) A reply is still awaited by the Hejaz-Nejd Government to its note of the 27th July to the Iraq Government inviting them to send a plenipotentiary to sign the "Bon-Voisinage" Treaty, and negotiate an extradition agreement. His Majesty's Government and the Hejaz-Nejd Government have been in communication since the 11th September and the 30th October have apparently not yet disclosed the reasons for the untoward delay.

(b) On the initiative of the Hejaz-Nejd Government, notes have been exchanged with the Iraq Government, and a series of communications and personal meetings of their frontier officials in order to deal with camel thefts and other incidents not to be dignified by the name of raids. The director of police in the Iraq Southern Desert has been authorised to meet for this purpose with the commander of the Nejd Desert. Ibn Arfaj is at present at Riyadh, probably to be relieved of that post, to which another appointment is expected.

The Hejaz-Nejd Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a note of the 14th August, based on the information furnished in the August report, section 6 (b), had mentioned the payment to His Majesty's Minister at Jeddah of £10,000 on this account (ibid.). For fear that the Iraqi Government should therefore claim the whole of the sum, which really was paid in pursuance of Ibn Saud's letter to Colonel Biscoe of the 27th June, and fell to be divided between Iraqi and Kuwait officers, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires was instructed in September to obtain a confirmation to this effect from the Hejaz-Nejd Government, and a

correspondent's report of the relevant passage in their note of the 29th August. Fuad Bey wrote a personal letter to Mr Hope Gill on the 9th September, unequivocally stating that this sum was that promised by Ibn Saud in January, but it proved impossible to induce him to write to Bagdad in the same sense. Personally, he seemed willing enough to correct his first misleading statement, but the King or Yusuf Yasin overrode him. The only likely explanation was thought to be that the matter of Ibn Mashhur still stuck in their gizzards (June report, paragraph 13 and (d) below).

In comment on the Hejaz-Nejd claim for £4,000 in respect of damages by aircraft (August report, section 8 (b)), the Air Council opined that the claim should be emphatically repudiated, there being verification of only two of the claims, in both of which cases the casualties were inflicted in Iraq or Kuwait territory on hostile parties engaged in raiding Iraq tribes, and after fire had been opened on the aircraft.

(c) A further reply was received from the Hejaz-Nejd Government and transmitted to Bagdad about the alleged activities of Ibn Saud's agents on the frontier marches of Iraq (August report, section 8 (d)). No comment on either answer has been received.

(d) The Ibn Mashhur affair is still unsettled (August report, section 8 (d)). The certain hope held in June that it would be disposed of in the near future has now been quite belied. At the end of August it was uncertain whether King Feisal would accept Ibn Saud's letter of pardon, but by the beginning of September this difficulty was tided over and news was received on the 3rd September that arrangements for Ibn Mashhur's journey via Damascus were being made. It was stated that the King had decided that Ibn Mashhur should reach the Hejaz. Thereupon Nuri Pasha telegraphed on the 10th September to Fuad Bey that Ibn Mashhur had been guaranteed absolute pardon in respect of his life, property and personal freedom and would travel to the Hejaz via Damascus. He asked for telegraphic confirmation.

Communication drew from Fuad Bey the reply that Ibn Saud's promise to King Feisal to grant "Amnan" to Ibn Mashhur needed no further confirmation and that it was impossible to agree to Ibn Mashhur coming by the Damascus route. Fuad Bey at once came to Jedda to talk the matter over with His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires. He explained to the latter that Ibn Saud's intention was not to dispossess Ibn Mashhur. His life was assured, and he would not be held to account for the crimes of *his majesty* and rebellion against the State, but would have to answer any civil claims for damages caused by his raids. Fuad Bey insisted, moreover, that the proposed method of his return offered no guarantee that he would leave Syria and reach the Hejaz or would, indeed, be allowed by the French to leave.

In transmitting these observations on the 14th September His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires pointed out that earlier in the year His Majesty's Government had stated that they could not agree to Ibn Mashhur's return to Syria except by consent of the French Government, in view of his past history and close association with Syrian rebels. He enquired whether it would not be possible to deliver the man by air to the Hejaz authorities at Wejh or the Hejaz-Nejd agent at Amman, where his presence might be opportune to the investigation of his raids by Mr MacDonnell. His Majesty's Government found that Fuad Bey's attitude was not reasonable and that the proposed method of his return would be reached with the Hejaz-Nejd for Ibn Mashhur's return by one or other of the more direct routes that had been mentioned or else by the authorities in the Iraq Southern Desert, but it was learned on the 10th September that King Feisal and ex King Ali regarded it as essential to their honour that Ibn Mashhur should go to Ibn Saud of his own free will. Various descriptions as an uncaptured Bedouin youth and a tall, intelligent fellow of 40, he refused to travel either by sea or by way of Nejd.

Ibn Saud at length, on the 7th October, received a telegram from King Feisal simply saying that Ibn Mashhur was proceeding. It was learned, however, on the 10th that he had not left, but that the Acting High Commissioner for Iraq had asked King Feisal that he should send Ibn Mashhur to Iraq with the proposed arrangements for his journey. His Majesty's Government had meanwhile suggested that Ibn Mashhur should be flown to Iraq and stopped there to

Jedda, or to Amman, and motored thence to Qaryat, but apparently Transjordan was considered too hot for him, and, in any case, he refused to fly. Both King Feisal and the Iraqi Government took full responsibility for his arrival at Damascus, and the Iraq Government took full responsibility for his arrival at Jedda and said they would send one of their own men with him.

On the 15th October His Majesty's Government telegraphed strongly to the Iraqi Government, stating that the Iraqi Government had definitely stated that he had no objection. The risk of his escape in Syria was very great and could not fail to have most serious consequences. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires expressed the fear, however, that it would be a waste of time and also impolitic to press Ibn Saud further to agree to the Syrian route, as the Iraqi Government's responsibility in circumstances over which neither of them would have full control.

On the 16th October the Iraqi Government telegraphed to His Majesty's Government, stating that the Iraqi Government had definitely stated that he had no objection. The risk of his escape in Syria was very great and could not fail to have most serious consequences. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires expressed the fear, however, that it would be a waste of time and also impolitic to press Ibn Saud further to agree to the Syrian route, as the Iraqi Government's responsibility in circumstances over which neither of them would have full control.

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On the 18th October the Iraqi Government telegraphed to His Majesty's Government, stating that the Iraqi Government had definitely stated that he had no objection. The risk of his escape in Syria was very great and could not fail to have most serious consequences. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires expressed the fear, however, that it would be a waste of time and also impolitic to press Ibn Saud further to agree to the Syrian route, as the Iraqi Government's responsibility in circumstances over which neither of them would have full control.

The latest news from Syria is to the effect that Ibn Mashhur has been informed that he was free to go to Iraq. He was prepared to surrender to the Iraqi Government. He was then in the hands of the Iraqi Government. He was then in the hands of the Iraqi Government. He was then in the hands of the Iraqi Government.

There, too, rests, for the moment, this unfortunate affair, which began on the 24th December, 1929, with Ibn Mashhur's escape into Iraq as a rebel from Ibn Saud, and has since done more than anything else to poison the friendly relations between Iraq and Hejaz-Nejd.

(e) The appointment in October of Dr Damlaji as Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs was not liked in Mecca. He was for many years Ibn Saud's Foreign Minister and left the Hejaz under a cloud in 1924. The Hejazi Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires that, while his

Government cannot, of course, interfere in what is primarily a domestic concern of the Iraq Government they cannot, nevertheless, correspond with the new Hejaz-Nejd Government through the Iraqi Prime Minister.

raised in September, when the Acting High Commissioner for Iraq forwarded to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires letters from ex King Ali and his sister to their agents in Jedda and Mecca with a request for their delivery. As the contents of the letters involved the use of His Majesty's Legation as an intermediary for the receipt of Hashimite revenues, the matter was referred to His Majesty's Government, who were of the opinion that, were the question of return of Ibn Mashhur satisfactorily disposed of and the "Bon Vo" Treaty signed, the situation might be easier, but that meanwhile much harm might be done by the intervention of His Majesty's Legation in the delicate question of Hashimite properties under the Saudian régime. Fresh letters were local bank, and delivery of the letters was duly effected by His Majesty's Legation.

12. Koweit

(a) The question of conducting negotiations on the Persian Gulf side of Arabia on the subject of the commercial blockade of Koweit and other Persian Gulf matters (August report, section 9 (a)) has been further studied but a decision has not yet been reached. A draft agreement on Nejd-Koweit affairs for presentation to Ibn Saud has also been under consideration.

(b) The activities of Ibn Arfaj (August report, section 9 (b)) have now been curbed by Ibn Saud himself, and an agreeable exchange of letters took place in October with the Sheikh of Koweit, who expressed himself as pleased and gratified at the turn of events.

13. Bahrein

A strong commission under Mohammed at Tawil was despatched to the Hase coast in September to study the commercial situation on the spot and to report on the possibilities of Nejd ports on the Persian Gulf. It is hoped to attract pilgrim traffic and eventually trade to these ports, and the commission's recommendations will in all probability aim at a short-circuiting of Bahrein and its transit dues, while creating new customs revenue for the Hejaz Nejd.

14. Yemen.

For years past it has been consistently rumoured that Ibn Saud was on the point of attacking the Imam Yahia. In November the tables were said to be turned and the Imam was to chastise Ibn Saud for meddling too deeply in Idrisi affairs (see 15 below). The latter did indeed despatch a thousand or two of his troops to the Yemen but they were not to be seen in connexion with his assumption of the administration of Idrisi Province.

15. Amir

As a result of the groundwork done since last May by two Royal Commissions, an encouraging letter from Ibn Saud, Sayyid-al-Hasan-al-Idrisi telegraphed to him on the 9th October entrusting him with the administration and finances of the Idrisi Province. The province had, of course, been declared a Saudian Protectorate in the Mecca Agreement of 1926, but its article 8 had expressly reserved the administration of the territory to Sayyid-al-Hasan. Ibn Saud replied to the letter with a letter of acceptance, and on the 11th October sent two formal letters of request from the Sayyid and his Legislative Council, couched in the most servile terms. The outstanding feature of the Sayyid's letter was his concern for his personal rights and honour and the regard due to his personal friends and relatives.

The Idrisi deputation and Saudian Council of Ministers sat in November in Mecca under the presidency of the Amir Faisal to elaborate the details of the

new administration. They submitted a report to Ibn Saud on the 18th November recommending that—

- (i) The Sayyid should remain as head of the Idrisi Government, all orders being issued in his name on behalf of Ibn Saud,
- (ii) Ibn Saud should appoint an Amir as chief executive officer
- (iii) A legislative council should assist the Amir with advice,
- (iv) Ibn Saud should appoint a director of finance;
- (v) Due regard should be paid to the Sayyid and his family in all respects, and
- (vi) All decisions of the council should be submitted for the Sayyid's approval, any subject of dissent between them being referred to Ibn Saud.

Ibn Saud thereupon issued a Royal Order dated the 20th November approving the above report and defining the composition and functions of the council and the powers of the Amir. The former are to foster the interests of the province, its commerce, agriculture, and education, provided that these do not clash with the interests of neighbourly relations and Bedouin affairs. The Amir is to be assisted by a council of five members, one of whom is to be the Sayyid. The Amir is to be assisted by a council of five members, one of whom is to be the Sayyid. The Amir is to be assisted by a council of five members, one of whom is to be the Sayyid. Hamad ash Shuwair has been appointed Amir of Amir.

111. International Relations

16. British Commonwealth

(a) On the occasion of the "R. 101" disaster, messages of condolence were despatched by the British Government to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to His Majesty's Government through the Legation.

(b) On the 10th November Sheikh Hafiz Wahba was received in audience by the British Government. He is the British Minister Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from the King of the Hejaz and Nejd and its Dependencies.

(c) On the 14th September the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs requested His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires to inform His Majesty's Government of the Hejaz Nejd Government's desire to appoint consuls at Bombay and Singapore for commercial and pilgrimage purposes. Mr Hope-Cull accordingly sought the views of His Majesty's Government. The initial reactions of the Governments of Bombay and Singapore were unfavourable to the proposal, but the matter is still under discussion.

(d) The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has shown an increased disposition to minimise the difficulties of conducting business between his Ministry in Taif and Mecca and His Majesty's Legation at Jedda. He has visited Jedda from the 30th August to the 2nd September, the 29th September to the 1st October, and the 10th to the 12th November, when he accompanied the Amir Faisal. On the latter occasion His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires was assured that the latter's appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs with Fuad Bey as his Under-Secretary at Jedda was imminent. It still is.

17. Italy

Much the same impression in regard to Italy's waned interest in the Yemen as was noted in the February report is now being gathered in Egypt. Italy now sees the Soviets advancing towards the commercial position in the Imam's dominions which she coveted for herself.

18. Germany

(a) The treaty of friendship between Germany and the Hejaz Nejd of the 26th April, 1929, ratified by Ibn Saud on the 7th June, 1929, and approved by the German Law of the 28th July, 1930, came into force on the 8th November with

(b) Herr Heinrich de Haas, son of the head of the Western Department of the German Foreign Office, arrived in Jeddah on the 5th October. A man of about 35, born in Australia and speaking fluent English, he is studying the commercial possibilities of the Hejaz. He is believed to be well connected and will probably represent Germany as consul. German interests are at present unofficially in Dutch hands.

The Egyptian consul visited Mecca several times during October and November to discuss with Ibn Saud and his Ministers an improved *modus vivendi* between the two countries. It proved impossible, as yet, to warrant the special visit which Ashmuni Bey made to Cairo at the end of November.

The English text of the Money Order Agreement with the Hejaz, signed by the Postmaster-General of Palestine, was remitted on the 14th November to the Hejaz-Nejd Government for their signature and communication of the Arabic text.

21 *Hera's Air Force*

Darin-Shaibah, 310 miles. 3 hours 50 minutes
 Shaibah Hinaidi, 290 miles. 3 hours 35 minutes
 Hinaidi-Rutba, 240 miles. 3 hours
 Rutba-Amman, 292 miles. 3 hours 35 minutes
 Amman-Maan, 125 miles: 1 hour 45 minutes
 Ma'an-Wejh, 240 miles. 3 hours 30 minutes
 Wejh-Yenbo, 174 miles. 2 hours 10 minutes
 Yenbo-Jedda, 197 miles. 2 hours 35 minutes

The Hejaz-Nejd Government approached His Majesty's Government in October 1917 for the sale of 100,000 rounds of two inch anti-aircraft cartridges and the supply of Vickers and Lewis guns and spare parts for the Wapitis.

The formation of this society in November marked a step forward, which at present is a veritable step into space. Its avowed objects are to encourage aviation in Ibn Saud's dominions and morally and materially to help the Hejaz-Nejd army by presenting machines and equipment for training the youth of

Arabia to fly. There probably never was a country less scientifically inclined or a youth more completely lacking in essential qualifications. The jost sounds all the more hollow against its hacking of empty coffers, private as well as public.

Gulf on the 19th September, and taxied into Nejd territorial waters to shelter behind Abn Ali Island. A second boat having brought spares, they both left for Basra the next morning. This technical infringement of a jealously guarded sovereignty was duly communicated with the necessary explanation to the Hejaz-Nejd Government. The only relevant comment of the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs was that to deny shelter would be inhuman.

24 Yemen "Front"

About 1,800 Ataiba tribesmen are reported to have been moved southward into Asir, probably as a precautionary measure against any movement on the part of the Imam hostile to the new Idrisi régime (see 14 above).

The late Agent's comments (~~the~~^a ~~concentration at Mafraq~~^{concentrated at Mafraq}) (A-907 report, section 28) were to some extent confirmed by information which reached the Transjordan authorities in September. No further reports, however, have been received to indicate that anything unusual is brewing. The tribal concentrations, which seem undoubtedly to have taken place, may have been in the nature of a census of fighting men in connexion with the military organisation of the country.

[illegible]

A Syrian refugee, Nabih al Adhima, who saw service for some time in the Turkish army, was appointed Director of Military Organisation in September and has since carried out a tour of inspection as far north as Khurayba on the Hejaz coast. There was talk of placing the Hejaz Air Force under his command but, in view of its special nature, it has been reserved to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

27 None of His Majesty's ships visited Jeddah during the period under review. The French despatch vessel "Montmirail" entered on the 6th September to return the French Chargé d'Affaires from his visit to the Yemen, and left on the 8th.

28. "Aug."

The report of the court of enquiry held at Marseilles on the burning of the Arabian has now been completed. It was assumed that a formal statement disclosure of the findings of the Hejaz committee (August report, section 29). The captain and crew are not advised to leave the ship until the French authorities have been informed of the findings of the court of enquiry and the reaction of French logic to the breach of the custom which would have a captain be the last to leave his ship.

The wreck is in the hands of the underwriters, who are represented in Jedda by Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. The local authorities made an attempt to

intervene in October, stating that, having taken charge of the hulk, they wanted a receipt for one of its boats which the firm holds, but on being asked for a receipt for the "Asia" they quickly let the matter drop.

29. Forged Rupee Notes.

The Government of India decided to take no action themselves with a view to having the forgers and dealers entrapped through the agency of the Indian vice-consul. The French consul, however, reported (see section 32) that the matter be entrusted to the French authorities, but declared themselves to be vitally interested and ready liberally to recognise any good work done by officials or private persons. His Majesty's Munshi Ihsanullah in the hands of the *Sûreté générale*, and a plan elaborated by the munshi was agreed upon. Unfortunately, it was badly handled by the French inspector in charge and failed. His leave having expired, Ihsanullah returned disconsolate to Jeddah, but letters followed him from Syria which showed season. At the end of November, therefore, he was applying his undoubted talents to another MacLave plan to entice the gang's chief broker once more into the hands of the police.

30. 1931 Pilgrimage

The first pilgrim ship from the Dutch East Indies arrived on the 11th November, nine ships had arrived by the end of the month, bringing just over 3,000 pilgrims, chiefly Javanese, but including a few Malays. Last year the first ship arrived on the 10th November, and the first nine ships brought nearly 8,000 pilgrims. The fall is symptomatic of world conditions, and foretells an extremely lean year for the Hejaz, the great majority of whose population lives and used to huddle upon the devout of Islam.

Viceroy's visit of the 10th November to Jeddah to put the finishing touches, there was much unpreparedness and the usual alarms and excursions. Pilgrims who had landed in the morning were still penned in the customs late at night. The quantity of their own—was subjected without warning to an import duty, a hitherto unheard-of imposition. A few days later the tax had to be repealed, but was replaced by a new poll-tax of 5 pence exacted from the pilgrims indirectly. The Government has this year secured to itself and sent all their pilgrims to Mecca sessions by a Royal decree which was only annulled to be replaced by another ordaining that all pilgrims must hereafter visit the Holy Places by motor car. Now making common cause with the carpenters, the traditional hirers of camels, letters, to induce the Government to meet the debts which they have contracted by their preparations for normal pilgrimage custom.

As position as to the dues and taxes payable by this year's pilgrims is still officially obscured. The Hejaz Nejd Government have been pressed for the tariff but have not yet thought fit to communicate it. The truth of course is that it is still in a state of flux. Opportunist measures are being taken at the eleventh hour to minimise as much as possible the effects of what is now foreseen until the extra burden which can be placed on such pilgrims, as do come, has been calculated by trial and error.

VIII. SLAVES

31. During the period under review four slaves were manumitted by the Legation and repatriated to the Sudan, and two were manumitted locally. With a view to preventing runaway slaves from reaching Jeddah, orders have been issued in the interior requiring all negroes to carry travel permits from a recognised authority whenever they wish to move.

IX. Miscellaneous

1. The "Umm al Qura"

The "Umm al Qura" has been interesting itself in the history of Nejd and published on the 5th September a list of old Arabic historians and historical documents. It also stated that one Abdullah al Anqari has been commissioned to write a modern history of Nejd. The paper has also been publishing Sheikh Yusuf Yassin's journal of the 1929 rebellion in weekly instalments.

Mr Philby's "Arabia," published in September in Beun's "Modern World" series edited by Mr H. A. L. Fisher, is not so much a history of Arabia as a detailed and biased account of Wahhabism as such it is excellent.

33. Reuter

Reuter's agents in Jeddah, Messrs Gelatly, Hankey and Co., have been examining the possibility of introducing a daily news-service for the Hejaz. News from the outside world at present drifts in with the mails at irregular weekly or ten day intervals.

34. Legation Personnel

Mr. Seager, on the 9th November. The Malay pilgrimage officer (Ispah) Abdul Majid, arrived on the 28th November for his pilgrimage season.

Meteorological

Observations taken within doors at the Legation show the following averages of office temperature and atmospheric humidity for the six months ended the 30th November—

Month	Humidity		Temperature	
	Max.	Min.	Average	Lowest
Jan.	82	62	72	50
Feb.	82	62	72	50
Mar.	82	62	72	50
Apr.	82	62	72	50
May	82	62	72	50
June	82	62	72	50

There were four short "simoon" spells in June, four in July, five in August, one in October, and two in November, when a hot desert wind blew for a few hours and humidity dropped to between 50 per cent and 25 per cent.

The first rain fell in a thunderstorm of the 23rd (about 3 inches). Rain fell again on the 29th November (about 1/4 inch).

Wind was 90 per cent constant and 90 per cent. W N W

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No 3

Sir A. Ryan to Mr A. Henricson.—(Received January 19, 1931)

(No. 373)

Sir,

Jeddah, December 23, 1930.

In my telegram No. 246 of the 19th December I had the honour to report that I had arrived at Jeddah on that day on my return from leave. It may be worth while to record the additional fact that Fuad Bey Hamza, now Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had been in Jeddah on the 19th and to present his personal greetings. He met me at the custom-house and

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delivered cordial messages from Ibn Saud, accompanied by an expression of regret that he had been compelled to time his departure for Riyadh so that it coincided with my arrival. Fuad Bey, who will certainly continue to play the leading rôle in foreign affairs, especially as regards the maintenance of relations with foreign representatives, was most effusive in his personal welcome to my wife and myself.

2. Fuad Bey had to return to Mecca the same afternoon as the King was under Secretary and am unlikely to see the King himself for at least two months, possibly a good deal longer.

3. The cordiality of my reception shows that Ibn Saud desires to stand well with His Majesty's Government. Any optimism that I might be tempted to feel is discounted by the prospect of having to deal with various contentious questions and more especially by the blackness of the financial outlook, which is worse than when I left in August. It is now such that I shall inevitably have to bring strong pressure to bear to procure the settlement of outstanding debts, like that due to the Eastern Telegraph Company in respect of telegrams despatched by the Port Sudan cable and the considerable amounts due to Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. (Limited).

I have &c
ANDREW RYAN

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No. 4

Sir A. Ryan to Mr A. Henderson - (Received January 19, 1931)

(No 374.)

Sir,

Jedda, December 30, 1930

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith a copy of a Green Book issued by the Hejaz Nejd Government containing the text of the treaty between the Hejaz Nejd and Turkey, which was signed by Fuad Bey Hamza and Abdul Ghani Bey, the Turkish representative here, at Mecca on the 3rd August, 1929. I enclose a translation of the preliminary portion of the treaty, which is followed by a despatch from Constantinople, No. 161 of the 21st May last.

2. The Green Book also contains the following texts, viz. —

A decree of Ibn Saud, dated the 21st November, 1930, approving the treaty. Notes exchanged between Seni Bey and Fuad Bey Hamza on the 10th December, 1930, recording the promulgation of the Turkish law of the 15th May, 1930, sanctioning the treaty, and a subsequent agreement.

The protocol of exchange of ratifications signed by Fuad Bey Hamza and Seni Bey on the 10th December, 1930.

3. I enclose a translation of the last of the documents mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

I have &c
ANDREW RYAN

Enclosure 1 in No. 4

Printed

In the name of the Most Merciful, the Compassionate Praise be to God alone. Prayers and peace be upon the last Prophet We, Abdul Aziz Ibn Abdurrahman al Faisal Al-Saud, King of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies,

Whereas a Treaty of Friendship has been concluded between us and his Excellency the President of the Turkish Republic, with a view to establishing and strengthening the relations between our countries, and signed by a

(*) Not printed.

plenipotentiary on behalf of his Excellency and a plenipotentiary on our behalf, both being fully and mutually authorised, at Mecca Mukarrama on the twenty seventh day of Safar, in the year one thousand three hundred and forty-eight Hejri (corresponding to the 3rd August, 1930)

It is as follows:—

In the name of God the Most Merciful, the Compassionate

The Kingdom of Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies on the one part, and the Turkish Republic on the other,

Being desirous of strengthening, of firmly establishing and of placing on a basis of mutual good understanding the sincere friendly relations existing between them.

Have decided to conclude a Treaty of Friendship and Good Understanding

For this purpose His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies appointed his Excellency Fuad Bey Hamza, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, and his Excellency the President of the Turkish Republic

Turkish Republic in the Hejaz, as plenipotentiaries on their behalf

After their credentials had been exchanged and found valid, they agreed on the following articles

(Text as given in enclosure to Mr Edmond's despatch No. 161 of the 21st May, 1930, to Foreign Office) (*)

Enclosure 2 in No. 4

Range of Ratification Decrees of the Treaty of Friendship and Good Understanding concluded between the Kingdom of Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies and the Turkish Republic

THE undersigned, who are authorized by their Governments to exchange the ratification decrees of the Treaty of Friendship and Good Understanding signed at Mecca Mukarrama on the 27th Safar 1348 (corresponding to the 3rd August, 1929), between the Kingdom of Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies and the Turkish Republic have met on the date undermentioned

After checking the two documents and finding them true copies, they have drawn up this protocol to signify that the said exchange has taken place officially

Written at Jedda this 20th day of Rajab, 1349 (corresponding to the 10th December, 1930)

FUAD HAMZA

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,—

A. SENI

Turkish Charge d'Affaires

(*) Ratification in Section 8, May 24, 1930.

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No. 1

Mr A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No 32.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 19, 1931

WITH reference to Foreign Office despatch No. 198 of the 16th September, 1929, to Mr Bond, I transmit to you, for your information and guidance, the copy of a revised memorandum of instructions on the question of the channels for communication with King Ibn Saud and the Hejaz-Nejd Government, to be used by the British authorities in neighbouring countries.

2. The memorandum has been drawn up in the light of your conversations with the other Departments of His Majesty's Government concerned. It is being

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issued as an instruction to the High Commissioners for Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and other British officials in the Near and Middle East concerned.

3. The instructions therein should be regarded as superseding those contained in the memorandum enclosed in the Foreign Office despatch referred to above.

I have, &c

ARTHUR HENDERSON

Enclosure in No. 5

Memorandum respecting Communications with Ibn Saud and the Hejaz-Nejd Government

THE creation of a British Legation at Jeddah and the establishment of more normal diplomatic relations with King Ibn Saud have necessitated a revision of the arrangements embodied in the Foreign Office memorandum of the 16th September, 1929 (enclosed in the despatch No. 188 of the same date to His Majesty's agent and consul at Jeddah), which is superseded in its entirety by the present memorandum.

2. It is desired in future to conduct relations with King Ibn Saud and his Government as far as possible in accordance with the usual diplomatic procedure. Matters which appear to the British authorities in Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan, the Persian Gulf and elsewhere to require representations to King Ibn Saud or his Government will, therefore, normally be referred by the High Commissioners, the Political Resident, &c., to the respective Government Departments in London, if they involve questions of policy or direct to His Majesty's Legation at Jeddah, if of lesser importance. Copies of despatches sent to London should, save in exceptional circumstances, be sent direct to Jeddah, and telegrams repeated to that post. Similarly, in the case of despatches and telegrams addressed direct to Jeddah, copies and repetitions should be sent to London.

3. When reports are addressed to His Majesty's Government, the Foreign Office will issue any necessary instructions to His Majesty's Minister at Jeddah as to the form of any representations which he considers he can properly make to the Hejazi authorities without seeking or awaiting instructions from His Majesty's Government.

4. The British authorities in Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan, the Persian Gulf, &c., may use their discretion as to drafting any proposed representations in the form of a memorandum suitable for transmission verbatim to the Hejaz-Nejd authorities. This procedure may conveniently be followed when the subject matter consists mainly of a recital of facts. In all cases, however, His Majesty's Minister will have discretion to use the memorandum as he thinks fit. He will also have discretion, if he elects to forward the memorandum, to introduce minor alterations of language not affecting the sense of the document.

5. It is realised that, when King Ibn Saud is in parts of Arabia remote from Jeddah, and within easier reach of Bagdad, Amman, or the Persian Gulf, cases may arise of such importance and urgency as to make it desirable that the views of His Majesty's Government or the British authorities concerned should

indicating the reasons for and the nature of the proposed representations, and repeating their telegram to His Majesty's Minister at Jeddah. They should not, however, actually despatch such communications to King Ibn Saud until they receive the approval of His Majesty's Government, save in some exceptional emergency, when circumstances render it essential in their opinion, that they should act without awaiting sanction. Should this be done, their action and the reasons for it should simultaneously be reported by telegram to His Majesty's Government and the telegram repeated to His Majesty's Minister at Jeddah.

6. In certain cases, e.g., when King Ibn Saud has been in personal relations with the British authorities, it may be necessary for the British authorities to possibly address letters direct to such authorities. In such cases the officer

addressed should, unless the subject of the letter is of minor importance, obtain, before replying, the instructions of the senior British representative in the territory concerned, or, in the case of the territories bordering on the Persian Gulf, of the Political Resident, and in all cases, even if he replies without doing this, copies of the correspondence should be sent through the usual channels to His Majesty's Government and to His Majesty's Minister at Jeddah. It is not desired to encourage communications of this kind, but they may on certain

especially if they arise out of personal friendly relations, be provided (a) that the matters dealt with are, in fact, of such importance that the necessary steps are taken to keep His Majesty's Government and His Majesty's Minister at Jeddah fully informed by despatch or telegram, as the case may be, of all matters affecting those authorities, regarding which he is in communication with the Foreign Office or the Hejaz-Nejd authorities. He will normally leave it to the authorities concerned, more especially the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to supply the Government of India with information, where this may be necessary, but, in cases immediately affecting that Government or having an important bearing on Moslem reactions, he will communicate direct with the Political and Foreign Secretary to the Government of India.

Foreign Office, January 18 1931

E 418 2 25]

No. 6

*High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, -
(Received in Foreign Office, January 25.)*

(No. 51)

(Telegraphic) P

Bagdad, January 23, 1931

AS regards condition (a) in Jeddah telegram No. 1 to Foreign Office Prime Minister states that having signed "Bon Voyage" Agreement he would, of course, get it ratified as soon as possible, but that unless he can go to Jeddah during present session of Iraqi Parliament, ratification will have to be left over till next session, which opens on 1st November.

As regards condition (b) Prime Minister says he has no intention of taking up a non possumus attitude, but is quite ready to consider any proposal put forward by Hejaz-Nejd Government as soon as "Bon Voyage" Agreement is signed. I am requesting him to send a letter in this sense superseding letter No. 4178 of 11th December, and I will discuss with him question raised in penultimate paragraph of Jeddah telegram under reference as soon as I receive views of His Majesty's Government thereon. If Prime Minister's proposal is approved in principle King Faisal will doubtless communicate with Ibn Saud as suggested, but I can scarcely ask him to do so until His Majesty's Government have concurred in the proposal.

(Repeated to Jeddah No. 3)

E 408 408 25]

No. 7.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson. - (Received January 26.)

No. 6.)

Jeddah, January 8 1931

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the usual confidential report on the heads of the other foreign missions at this post.

I have, &c

ANDREW RYAN

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*Report on Heads of Foreign Missions at Jedda.**Egypt*

THE Egyptian representative, M. Hassan (or Hassan Bey) El-Achmouni, has no definite status owing to the non-existence of normal relations between Egypt and Ibn Saud, but calls himself consul. He is an intelligent young man of perhaps not more than 30, and is a good example of a modern-minded Egyptian. Moslem colleagues are, but he seems to keep in pretty close touch with the latter and with local circles. He shows every sign of desiring to stand well with the British Legation. He is always pleasant and sometimes quite interesting in conversation. Altogether he sustains a difficult position very happily. He is

France

M. Roger Maigret, who occupies the peculiar position of being *Chargé d'Affaires*, has had a long career in the French Near East service, and was employed for some twenty years in Morocco, including Tangier, where, I believe, he was employed up to 1921. He was subsequently employed in Iraq, whence he came to his post here. I have heard it vaguely suggested that he was not well regarded in Morocco, but cannot vouch for this. He is intelligent and witty, and has a considerable knowledge of Arab countries. In his lighter moments he claims also to know a great deal of the Persian underworld, having cultivated *apaches* in his conscript days. As we have both been in Morocco, though at different times, I know him, however, rather too intimately on the personal side and rather too reticent about the affairs which now interests us both officially. He has little social value of a general kind, for, though he has a passion for Arabian travel, he sticks very tight in his house when in Jedda. I have not heard him speak English but he appears to have considerable book knowledge of this language, and has already completed a French translation of Mr. Philby's recent work on "Arabia".

He is married, but appears to be permanently separated from his Spanish or half-Spanish wife. She has never come to Jedda. A venerable mother has recently come to live with M. Maigret instead.

Italy

has not yet established normal relations with Ibn Saud. He is a youngish man of about 35, but not aggressively Fascist. He speaks French reasonably well. He is a man of good average intelligence and definite views. He finds himself I think, rather overshadowed by the Italian administrators in Eritrea. He does not seem to care much for society, but I find him an agreeable and useful colleague, very ready to exchange information on matters of interest.

M. Sollazzo married not long ago an attractive and pleasant but not very interesting Italian wife. She shares all his vicissitudes, but they both dislike Jedda.

Netherlands

M. D. van der Meulen, formerly consul and now *Chargé d'Affaires*, is a member of the Dutch East Indian service, in accordance with an elaborate system designed to make the Dutch representative here a trained specialist in Moslem affairs and pilgrimage matters. He is a man of about 35. He speaks English and French very well, and lives up to the traditional intimacy between the British and Dutch communities in Jedda, being himself sociable and extremely keen on sport. He is a thoroughly good colleague and always ready to exchange views on matters of common interest in the most friendly spirit. He will soon make way for his successor M. Adrianse, who has already arrived in accordance with the system mentioned above.

M. van der Meulen is married, but he has six young children, and his wife stays in Holland to look after them.

Persia

M. Habibulla (or Habibulla Khan) Hoveida, born in the days of Persian titles that of *Ain-ul-Mulk*. He was "diplomatic representative" when I arrived and is now *Chargé d'Affaires*. He is a Persian Moslem, but his special habitat appears to be in Syria. He is an elderly man. He was recommended to my favourable attention by Sir R. Clive, but I fear that I find him unattractive, in spite of his great desire to please and his ability to speak English passably. I have heard him accused of making so much per head out of his pilgrims, but have no reason to believe a charge so easy to invent in connexion with the representative of a country like Persia in a country like this. He left Jedda some six months ago. Shortly afterwards, the junior whom he left in charge went away also, leaving the post vacant. Little seems to have been heard of either since then, and the Persian Legation is not effectively occupied. I much doubt whether M. Hoveida will return. His health suffered here and I rather think that he covets the post of Persian representative at Cairo.

Soviet Russia

M. Nezir (sometimes called Nezir Bey) Touracoulov, the only Minister besides myself, presented letters before me, and is therefore doyen of the Diplomatic Body. He comes from Turkistan, and is a round-headed young man with distinctly Tartar features. He seems fairly intelligent, and has learnt enough French and Arabic since he came here a couple of years ago to carry on conversation in those languages. He usually talks Turkish, which he knows better, on the comparatively rare occasions when we meet. He has a sound, simple sense of humour and is an agreeable companion, but he goes little into

one occasion on which I had occasion to seek information from him on a non-political matter connected with public health he was very helpful. He presents no appearance of wishing to make a splash. He strikes me as a sure, straightforward person, rather more interested in commercial and economic subjects than

She is a professional doctor or nurse, and left Jedda before I arrived in May to take charge of some sort of institution in Moscow. She has not returned.

Turkey

Abdul-Ghani Seni Bey, the Turkish *Chargé d'Affaires*, is an elderly official of long service, partly I believe, in Macedonia, mostly in what were the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, including the Yemen. He seems to have few strong interests, and speaks French only indifferently. As however, we can converse in Turkish and have Turkish memories in common, we get on together very well indeed. Although a fairly typical old Turk of the better class, he is sufficient modern-minded to rejoice in his only daughter's being brought up to be a bacteriologist in Beirut.

Mine, Seni Bey is a Turkish lady from Salonica, much younger than her husband. She is a very agreeable, unaffected woman. She dresses and comports herself in an entirely European way, and last June she produced the best of the few dinners that I have had outside my own house in Jedda.

E 487 487 25

No. 8

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda)

No. 14.

Foreign Office January 29, 1931

No. 462 of 27th November. Relations between Ibn Saud and the Yemen.

Italian *Chargé d'Affaires* states that alarmist reports from Governor of Eritrea regarding situation on Asir-Yemen frontier have reached Italian

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Government, who are willing to urge counsels of moderation on the Imam are anxious that His Majesty's Government should give corresponding advice to Ibn Saud in the hope of preventing a conflict.

Italian Chargé d'Affaires was informed that I had no reason to view situation with special anxiety. If, however, definite information should at any time reach you indicating danger of outbreak of hostilities, and in your opinion your discretion, urge Ibn Saud or his Government to refrain from embarking on policy of adventure which could only injure best interests of Arabia as a whole.

E 507 487 25

No. 9

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson. (Received February 1)

(No. 18)

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, January 31, 1931

YOC R telegram No. 14

Information here, not valuable in itself, supports generally Aden intelligence reports of 20th and 27th December regarding Imam's preparations.

Other local reports, which I have no means of verifying, indicate that Ibn Saud has been sending to Asir forces important in aggregate though despatched in small parties. Informant suggests total of several thousand men, but I am slow to accept figure so large. Action of this kind may be due to desire for effective occupation of Asir, and I have no recent indication of intention on the King's part to initiate hostilities against Yemen. I consider representations at present time would be premature, though I might mention the subject generally to Ibn Saud when I see him personally.

Crucial factor seems to me to be reaction of Imam himself to practical situation of Asir. Can Italian Government or Aden throw further light on this?

My knowledge of past history is imperfect. It would assist me to know (a) whether any definite representations have been made to this Government since date of 9th September, 1927 (Jedda despatch No. 102 of 16th September) and (b) whether any such representations have been made to this Government since such as those recorded in Clayton's despatch to Colonial Office of 16th July, 1928, regarding non-interference by His Majesty's Government in internal affairs of Arabia.

It would also help if Italian consul here were instructed to exchange views on this information with me.

E 524 524 25

No. 10.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson. (Received February 2)

(No. 13)

Sir,

Jedda, January 12, 1931

WITH reference to Mr. Bond's despatch No. 25 of the 20th January, 1930 I have the honour to state that the anniversary of King Ibn Saud's accession was celebrated for the second time on the 8th and 9th of this month in accordance with

On this occasion there was no delegation of the Egyptian press, but there was a sufficiency of journalists to provide for publicity and innumerable photographs were taken by all sorts of people. The most active press representative present was one Mahir Bey, an Arab of Mosul origin, who seems to have his headquarters at The Hague at present and whose main line appears to be the supply of European news to the papers of the Arab countries.

2. I had received your permission to attend the banquet, which I understood would be given at the Hotel de Ville. I considered it politically desirable to be present, notwithstanding the mourning ordered by His Majesty the King for the Princess Royal. I learnt later that

there were to be four principal functions to which foreign representatives were invited. As the head of the only mission of first-class political importance here, I

and Mecca, especially as I had had no previous opportunity of meeting the Emir Feisal, who now combines the functions of Minister for Foreign Affairs with those of Viceroy of the Hejaz. I therefore accepted the various invitations. One of the social functions projected, a tea party at Knadara on the afternoon of the 8th, was in the event countermanded. Although no express reason was given, I was told privately by Fuad Bey Hamza that this change in the programme was intended as a mark of respect to the memory of the Princess Royal. I felt it all the more incumbent on me to attend the other functions. In my private letter thanking Fuad Bey and expressing satisfaction, I added that the gesture of the local authorities would be greatly appreciated in England and explained that I was interrupting a period of mourning for an event deeply felt at home in order to be present at the various celebrations.

3. On the morning of the 8th January, my colleagues and I called on the Acting Governor of Jedda. Early in the afternoon the Emir Feisal gave me a special interview, which had been arranged by Fuad Bey. His Royal Highness was very civil and very nervous. I cannot say that my first impression of him was favourable. He has the fine features of his family and he does not show in his face the signs of dissipation which I expected. He lacks, however, both the charm and the physique of his father and his elder brother, the Emir Saud. In repose he wears a look of jaded melancholy and listlessness, and his smiles, though agreeable, are sickly. In my own slight intercourse with him on the 8th and 9th January, he gave little evidence of resources or intellect, though I noticed that with his own entourage he seemed confident and quick in decision. The interpreter whom he employed at my private interview was incapable. I had not intended to talk much business on such an occasion and, owing to the difficulty of getting anything of importance translated, I limited myself still further. I enquired as to whether my letters to Fuad Hamza and the King in connexion with the proposed visit of C. Lloyd P. to the Hejaz had been forwarded. I might be expected to arrive. The Prince said that he had forwarded the letters, but his reply to my second question was hopelessly vague. My only other attempt at business was to appeal to the Prince on behalf of two prisoners, one a British Indian, who has been detained too long on a doubtful charge, the other, a Hadrami, who may be guilty of a serious offence, but who appears to have been barbarously treated. I evoked the custom of using clemency on royal anniversaries and the Prince promised to look into the two cases.

4. The evening of the 8th January was spent at the Knadara, where the Emir Feisal gave a large reception. The Emir Feisal was very civil and very nervous. I cannot say that my first impression of him was favourable. He has the fine features of his family and he does not show in his face the signs of dissipation which I expected. He lacks, however, both the charm and the physique of his father and his elder brother, the Emir Saud. In repose he wears a look of jaded melancholy and listlessness, and his smiles, though agreeable, are sickly. In my own slight intercourse with him on the 8th and 9th January, he gave little evidence of resources or intellect, though I noticed that with his own entourage he seemed confident and quick in decision. The interpreter whom he employed at my private interview was incapable. I had not intended to talk much business on such an occasion and, owing to the difficulty of getting anything of importance translated, I limited myself still further. I enquired as to whether my letters to Fuad Hamza and the King in connexion with the proposed visit of C. Lloyd P. to the Hejaz had been forwarded. I might be expected to arrive. The Prince said that he had forwarded the letters, but his reply to my second question was hopelessly vague. My only other attempt at business was to appeal to the Prince on behalf of two prisoners, one a British Indian, who has been detained too long on a doubtful charge, the other, a Hadrami, who may be guilty of a serious offence, but who appears to have been barbarously treated. I evoked the custom of using clemency on royal anniversaries and the Prince promised to look into the two cases.

5. The first day ended with a dinner of about 120 covers at Kandara. The Emir who was to have presided, excused himself at the last moment on grounds of slight indisposition. Otherwise, the arrangements were excellent. Only two speeches were allowed. The first and more important consisted of a lengthy review of Ibn Saud's efforts in various directions. International relations were touched on and reference was made to the rapprochement with Iraq resulting from the meeting of the two Kings on board H.M.S. "Lupin." It was remarked that no mention was made of Egypt, an omission the more striking as it is understood that recent negotiations, though their scope and prospects of success have been exaggerated, have afforded promise of a better understanding between the two Governments. At the end of dinner in reply to the references which had been made to the diplomatic representatives.

6. Mr Hope-Gill and I started early on the 16th January for Wady Fatma to attend the celebration organized there by the municipality of Mecca. The programme was a heavy one. There were some twenty four speeches, poems and set pieces recited by schoolboys, before and after luncheon. The Emir presided with hardly concealed boredom, though he was himself the object of the most eloquent eulogies. He was at his best with some children of the Royal family, including his own son, who flitted in and out of the reception tent. One of the items was a set piece welcoming the Prince and the foreign representatives, delivered in English by a Mecca schoolboy. His nervousness contrasted strongly with the aplomb of his comrades, who produced their Arabic effusions from lungs of bronze, and he boggled sadly, poor child, over the hard word "representatives." Another interesting school item was a case heard before the Cadi between advocates of pen and sword. The sword was very large and the pen very little. The Cadi, in a nicely balanced judgment, declared them both to be servants of equal utility as such, and reconciled the advocates in a handshake. One poet gracefully compared the Emir and the diplomatic representatives to the moon surrounded by stars. His comparison was apter than he knew for our Minister are very fixed in Jeddah. The proceedings were punctuated by choral singing. The chants were introduced as the "Song of the Fatherland." At least 200 guests sat down to an excellent luncheon served at one long table in a marquee. The day ended with a fantastic war dance by Najdi tribesmen, a barbaric pantomime full of life and colour. At the outset the dance centered on a gigantic Royal Standard but before long standard and standard bearer were dancing with the most active.

7. Not only had Egypt been ignored in the speech of the evening but the Egyptian consul had been given a comparatively poor place at table. These circumstances may account for his absence from the Wady Fatma party. Some

8. I apologise for the length at which I have described these proceedings. They are worthy of attention for various reasons. It was suggested last year that such a celebration was un-Islamic. The contrary view has triumphed. Secondly, no one present could fail to be struck by the element of Saudian propaganda and the strong insistence on his successes as being great Arab achievements. Lastly, the element of compromise between Wahabi strictness and European ideas, which Mr Bond noticed last year was again definitely present. The intervals for prayer were duly observed, but during the Prince's absence many members of his entourage strolled with us under the palms and smoked freely in our company. Although the music at the Wady Fatma party was all sung the inhabitants of the district used musical instruments undisturbed within earshot of us, nor was there any lack of drums in the war dance.

I have, &c
ANDREW RYAN

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No. 11

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 2.)

No. 14)

Sir,

Jeddah, January 14, 1931

WITH reference to my printed despatch No. 343 of the 10th December last, I have the honour to state that the Mecca paper "Umm-al-Qura" published in its issue of the 19th December the proposed regulations of the "Arab Aeronautical Society" together with an eloquent appeal for support addressed by the committee

to every Arab who wishes his nation to be powerful and respected, to every Moslem whose heart is touched by his Holy Land.

2. I enclose a summary of the regulations. The accompanying appeal is full of religious fervour. The writers call for union and co-operation in the attainment of the society's objects, namely, "the establishment of an air force in this country and the training of the people of the country in work of a kind which has become part of the power and trade of the world." They invoke the example of other countries than the great traditions enshrined in Arabian and Islamic history from the time of the Prophet. After meeting to consider the regulations and to enable every Moslem, the committee with a verse from the Koran enjoining on the faithful to prepare power and horses wherewith to strike fear into God's enemies and their own and promising full recompense to those that give for the purposes of God.

3. You will observe that while the project is commended more particularly to Hejazis and Nejdais the appeal is not confined to them and the Islamic character of the society is stressed no less than its national character. It may be assumed that a considerable drive will be made to ensure liberal financial support on the part of persons amenable to Government influence like the townspeople of Jeddah and the Holy Cities. The Government, in their present impoverished condition doubtless see in the creation of the society a means of throwing on to the public the cost of an enterprise which it would be difficult to finance directly from official sources.

4. It appears from subsequent numbers of the "Umm-al-Qura" that the public meeting contemplated by the promoters of the society was held in Mecca on 17. 12. 1930.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to Cairo, Jerusalem, Bagdad, Bushire and Khartoum.

I have, &c
ANDREW RYAN

E 528 31 25]

No. 12

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 10. Confidential)

Sir,

Jeddah, January 17, 1931

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jeddah report for December. This report owes much to the assistance of Mr. Hope-Gill, who was in charge of the Legation during the first eighteen days of the period under review.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch to Cairo, Jerusalem, Bagdad, Basra, New Delhi, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Aden, Addis Ababa, Lagos, Khartoum, Port Sudan, the senior naval officer in Red Sea Sloop, and the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan.

I have, &c
ANDREW RYAN

(Confidential)

Jedda Report for December 1930

I—Internal Affairs.

Local Government—

- a) King Ibn Saud.
b) Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Finance.

Transjordan.

- a) MacDonald investigation.
b) Current ruling.
c) Frontier situation.
d) Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Zaid

Iraq—

- a) Non-Violence.
b) Claims and extradition.
c) The Mashhur

Israel.

- a) Proposed negotiations.
b) Proposed courtesy visit

Cyprus.

Yemen and Aden.

III—International Relations.

- 10 Great Britain—
 (a) His Majesty's Minister
 (b) Hejaz
11 France
12 Turkey
13 Other countries

IV—Air Matters.

- Hejaz Air Force
Arab Aeronautical Society

V—Military Intelligence.

- 17 Importation of arms

VI—Naval Intelligence.

- 18 Nil

VII—Pilgrimage.

- 19 Pilgrimage coupon notes
20 1931 Pilgrimage
21 Nigerian Pilgrimage

VIII—Slavery.

I—Internal Affairs

1. Local Government

(a) KING IBN SAUD visited Jedda from the 5th to 10th December. The visit was significant in many respects. It was the first visit of any kind. His Majesty took the opportunity to inspect the quarantine islands and received all the leading inhabitants of Jedda at the Green Palace with his customary Arab urbanity. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires had a friendly half hour's conversation with him on the 7th December, but no business was discussed. On his return Ibn Saud remained in residence at Mecca until the 20th. It was long anticipated that he would maintain touch with Nejd. His Majesty's desire to maintain touch with Nejd is well known.

(b) A letter from the King to the British Minister at Jedda, dated 10th December, stated that the King had decided to send a mission to the Amir of the Ministry at Jedda to maintain more continuous relations with the foreign representatives. It was expected that Fuad Bey would be placed in charge of the Jedda office, and he himself explained to Sir A. Ryan last July that his position would not be materially altered by his change of status from that of Acting Minister to Under Secretary. Up to the end of December the

change had produced no obvious effect, owing to the fact that Fuad Bey fell somewhat seriously ill in Mecca about the 21st December. The new Minister remained in Mecca, no business could be transacted by telephone, and the isolation of the foreign representatives, unable to communicate otherwise than by notes, of which there is no end, became more pronounced than ever. It remains to be seen whether the King will, in fact, delegate authority to the Amir, whether the latter will accept the position of figurehead, whether Fuad Bey will settle in Jedda, and whether his position has been really diminished or not.

2. Finance

There has been no improvement in the financial situation. It was stated in December that the King's own plans for his visit to Nejd had been delayed by the difficulty in finding money for the excursion. Money is, indeed, found for immediate requirements, but the difficulty of obtaining the settlement of outstanding Government debts remained as great as ever. Salaries were said to be as much as eleven months in arrear. In addition to the important cases mentioned in section (b) (c) of the previous report, His Majesty's Legation has had to consider the grievances of Sudanese chaulcaras who cannot get their wages. It is alleged that, in order to provide ready money, the first arrivals of pilgrims mostly Javanese, have been hurried through to Medina in order to secure payment of the tax levied on pilgrims, who include Medina in their programme, amounting to at least £6 a head. All the efforts of the British Legation to obtain as to the scale of fees and other dues payable by pilgrims have failed, a fact which seems to indicate that the authorities are unwilling to commit themselves until they see how much the pilgrims can stand. The present prospect of a lean pilgrimage made the outlook in December even gloomier than before.

3. Commerce (see section 5 of the report for July and August)

At the instance of the Camultra Marine Insurance Association further representations were made to the Hejaz Nejd Government in December in regard to the stranding of lighters in the shallow approaches to the Customs quay. No reaction or improvement has yet been noted.

4. General

(a) A tendency was remarked to increase Nejd influence in the Hejaz. The use of the Nejd dialect has now been imposed by Government order on Hejaz officials. On the other hand, there has been no further attempt of late to enforce strict Wahabi principles. If anything the tendency to compromise has been little less. Sir A. Ryan found the gramophone as much a feature of life as before and choral music, bearing a singular resemblance to Christian hymn tunes, raged relentlessly in the school close to the Legation House, apparently in preparation for its school choir.

(b) No news of interest was received in December in connexion with the tribes in the interior.

5. Transjordan.

II—Frontier Questions.

(a) The centre of interest as regards the MacDonald investigation, see section 10 (a) of report for July and August. The Hejaz Nejd Minister the Amir, Mr. MacDonald and at the Foreign Office. The Amir's refusal to recognise the validity of any proceeding issued by Mr. MacDonald, and the fact that the Amir had moved back to Nejd, as being for that reason excluded from the scope of the investigation, unless an undertaking were given that the persons responsible for the raids would be denied readmission to Transjordan. In the latter case the Hejaz Government have persistently tried to obtain more than they originally

asked for. Not only have they wished, not unreasonably, that the proposed undertaking should be defined to provide for expulsion from Transjordan, if measures taken to prevent re-entry should fail, but they have sought to make the undertaking applicable to groups of unnamed members of the Beni Attiyah. These demands were reaffirmed in a note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to His Majesty's Legation in Jedda, dated the 24th December, and the matter was still under consideration at the end of December.

(b) During the month the Hejaz Nejd Government only protested against one raid, alleged to have been made by Transjordan subjects on the 2nd December and involving the loot of seventy camels. There was no counter-protest by the Transjordan Government against any raid from the Hejaz Nejd.

(c) The month passed without any further reply having been returned by the Hejaz Nejd Government to the comprehensive British memorandum on the present and future of the frontier situation, which His Majesty's (Charge d'Affaires) forwarded on the 23rd October (section 10 (b) of the previous report). When replying on the 25th November to a note from Mr. Hope Gill, asking that measures should be taken to forestall a raid into Transjordan which His Majesty's High Commissioner believed to be impending, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs professed inability to identify the section of the Aniza tribe believed to be implicated, and went on to suggest openly that raids from Nejd were legitimate retaliation, and that his Government could not definitely condemn them until raids from Transjordan had been completely stopped. Mr. Hope Gill took exception to this attitude in a reasoned note dated the 2nd December. His Majesty's Government decided to leave it to Sir A. Ryan, who had been fully acquainted with their views at home, to attempt to deal orally with the questions raised in this unsatisfactory correspondence, with special reference to the somewhat ill-defined frontier. On the 15th November to His Majesty's Government's memorandum (see section 10 (c) of the last report). Instructions to this effect were telegraphed to Jedda on the 15th December, but Sir A. Ryan had no opportunity up to the end of December of taking the question up with the Hejaz Government.

(d) It was reported in December that Sheikh Abdul Aziz Ibn Zaid, formerly Assistant Governor of Haifa, had been appointed Governor of Haifa.

6. Iraq

(a) No development in connexion with the proposed *Bon-Voisinage* Agreement has, however, come to life again at the Bagdad end. On the 18th December Sir Francis Humphrys repeated to Jedda a telegram to London ordering to sign the *Bon-Voisinage* Agreement and negotiate an extradition treaty, provided that the Hejaz Government would agree to sign the former first and not make their signature dependent on the extradition negotiations. Nuri Pasha proposed also to discuss other matters, including the Ibn Mashhur imbroglio and the general question of Iraq Nejd claims and counter-claims. On the 30th

His observations (which were not actually telegraphed until the 1st January, but with favour Nuri Pasha's proposal which squared with the outcome of his own conversations with Lord Bey Hamza last summer, provided the Iraq Government could promise early ratification of the *Bon-Voisinage* Agreement once signed, and that they would be ready to take up at the outset an accommodating attitude on

He suggested that the Iraq Government might reasonably be expected to agree in principle to the Hejaz Nejd contention that tribal offenders should be excluded from this definition. He thought that the question of claims might be left for the negotiators to thresh out when they met. While expressing these views on Nuri Pasha's proposed action, as described by him to Sir F. Humphrys, Sir A. Ryan drew attention to the possible bearing of a statement said to have been made by the Pasha to the press in October, to the effect that he intended to promote some sort of alliance or combine of Arab States, including Iraq, Transjordan and Hejaz Nejd and contemplated visiting the other capitals this winter with that object.

(b) As regards the other points mentioned in the last paragraph, it appears that the Foreign Affairs wrote a letter to the Hejaz Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 13th December regarding claims and another at or about the same time on extradition. The first made it clear that the £30,000 which King Faisal had expressed readiness several months ago to accept (see section 8 (b) of Report for July and August) in settlement of claims against Nejd, represented the amount which he considered due on balance and not an assessment of Iraq claims to be followed by a later assessment of Nejd claims against Iraq. The text of the letter on extradition had not reached the Legation up to the time of writing this report, but it is understood to be uncompromising on the question of political offenders.

(c) The Ibn Mashhur affair (see section 11 (d) of previous report) continued to be the subject of active correspondence during December. It has been reported that the return of Ibn Mashhur, according to plan, owing to the latter's ill-health and the way of amends to place the family and property of Ibn Mashhur at Ibn Saud's disposal. The Legation took no parallel action as His Majesty's Government preferred that any communication as from them to the Hejaz Government should be delayed pending elimination of the Iraq Government's exact intention in regard to the property of Ibn Mashhur. It has in fact been already seized by them in satisfaction of Iraq claims in respect of past raids by Ibn Mashhur from Nejd into Iraq.

7. Kuwait (see section 12 (a) of previous report)

(a) Following on earlier correspondence His Majesty's Minister was authorised soon after his return to Jedda on the 19th December to make a fresh attempt to further a complete reconciliation between Ibn Saud and the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, with whom the King is still angry because of the circumstances surrounding his visit to Bahrain on his return from the Lush Conference last January. The King had replied fairly satisfactorily to a letter from Sir A. Ryan at the end of August, but the incident was known to be still rankling in his mind. The matter is important

on any negotiations of Kuwait questions, which, if embarked on, would probably have to be of more general scope as regards the Persian Gulf. Arising out of various discussions in London, it was suggested that Colonel Bruce might visit the King at some convenient place in Nejd during Ibn Saud's stay there. Sir A. Ryan, on the 28th December, with which he also sent a letter to be forwarded to Ibn Saud, consisting mainly of courtesies but referring discreetly to the proposal regarding the visit.

It was stated that it should be left to Ibn Saud to touch on outstanding Persian Gulf questions, if he wished. It was hoped that, if the visit took place, he would be unable to refrain from mentioning questions which he himself is anxious to discuss, that this would enable Colonel Bruce to broach similarly, if only in general terms, the questions affecting Kuwait which His Majesty's Government have at heart, and that the interview might thus pave the way for eventual formal negotiations. Unfortunately, for these hopes, it seemed more than likely that, even if Ibn Saud were otherwise agreeable, the shortness of his stay in Nejd and the slowness of communication with Riyadh might make it impossible to arrange the visit in time.

8. Bahrain (see section 13 of previous report)

No further information has been received regarding the proposals to develop the project mentioned in the previous report (section 13), the realisation of this project might depend on its utilisation by pilgrims as well as traders. The "Muslim Outlook" of Lahore, in its issue of the 8th December, published an extract from "Al-Siyassat" of Cairo (date not given) which may be mentioned here as bearing on

this subject, though it relates more directly to pilgrimage matters. The extract reproduces a Tehran message to the effect that the Persian representative in Jeddah had stated while on leave in Tehran that a treaty of friendship and commerce would shortly be concluded between Persia and the Hejaz. "He referred," the passage goes on, "to the new route for pilgrims crossing the Nejd territories and affirmed that it was the exclusive monopoly of transport and communications held by the Syrian and Iraqi companies which led the Persian Government to decide

new road opened by the Government of His Majesty Sultan Ibn-us-Saud." It will be noted that the date of Habibulla Khan's alleged interview is not given. As stated in section 21 of the report for July and August a Treaty of Friendship between Persia and Hejaz Nejd was ratified on the 18th June last, some weeks before the Persian Chargé d'Affaires went on his long leave.

9 Yemen and Asir

No information has reached the Legation regarding any developments in Asir following on its practical annexation by Ibn Saud (see section 15 of previous report), or the Imam Yahya's reaction to this event.

10 Great Britain.

III—International Relations

Ibn Saud—As Fuad Bey had to return to Mecca the same day owing to the King's imminent departure for Nejd and fell ill two days later, no opportunity arose during the rest of December for the oral discussion of business.

Bombay and Singapore (see section 10 (d) of previous report) continued to engage attention during the month. The position at the end of it was that the Government of India had agreed in principle to the appointment of a consul at Bombay, subjects to efforts being made to reduce to a minimum the danger of pilgrims being subjected to inconvenience and extortion under passport regulations, while the Government of the Straits Settlements were still reluctant to have a consul at Singapore. His Majesty's Minister was instructed, on the 24th December, to endeavour to settle the matter as regards Bombay on the lines desired by the Government of India. In a telegram of the 20th December, he suggested that he should await Fuad Bey Hamza's next visit to Jeddah to discuss the matter orally and enquired whether the conclusions reached in London regarding Singapore were similar to those of the Government of India. He proposed, subject to legal

maintain that the appointment of consuls was a matter for international agreement, and expect reciprocity if they wished to appoint consuls in Hejaz Nejd ports. He threw out more tentatively a suggestion that the occasion might be used to pave the way for the appointment of consuls at Bombay and Singapore might be made provisional, e.g. for two years.

11 France

In a conversation with Sir A. Ryan, shortly after Sir A. Ryan's return, the French Chargé d'Affaires made an interesting disclosure regarding the deadlock between the two Governments since July and August, section 12 (a). M. Maigret brushed aside the question of slavery,

Nationality in the case of Algerians. There had formerly, he said, been a large Algerian colony at Medina, and, though dislocated by war conditions, it was still sufficiently important to make the French Government unwilling to admit the pretension of the Hejaz Government to regard them as Hejaz.

12 Egypt

M. Al Achmouni, the Egyptian consul, returned to Jeddah on the 25th December, after an absence of a few weeks. It had been supposed that his visit to Egypt marked a favourable turn in the negotiations between that country and Hejaz Nejd, with a view to Ibn Saud's recognition by Egypt, and the settlement of other questions, like that of the Sacred Caravan and medical arrangements for pilgrims. It is understood that the scope of his negotiations had been exaggerated, but disclosed little else. The general impression at the end of December was that the negotiations, whatever their scope, had not really produced much up to date.

13 Turkey

An official green book was published by the Hejaz Nejd Government in December containing the text of the treaty with Turkey, signed at Mecca in 1929 of Ibn Saud's decree of the 21st November, 1930 approving the treaty, and of the protocol of the exchange of ratifications at Jeddah, signed by the Hejazi Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Turkish diplomatic representative on the 10th December.

14 Other Countries

The return of various heads of missions in December brought the Jeddah Diplomatic Body up to its full strength, except that the Persian Legation remains without either a head or a chancery (see report for July and August, section 21 (b)). Its work is still presumably carried on in Syria, where Habibulla Khan has his principal residence. But it may be inferred from the press extract quoted in section 8 above that Habibulla Khan, wherever he is, is serving his country like a man and a Persian.

IV—Air Matters

15 Hejaz Air Force

The transfer of the Hejaz Air Force to Jeddah (see section 21 of previous report) has been completed. The three remaining pilots have come to be divided definitely into two camps of two and one. Towards the end of December two of the six mechanics tendered their resignation. The Hejaz Government, on their side, have shown no disposition to utilise the force in any intelligent way. Even up to the end of the year.

16 Arab Aeronautical Society (see section 22 of the previous report,

(a) The Mecca paper "Umm al Qura" published in its issue of the 19th December the proposed regulations of this society with an appeal for support addressed to "every Hejazi and Nejd in whose veins the blood of Islamic and Arab zeal flows, to every Arab who wishes his nation to be powerful and reputed, to every Muslim who wishes to see the Holy Land flourish and prosper." The regulations were made in anticipation of a great public meeting to further the objects in view. The draft regulations enable all subjects of Ibn Saud to become members by payment of an entrance fee and annual subscriptions, and other persons may be admitted on the same terms by the Administrative Council. The preliminary meeting was held on the 25th December, but no detailed report of the proceedings has reached the Legation. The society would have a great prospect of success if instead of thinking only of aeroplanes, it devoted its attention to dirigibles, and if the gas of Arabian oratory could be used for floating castles in the air.

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24 Location Personnel

Mr. Wikeley, probationer vice-consul attached to this Legation, was granted a month's sick leave on the 6th December.

Captain C. C. Lewis arrived from England on the 15th December and shares with Mr F V Jones, who arrived last June, the clerical duties of the Chancery formerly performed by Captain Thacker, but now greatly increased.

25. Meteorological

The climate in December was unusually hot for the time of the year owing to prolonged south wind. The figures corresponding to those given in section 15 of the previous report were—

72° — 84° — 82° — 74° — 68° F

E 520 282 25

No. 13

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson - (Received February 2)

2. 12

Soda, February 2, 1931

He and Amir Faisal were in London on 21st January 1914. Yusuf Yash appears to have taken his place as Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He and Amir Faisal were in London on 21st January 1914.

Consequently, the following theorem holds:

E 540 2 25

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*Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Iraq.—
(Received in Foreign Office, February 2.)*

(No. 51)

Colonial Office January 30 1931

The Prime Minister would I note, also propose to discuss general questions of claims, and a separate communication is being addressed to you on this subject.

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No. 15

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda)

(No. 17)

(Telegraphic) P.

Foreign Office, February 3, 1931

PARAGRAPHS 5 and 6 of your telegram No. 1 of the 2nd January Proposed visit of Iraqi Prime Minister to Hejaz

The Colonial Office telegram to Bagdad, No. 31 of the 30th January, will show you that His Majesty's Government are in general agreement with views

in future appears, however, unnecessary, since project seems quite unrealisable in present circumstances

E 595 2 25

No. 1

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 5)

(No. 22)

(Telegraphic) P.

Jedda, February 4, 1931

TELEGRAM No. 51 from Bagdad to Colonial Office.

Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs' letter of the 13th December regarding extradition was communicated to me on the 29th January by the Hejazi Minister

but reply was despatched some days since. It is firm, though polite, as regards necessity that tribesmen should be excluded from the clause concerning political offenders

As Minister expressed wish to discuss question, Yusuf Yasin and I had long conversation on the 21st February. With the idea of finding out present position, I stated what I understood to have been agreed orally in July with Fuad viz. that if Iraqi representatives came here to sign "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement and had powers to negotiate treaty of extradition, Ibn Saud would complete the "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement.

While not denouncing, Yusuf Yasin laid stress on importance of treaty of extradition on lines which King desired.

I pointed out what advantages the "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement in itself would have. I added that active consideration was now again being given to

Iraqi representatives to come here. As to extradition, I personally felt strongly that it was necessary that the treaty should take account of the special frontier

directly involved, my aim would be to help to find a formula adapted to that end. My own view, suggested and put forward when Clayton Mission was here, even though owing to breakdown of negotiations at that time they had lapsed, might be of assistance.

It would, however, be useless to try to find formula beforehand—it would only be established in the course of the negotiations now suggested. I intimated that

upon as merely a statement of extreme views of the type usual when a difficult matter was about to be discussed by Powers who were not on terms of complete friendship.

As far as possible, to personal expression of views and to avoid revealing too much. It might produce good results if I were authorised on next suitable occasion (possibly in writing personal letter summing up what I had said) to say

result would be much increased if Nuri Pasha, without awaiting the reply of the Hejazi Government to his earlier letter, offered evidence of

from High Commissioner, Bagdad. I still feel sure that, if Nuri Pash

here unprepared to go reasonable distance to meet Ibn Saud on point of tribal

"Bon-Voisinage" Agreement lack of conciliatory spirit on Iraq side causes extradition negotiations to fail, situation would be, if anything, worse. As Ibn Saud only yielded to the extent he did last July under strong pressure, he would feel His Majesty's Government had tricked him into concluding "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement.

Communication by post between Mecca and Bagdad wastes much time. Would it not be possible to persuade Nuri Pasha to telegraph about his proposed visit, indicating at the same time, that he is prepared to adopt accommodating attitude on question of political offenders? If his visit can be arranged the sooner it takes place after Ramazan the better.

Minister for Foreign Affairs asks whether Nuri Pasha can take steps to ensure that letters referred to in my telegram No. 23 and herein are delivered himself. Owing to mistake they were addressed to Naji Suwaid as Minister of Iraq.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 40)

E 572 337 25

No. 1

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 24)

(Telegraphic) R.

Jedda, February 4, 1931

YOF R telegram No. 215.

I discussed the whole situation with Yusuf on 3rd February. I think I disposed of Fuad's interim reply of 25th October to British memorandum. I emphasised importance of dealing seriously with points stated in last paragraph of memorandum.

Yusef was studiously conciliatory. Most important point in his reply that Hejaz Government were preparing statement of their measures and that King was taking active steps to bring article 3 of Hedda Agreement into operation.

As regards latter, Yusef said that Abdul Aziz bin-Zaid had been appointed Governor of Bedouin with headquarters at Janf and that Newsum was being replaced by another Governor there. He asked for suggestions as to how communication contemplated in article 3 could be best effected. I promised to go into this and I should welcome early intimation of views of the British authorities in Transjordan.

Full report follows by bag.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 42)

E 615 337 25

No. 18

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda)

(Nos. 20, 21 and 22)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, February 5, 1931

REPORT of Sir A. Ryan (Jedda) of 2nd October last) show that situation in frontier districts of Transjordan has become exceedingly grave.

As a result of raids from Hejaz Nejd culminating in serious attacks in September and October, important sections of Howeitat tribe of Transjordan, having lost most of their camels, are in state of acute distress and in many cases are on verge of starvation. About 800 Transjordan camels have been taken since 1st August, most of which are, or at any rate were until recently, known to be

introduced by His Majesty's Government to prevent raids from Hejaz Nejd.

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Meanwhile, situation has been much aggravated by following facts.—

- (a) By all Arab standards raiding should have ceased while Mr MacDonnell's tribunal was actually in session. Large Nejd raid of 17th September, three days after opening session, is therefore regarded in Transjordan as particularly flagrant act of treachery.
- (b) As a result of effective preventive measures taken by His Majesty's Government, such Transjordan counter-raids against Hejaz-Nejd as have taken place since 1st August have been of very minor character, but raids from Nejd have become of increasing importance, with result that tribes under British protection are now threatened with ruin and starvation.
- (c) It is now generally known on both sides of the frontier that Governor of Jaufr is openly encouraging Nejd to raid and is taking a share of the loot. Latter fact was openly admitted by Hejaz Nejd representatives to Mr MacDonnell during investigation, and percentage of looted camels retained by Ibn Saud's officials was more than once quoted as evidence of amount of loot actually taken. Governor has also publicly admitted that he is a powerful factor in the raiding of Transjordan.
- (d) His Majesty's Government have recently obtained definite evidence that at least one important raid was carried out on direct instructions from Ibn Saud himself. (End of R)

I provided statement is kept in this form, and actual raid and source of which is of great importance, to Hejaz Government, notwithstanding instruction to the contrary in my despatch No. 407 of 29th December.

(R.) His Majesty's Government take most serious view of above situation. To check raiding from Transjordan and renewed appeal for institution of corresponding measures and for co-operation on part of Hejaz Government contained in memorandum in my despatch No. 300 of 2nd October would produce favourable response. There has been no response from Hejaz Government. On the other hand, grave danger to prosperity of Transjordan tribes makes it essential that situation should be remedied without delay.

Appointment of Captain Glubb as British Intelligence Officer on Tribal Council of article 3 of Hadda Agreement, and His Majesty's Government must call on Ibn Saud to fulfil his obligations under that article. They therefore propose that Captain Glubb should proceed forthwith to Wadi Sirhan, in order that immediate arrangements may be made by him for restitution of loot taken from Transjordan tribes since 1st August with the Governor of Jaufr or other official.

authorised to deal with claims of Hejaz and Nejd tribes in respect of loot proved to have been taken by Transjordan tribes during the same period. His Majesty's Government can no longer be passive in the failure of Ibn Saud to meet his obligations.

necessary orders to Hejaz frontier authorities, in fulfilment of article 3 of Hadda Agreement, to co-operate with G. It is possible that this has been done.

demand the immediate restitution to Howaitat of camels lost in course of Nejd raids since 1st August and public withdrawal and repudiation of orders issued to Nejd officials of Jaufr condoning or encouraging raid.

You should at once address communication in strong terms on above lines to Hejaz Government or to King Ibn Saud himself, explaining that matter is one of urgency to which His Majesty's Government attach great importance.

(Repeated to Transjordan Nos 12 13 and 14)

E 643 387 25]

No. 19

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office, February 9.)

(No. 9)

(Telegraphic)

February 5, 1931

FOLLOWING addressed to Jeddah N.

"It is reliably rumoured that Nejd tribesmen, under the leadership of Neshmi, ex Governor of Jaufr, contemplate carrying out strong raid against Transjordan Howaitat at end of Ramadan."

"Please inform Ibn Saud and request him to prevent any such raid if possible."

E 690 387 25]

No. 20

Sir A. Ryan to Mr A. Henderson (Received February 10)

(Nos 27 and 28.)

(Telegraphic)

Jeddah, February 9, 1931

R) YOUR telegrams Nos. 20 21 and 22

In the absence of reference I am uncertain whether you had received my telegram No. 24 and my despatch No. 26 before despatching telegrams under reference.

In view of more favourable turn taken by discussions here, I fear any attempt to force the pace to the extent contemplated in your instructions may do more harm than good. I venture to draw attention to the following considerations:—

- (a) Hejaz Government took prompt action regarding raid of 17th September and eighty odd camels were restored, remainder being claimed as property of Nejd. I understand this was the same raid regarding which Resident, Amman, expressed satisfaction in report to High Commissioner of 30th September. In subsequent report of 5th November he stated that balance of 117 camels was still outstanding but I have not yet received detailed criticism of statements in Minister for Foreign Affairs' note enclosed in my despatch No. 288.
- (b) Analysis of protests shows that Transjordanians complained of four raids including above, as having occurred from August to December, and Hejaz Government complained, rightly or wrongly, of fourteen for the same period. Transjordanians complained of none in November and December. Hejaz of only one in December. Unless there has been some misunderstanding, the discrepancy appears not to consist in the present raid but in sufferings of Howaitat in consequence of October raids.
- (c) If person described as Governor of Jaufr is Neshmi he seems to have been dismissed judging by what Yusuf told me and High Commissioner's telegram to me No. 7, repeated to Colonial Office No. 9. I should be glad of any further information from Amman regarding his present position.

Contents of your telegram No. 22 seem to be affected by my telegram No. 24 and by action which I have already taken regarding October raids on Howaitat. I am sorry to hear that you have made a statement that Hejaz Government have now publicly encouraged attack on Transjordanian tribes unless—

- 1) There has been some recent public incitement of which I am unaware, or
- 2) The Hejaz agent was party to admission by "Hejaz representatives" during MacDonnell enquiry and His Majesty's Government regard such admission in the course of proceedings, which are still *sub judice*, as constituting public encouragement.

The fact that His Majesty's Government themselves occupy judicial position seems to me to make it undesirable that they should use evidence given at investigation in this way.

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I suggest that sufficient immediate action would be to write further note with reference to recent conversation, again urging importance of restitution of loot taken from Howzat and proposing early meeting between Captain Glubb and Abdu Aziz. (End of R)

Now that Ibn Saud appears to be more amenable, personal accusation against him, which we could not substantiate without disclosing nature of our information, could in my opinion only even more the situation.

In any case it would be difficult not to reveal by inference actual raids we have in mind, as they could only be those which occurred in September and October unless there have been further raids this year regarding which you have similar information.

(Repeated to Transjordan Nos 47 and 48)

E 702 2 91

No 21

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Received in Foreign Office, February 11)

(No 78)

(Telegraphic)

Bagdad, February 5, 1931

RAQ Minister for Foreign Affairs has addressed letter to Minister for Foreign Affairs at Mexico, dated 1st February, referring to the former's letter of 13th December about extradition, and stating that, whereas that letter stated the views of Iraq Government regarding principles on which agreement should be based, the Iraq Government were ready in order to cement friendship and proposal made by Hejaz and that they were awaiting observations of Hejaz.

(Repeated to Jeddah, No. 33)

E 702 2 91

No 22

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Received in Foreign Office, February 11)

(No 82)

(Telegraphic) P

Bagdad, February 8, 1931

FOLLOWING addressed to Jeddah -

My telegram to Colonial Office, No. 81

King Faisal is telegraphing to King Ibn Saud in terms of my telegram following telegram. Nuri Pasha proposes to discuss in addition to "Bon Voisinage," Extradition and Customs, general questions of pilgrim trade and trade facilities. He also proposes to show copy of Iraq Transjordan Agreement to Hejaz Nejd Government, and to explain that it is in no way directed against Ibn Saud. Also to discuss case of the Muahhar.

(Repeated to Jerusalem No. 85)

E 702 2 91

No 23

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Received in Foreign Office, February 11)

(No 83)

(Telegraphic) P

Bagdad, February 8, 1931

FOLLOWING addressed to Jeddah, No. 93

In view of our strong desire to strengthen the bonds of friendship between our two Governments, we are ready at any time to reach an understanding on any proposals that your Majesty's Government may wish to put forward including Extradition Agreement. I feel strongly that a

presents itself now, as the Iraq Parliament has been adjourned for some time. I am ready to send my Prime Minister immediately to sign "Bon Voisinage" Agreement and to discuss with your Majesty's Government all points of common interest. If he reached Jeddah immediately after Ramadan any agreement that might be signed could be ratified by the Iraq Parliament during the present session. I request your Majesty to reply by telegraph whether this proposal is acceptable.

E 701 2 25

No 24

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson (Received February 11)

(No 29)

(Telegraphic) P

Jeddah, February 10, 1931

WITH reference to Bagdad telegram of the 8th February to Colonial Office I have received officially from Minister for Foreign Affairs copies of telegram from King Faisal to King Ibn Saud, and of latter's reply welcoming the proposal to send a mission and suggestions relating thereto. Ibn Saud hopes that Arab nations in general as well as both countries, will benefit from the mission, and states that he is ready to discuss questions enumerated in King Faisal, and that is confident of settlement of outstanding questions. It is evident that Hejaz Government are much gratified, for copies of telegrams have been sent under a covering note from Yusuf Yasin, who expresses belief that his pleasure at prospect of reaching union and accord between the two countries will be shared by me.

(Repeated to Bagdad)

E 723 723 25

No 25

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson (Received February 12)

(No 31)

(Telegraphic)

Jeddah, February 11, 1931

MY despatch No. 180.

Do you wish me to reopen question of use of Hima coast by aircraft? If so, (a) action be directed to securing (a) consent to peering flights this year by service aircraft, (b) similar permission for Imperial Airways or (c) consent in principle to flying over of aeroplanes employed in projected service to India? If action is contemplated it should be undertaken as soon as possible. I was expecting King to come here any time after 21st February, but there is now possibility of his visiting Jeddah during next few days.

You will remember that after date of my despatch under reference chief pilot of Air Force surveyed islands for possible landing grounds, and recommended Jinnah, to use of which Ibn Saud might agree, though he was believed to be strongly against any landing grounds on the mainland.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 52, and Bushire, No. 53)

E 724 387 25

No 26

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson (Received February 12)

(No 32)

(Telegraphic) R

Jeddah, February 12, 1931

FOLLOWING addressed to Transjordan, No. 54 -

"Hejaz Government protest against raid on four persons from Teisan at Alkhazn, four hours distant from that place, by party of Shararat under Smeihan Alshahari, who looted 620 dollars, one rifle and two camels. I am enquiring as to date, which is not given."

"Minister for Foreign Affairs suggests that this marks new start after short lull of raiding and asks that special attention be drawn to this. I have taken the opportunity to express agreement as to desirability of continued effort to prevent raids, drawing attention to report in your telegram. This will not preclude stronger action contemplated in recent correspondence with Foreign Office if His Majesty's Government decide on it.

E 890 387 25

No. 27

Mr A Henderson to Sir A Ryan (Jedda)

(No. 20)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, February 13, 1931

YOUR telegrams Nos. 27 and 28 of the 10th February. Proposed protest to Hejazi Government on raiding situation.

Although my telegrams Nos. 20, 21 and 22 were drafted before receipt of your telegram No. 24 and of your despatch No. 25 these did not appear to necessitate any modification in policy already decided on.

Recent detailed reports contained in Transjordan despatch No. 4640 of the 3rd January (copy to you by bag of 6th February) show necessity of obtaining immediate restoration to Howaitat of loot taken since 1st August, and this is unlikely to be achieved except by strong representations on lines proposed. I had not overlooked points which you raise in paragraphs 2 (a) and (b) of your telegram. As regards (b), raids of September and October are main subject of complaint, which is directed more to particularly disgraceful features of these raids referred to in paragraph 2 (a), (c) and (d) of my telegram No. 20 than merely to their size or fact of their occurrence. His Majesty's Government have only recently been informed of seriousness of these raids and of gravity of consequent situation in Transjordan.

Paragraph 2 (e) of your telegram. There seems no reason to refrain from complaining of acts of Neshmi, because he has since ceased to be Governor of Jauif.

Paragraph 3 (1) of your telegram. Transjordan authorities state categorically that it is common knowledge on both sides of frontier that Neshmi publicly encouraged raiding and Nejdī raiders made no attempt to conceal fact. This statement is reinforced by our knowledge that at least one raid was directly ordered by Ibn Saud himself.

Paragraph 3 (2). Hejazi agent himself made admission to MacDonnell, and I see no reason why it should not be quoted.

As regards personal accusation against King, knowledge that His Majesty's Government are aware of his instructions to raid should surely have salutary effect on His Majesty, who, while no doubt denying statement, will realise its truth and may hesitate to repeat proceedings.

I appreciate your arguments, but more vigorous measures than polite protest

My own inclination, then, is still to address note to Hejazi Government or to King himself substantially as outlined in my telegrams Nos. 20, 21 and 22 while leaving you discretion to defer action pending receipt of details in Transjordan despatch of 3rd January, and to make such minor changes as may be necessary to bring your representations into harmony with recent developments, especially with your recent conversation with Yusuf Yasin regarding article 3 of Hadda Agreement.

If, however, after weighing above considerations you adhere to opinion that situation would be aggravated by such vigorous protest as originally drafted, shall not take amiss further representations by you, before giving you final instructions.

(Repeated to Transjordan.)

E 816 387 25

No. 25

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies
(Communicated to Foreign Office, February 18)

(No. 12)

(Telegraphic)

February 16, 1931

FOLLOWING addressed to Jedda, No. 12 —

"Reliable informant reports that new Governor of Jauif with nineteen caravans recently arrived there. Money was distributed to men, who were ordered to purchase sound camels immediately. Tribesmen have been ordered to assemble at Elouia with war banners. Persons enquiring as to reasons of this are informed that they will learn after feast. It is also reported that 150 camelmenn are assembled at Zal Elhaj station. May reasons of these preparations be explained?"

E 844 387 25

No. 2

Sir A Ryan to Mr A Henderson — (Received February 16)

(No. 35)

(Telegraphic) P

Jedda, February 16, 1931

I HAVE considered your telegram No. 20 in conjunction with new communication from Yusuf Yasin, summarised in part 1 of my immediately succeeding telegram, and with telegram No. 12 to me from High Commissioner for Transjordan, repeated to Colonial Office No. 12.

I agree with serious nature of raids which took place last autumn, subject to what I said in my telegram No. 27 under (a).

I also agree in regard to continued importance of Neshmi, but Ibn Saud can

My objection to using argument regarding public knowledge of incitement

mind that the value of all evidence given at investigation had still to be appreciated by His Majesty's Government in judicial capacity and that it might therefore be better that they should not commit themselves explicitly to accept it now.

I still hold very definite opinion that it would do more harm than good to make direct accusation against Ibn Saud, however completely our secret information may justify it. I narrowly avoided acute quarrel with him, as you will remember, in July, when I addressed him on this frontier question. He is quite clever enough to deny accusation of personal complicity and demand reasons for it, even though he may have a guilty conscience.

I doubt whether it will prove effective to couch our demands in extreme terms (having regard to counter-accusation of Hejazi Government and their similar demands for return of loot) unless you are prepared in the event of delay or refusal to take strong punitive measures. You will no doubt also have in mind

infringeable

In these circumstances I addressed to Yusuf Yasin personal letter, the substance of which I have just now summarised in part 2 of my immediately preceding telegram.

me to send in official note to effect that you approve my letter and have instructed me to speak to the King on the whole matter. King is due to arrive here within a few days. I have also been informed that the King is fully aware of the facts that Neshmi's past activities are public knowledge and that Transjordan tribes think these activities had King's sanction. I could, in addition, express your strong resentment at insinuations made about Ghubb. Ibn Saud has, I fear,

taken Glubb's appointment worse than we anticipated. I venture to suggest that, if you still consider it essential to take stronger and more immediate action, you should telegraph in Government telegraph code actual text of a memorandum to be communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs (Repeated to Transjordan, No. 55)

E 845 387 25

No. 30

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson. (Received February 19)
(No. 36)

(Telegraphic) R.

Jedda, February 18, 1931

FOLLOWING are summaries mentioned in my immediately preceding telegram:—

Part 1. Yusuf Yasin's note to me of 15th February

"Raid recently complained of by Hejaz Government probably took place between 3rd and 7th February

I have read with surprise report of Neshmi's projected raid. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied on 25th January, and I have since spoken to you about falsity of similar previous rumour. I can assure you that new rumour with Governor of Jauif

I remind you of what I said about attitude of officer imported from Iraq. He evidently wishes to create state of disturbance on Transjordanian frontier similar to that produced by his earlier activities in Iraq. First consequences are these false rumours and reports received by my Government that on arrival he started collecting camels looted from our tribes and using them in his work instead of returning them. We cannot admit such action and believe your Government will not allow it. Please ask authorities concerned to do the necessary to avoid crisis, to put a stop to false rumours, and to ensure return of camels belonging to our tribesmen which have been collected in Transjordan."

Part 2. My personal letter to Yusuf Yasin of 17th February

"I prefer to reply privately to your note, which raises two immediate important points:—

"1. Report to which I drew attention on 12th February was new and

report. I realised that Neshmi was no longer Governor. His dismissal, of which I heard with satisfaction, does not end his activities. It would be a great boon to remove him from the frontier region.

"2. I see no foundation for accusation against Glubb. My Government will strongly resent such accusations based on mere [supposition] directed against a specially selected officer.

"I have now received even more serious report. (Here follows paraphrase of Transjordan telegram No. 12.)

"I cannot conceal the perturbation of my Government, though I prefer to say this by private letter pending instructions. Howbeit are in misery owing to non return of camels taken in October raids, of which Hejaz and Nejd Governments had advance knowledge though they were too late to prevent them. In my personal opinion situation can only be prevented from becoming dangerous by (1) immediate return of those camels, (2) immediate measures by King to prevent preparations for further raids into Transjordan.

"Our recent conversation filled me with hope of better things. I consider still that closer co-operation on frontier and direct exchange of information would result in less danger of further raids and less difference of opinion as to value of reports received by both sides."

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 56)

E 880 2 25]

No. 31

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received in Foreign Office, February 21)

(No. 100)

(Telegraphic) P

Bagdad, February 16, 1931

FOLLOWING addressed to Jedda, No. 13 S

"With reference to my telegram of the 2nd February, I have been requested by the Prime Minister to inform the High Commissioners at Cairo and Jerusalem and to ask you to inform the Government of Hejaz that he much regrets that he is compelled to postpone his visit to Transjordan, Egypt and the Hejaz owing to the delay in conclusion of the oil negotiations, which he hoped would have been completed before. He will later suggest another date to the Hejaz Government.

Repeated to Cairo and Jerusalem, No. 13 S

E 919 387 25

No. 32

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 24)

(No. 41)

(Telegraphic) R

Jedda, February 24, 1931

MY telegram No. 36.

I received, on 22nd February, emphatic personal reply, dated 18th February, to my personal letter to Yusuf Yasin. Following is summary:—

"Your severe indictment of Neshmi, based on rumours, of falsity of which I have assured you, causes astonishment. Neshmi never did anything but try to maintain security in area for which he was responsible. At the same time you count, and say that your Government will resent, accusations against Glubb, who immediately on arrival filled the area with confused and untrue rumours. Minister for Foreign Affairs assured you in note to which I referred of falsity of first rumour, and I assured you in my subsequent note of baselessness of report regarding raid expected at the end of Ramazan.

"I once more assure you that fresh information received by High Commissioner is groundless. No money was distributed, no tribesmen assembled at Alula, with or without standards, no prospect was held out of a raid on Transjordan after 27th February. All such reports false.

If you and your Government grasp the fact that all this information is baseless and designed to cause disturbance similar to that known to have resulted before from Glubb's action, matter will be easy, and your Government will have no occasion to resent formulation of accusations against that officer who has filled Transjordan with fear and alarm.

As regards measures suggested by you for improvement of the situation my views are these:—

"(a) You request return of camels looted from Howeitat in October. If you had said in this connection that camels captured by Transjordanian tribes since the beginning of the MacDonnell enquiry, most of which are at Glubb's disposal, would be returned simultaneously, request would be just and equitable, and you would find us ready to comply.

"(b) I have already informed you orally that we are prepared to consider suggestions you think best for bringing article 3 of Hadda Agreement into operation.

"(c) If you will refer to the early portion of this letter and realise falsity of reports, you will see there is no need for preventive measures, because there are no preparations for raids requiring them.

"In our recent conversation I shared your views that co-operation would prevent discord and dispute. I am sure that you will agree on your side that acceptance of false information as being incontestable will do more to disturb

47

Note ends with reference to raid mentioned in Transjordan telegram No. 11, which is being investigated, and with general observations of which following is summary —

If matters remain in this state situation will take greater extension. Important thing is to know whether this will not inconvenience His Majesty's Government themselves and cause [a group omitted] between them and us. Otherwise the matter is simple, as we know Transjordan Bedouins and they know us and we can settle with them sooner or later. If, however, your Government are concerned to stop raids owing to inconvenience to themselves please state what mutual measures should be taken to prevent them completely. Failing this, interposition of British between parties constitutes troublesome problem, because it is difficult for us either to see our tribes entangled with British forces or to refuse them our protection. I impatiently await suggestions of your Government because measures hitherto taken have not

Jeddo, February 24, 1931

It is noteworthy that the *Yan'an* *Yao* is merely a tactless echo of my own very categorical language and Hejux Government are being studiously polite in other directions.

My letter has probably served its immediate purpose of imposing caution on Ibn Saud in the immediate future. It is clear, however, that he will not give way as regards camel-herding in October except under the strongest pressure, and he may easily again postpone bringing into operation of article 8 if he is told that direct communication must be with Giubb, and especially if it is added, as suggested in Transjordan telegram No. 15, that all meetings after the first should take place in Hejaz territory.

It would be futile to continue personal correspondence. In my opinion the choice lies between action suggested in penultimate paragraph of my telegram N° 37 and H. M. Government themselves. I still prefer the former course. If the latter is adopted it seems necessary (a) that we should be absolutely certain of our ground and clear in our minds that the King has no counter-case worth considering, and (b) that His Majesty's Government should have clear view of their further action in the almost certain event of Hejaz Government failing to give full and immediate satisfaction. In that case I consider that the only effective means of pressure would be to take punitive action or to withdraw me temporarily, both of which would be very drastic remedies. Attitude of Hejaz Government is further illustrated by note summarised in my telegram No 43, which, though much more polite in form in effect revives the old suggestion that, if His Majesty's Government cannot put an end to raids from Transjordan, Ibn Saud and his tribes should have a free hand.

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1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 26

Foreign Office, February 25 1931

YOUR telegram No. 22 of 4th February Proposed Iraq Hojra Nujd
Extradition Treaty

I approve your language generally as expression of your personal views
negotiations, at any rate at present, when Iraq Prime Minister is about to
discuss matter direct with Hejazi Government, and still awaits latter's further
views (see Bagdad telegram to Colonial Office, No 74, repeated to you, No. 33)
I prefer, therefore, not to endorse to Hejazi Government your suggestion
regarding proposals made at time of Clayton's mission, since this might give
Hejazi Government erroneous impression that they could rely on support of His
Majesty's Government, and thus possibly hamper Nuri Pasha's negotiations.
(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 85)

Na 30

Sir R. Vannitart (for the Secretary of State) to Sir A. Ryun (Jedda)

No. 24.1

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 28 1931

24th February and No. 43 of 25th February. Banding situation on the Trans-jordan-Hejaz-Nejd frontier.

24th February, I agree to your discussing whole question orally with the King as suggested in your telegram No. 35 of 16th February. My immediately following telegram to His Majesty's Government is attached. His Majesty's Government High Commissioner for Transjordan has been asked to telegraph his observations immediately on detailed proposals, put forward in paragraphs 2 and 3 of my telegram, for meeting between King and myself. I am, I repeat, to you. You should await his telegram, which it is hoped will reach you very shortly, before acting on these instructions.

If High Commissioner suggests minor amendments only in proposals you may adopt them without further reference to me. But if he desires serious modifications you should await further instructions which will be sent to you as soon as possible.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr A. Henderson.—(Received February 25.)

{ No. 43 }

(Telegraphic) R

Jeddo, February 25 1931

I HAVE received note from Minister for Foreign Affairs dated 22nd February beginning with polite reference to my enquiries during his recent illness and expressing regret that his first business on resumption of work should be to complain of fresh raids.

He then complains of two raids by Transjordan tribes on 10th and 13th February. In the first case party believed to be Beni Attiya captured forty camels, whereupon one of the raided party went to seek help of his relations in pursuing raiders. In second case party of Transjordanians looted thirty-four camels and people raided went with their partisans in pursuit with results unknown. I am telegraphing full details to Transjordan, which will doubtless be forwarded to them in usual way.

As soon as you are in a position to do so you should at once take up matter with King, following memorandum as closely as possible. Your oral representations should in no circumstance be weaker in tone, and you are authorised to leave copy of memorandum with King if you think this desirable.

You will see that, in deference to your views, question of co-operation has been put in forefront and that communication is somewhat less peremptory than that originally proposed. It is, however, essential to know King's reaction at earliest possible moment, in order that policy to be pursued, if his reply should be unsatisfactory, may be further considered without delay. You should therefore

this, you should make every effort to obtain reply within two or three days, and

days after your representations have been made. Should you decide to leave copy of memorandum with King, you may make such minor purely formal alterations as may be required, as well as any minor amendments suggested by High Commissioner for Transjordan. If you think it desirable, you may make it clear that His Majesty's Government expect definite reply within four days.

The results of His Majesty's Government for co-operation on frontier, together with steps already taken for improved control of frontier districts, will, in opinion of His Majesty's Government, offer best guarantee for future improvement referred to in Hejaz Government's note of 22nd February summarised in your telegram No. 43 of 25th February.

(Addressed to Jedda, No. 33. Repeated to Transjordan, No. 23.)

E 939 387 25]

No. 37

Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda)

(No. 34)

(Telegraphic) R

Foreign Office, February 20, 1931

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have learnt with surprise of the Hadda Agreement into operation, the more so as recent reports from the Transjordan authorities have shown that the establishment of immediate co-operation between the authorities on the two sides of the frontier has become urgently necessary.

2. In conversation with His Majesty's Minister at Jedda on the 3rd February, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin asked for suggestions as to the method of initiating such co-operation. The appointment of Captain Glubb as British Intelligence officer attached to the Transjordan Bedouin Control Board and of Abdul Aziz bin Zeid as Inspector of Bedouin has much simplified matters, and His Majesty's Government now propose that Captain Glubb should proceed forthwith to the Wadi Sirhan to meet Ibn Zeid. They suggest that at this meeting (1) all representations and claims regarding the raids since 1st August

restitution of loot on both sides, (3) arrangements should be made for inter-communication of information in future.

3. For (1) and (2) His Majesty's Government propose that Captain Glubb and Abdul Aziz bin Zeid should be respectively accompanied by representative sheikhs of the Transjordan and of the Hejaz Nejd tribes concerned, who could put forward the claims of their tribesmen, identify loot, answer accusations, &c., in respect of raids which have occurred since 1st August.

4. His Majesty's Government are convinced that such early meeting for disposal of claims since 1st August and exchange of information regarding the present state of affairs is only means of removing grievances and suspicions on

5. As Yusuf Yasin has recognised there has recently been a short lull in raiding. As regards raiding from Transjordan, this lull was due to the increased effectiveness of the new measures for the control of the Transjordan tribes, of which information has already been given to the Hejaz Government. The Transjordan authorities cannot, however, guarantee to maintain this situation unless immediate steps as proposed above are taken to arrange for return to

Transjordan of the large number of camels (about 800) which have been taken in raids by Hejazi or Nejd tribes since 1st August, and most of which are, or at any rate were until recently, known to be grazing in the immediate vicinity of the frontier. The fact that this loot has not been returned and that measures of Transjordan Government prevent Transjordan tribesmen from recovering it by force is naturally greatly resented by latter.

6. Their resentment is aggravated by the following facts connected with these raids which have been brought to the notice of His Majesty's Government and have made a deplorable impression on them:—

(a) By all Arab standards raiding should have ceased while Mr. MacDonnell's tribunal was in session. Large Nejd raid of 17th September, three days after opening session, is therefore regarded in Transjordan as a particularly flagrant act of treachery.

(b) As a result of preventive measures taken by His Majesty's Government, such Transjordan frontier raids against Hejaz Nejd as have taken place since 1st August have been of minor character, but the raids from Nejd in September and October were of large dimensions, with the result that the tribes under British protection are now threatened with ruin and starvation.

It is generally known on both sides of the frontier that El Neshmi, while Governor of Jauif, openly encouraged the Nejd tribes to raid and took a share in the loot. Latter fact was admitted by Hejaz Nejd agent during Mr. MacDonnell's investigation, percentage of looted camels retained by Hejaz Nejd officials being more than once quoted as evidence of amount of loot actually captured. El Neshmi also stated publicly that King Ibn Saud permitted raiding into Transjordan. Latter statement has found wide credence and has not been effectively disproved. His Majesty's Government are glad to learn that El Neshmi has been removed from Governorate of Jauif and to receive denial contained in Yusuf Yasin's letter to Sir A. Ryan of 11th February.

It is for a raid by El Neshmi at end of Ramadan. The evidence referred to above of El Neshmi's activities before his removal from the Governorate of Jauif is of a different character from these recent reports, and so circumstantial and definite that His Majesty's Government have no choice but to accept it as true, that during a considerable period when he was the chief official in the neighbourhood he was inciting the tribes to raid and sharing in the loot. This constitutes a flagrant infraction of Hadda Agreement, and it is deplorable that such action should have been taken by an official of the Hejaz Government when that Government had before them a detailed memorandum from His Majesty's Government urging the closest co-operation between the local authorities on the two sides of the frontier. His Majesty's Government must press that, if this has not already been done, the strongest measures should be taken to counteract the effect of El Neshmi's action in giving countenance to raiding, and to make it publicly known that King Ibn Saud expressly disavows and condemns it. His Majesty's Government have now been informed that El Neshmi has been appointed to command tribal forces with headquarters at Jauif. In view of his previous record they trust that this report will prove unfounded.

7. His Majesty's Government request that Hejaz Government will appoint a representative to meet Captain Glubb and Ibn Zeid and that they will invest the latter with full powers to deal with the matters proposed, including the immediate restitution of the camels and other loot taken from Transjordan tribes since 1st August. Captain Glubb will also be authorised to arrange for the restitution of loot identified as having been taken from Hejazi or Nejd tribes.

8. Having regard, however, to the urgent necessity and evident justice of restoring to the Transjordan tribes the large number of camels looted during September and October in the exceptionally unjustifiable circumstances referred

(Addressed to Jedda, No. 34. Repeated to Transjordan, No. 24.)

No 39

Foreign Office, February 26, 1951

(Addressed to Jeddah, No. 85. Repeated to Transjordan, No. 25.)



Foreign Office February 26, 1981

(Addressed to Jodda, No. 36 Repeated to Transjordan, No. 26)

No. 40

Foreign Office, February 26, 1931

above represents His Majesty's Government's desiderata, but I leave you discretion as to how much of them to put forward at first, and also as to manner and moment of representations.

No 41

Jeddah, February 27 1841

42 1 In addition to prominent headings and leading article on Arab alliance, paper reproduced statement by the Prime Minister in Parliament to the effect that Ibn Saud had agreed to the proposed Anglo-Saudi alliance. There was no mention of any Arab alliance.

What could be the object of such an alliance and against whom was it to be directed? Yusuf Yasin insisted that Arabic word "hilf" which was used implied alliance for common action against other

of telegrams exchanged would be published in Mecca paper on 27th February

to things, but they had confidence in His Majesty's Government and had wished to fall in with their views.

- (4) Hejaz Government had been willing to postpone Ibn Mashhur question until Nuri came and had kept silence regarding it. Iraq had recently published its own version and denied any undertaking to surrender Ibn Mashhur. If Nuri was not coming Hejaz Government would be compelled to make facts public

As per telegrams received from Iraq, the Hejaz Government had been willing to postpone Ibn Mashhur question until Nuri came and had kept silence regarding it. Iraq had recently published its own version and denied any undertaking to surrender Ibn Mashhur. If Nuri was not coming Hejaz Government would be compelled to make facts public

I made it clear throughout that I was expressing purely personal views
(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 40)

E 1004 3 251

No. 42

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson. (Received February 27)

(No. 47)

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, February 27, 1931

DISCUSSION, which I should have preferred to await at this stage, was forced on me. I was greatly taken aback by contents of newspapers which Yusuf Yasin produced. I could only admit that they misrepresented facts of the situation. I felt it was necessary to make immediate efforts to soothe outraged feelings of Ibn Saud who is clearly much incensed by attempts to involve him in Arab alliance project. I tried to minimise its importance in present circumstances without expressing any view as to its merits. I suggested that allowance should be made for difficulties of Nuri Pasha in a country which, unlike this, had parliamentary institutions and an active press. Whilst I expressed my personal views, I did not say that it would restore

things to their true proportion and I said I did not think it would do any particular harm although I should have personally preferred it to be postponed.

Later in the day I received your telegram No. 32. I will endeavour to keep off the whole subject as far as possible during remainder of the King's visit. I appreciate your reason for not wishing to express any views of your own at present, but I feel that prospect of successful negotiations between principals is already much impaired and that they will fail unless His Majesty's Government eventually take a hand in composing differences

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 70)

E 990 387 251

No. 43

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson. (Received February 27)

(No. 48)

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, February 27, 1931

Q telegrams Nos. 33, 35 and 36

I expect to have business audience with the King early on 1st March. If Transjordan observations reach me in time, is there any objection to my sending a memorandum beforehand as official communication to the Hejaz Government. I think this would be most effective course, as basis of representations is to be

summarised in my telegram No. 41 and my personal of Glubb's report which reached me on 23rd February. It would help me greatly if such papers could be sent to me direct from Jerusalem in future if only for my own information pending your instructions.

your telegram No. 35. Before I had time to study your telegram as a whole, I had formed my own views. I prepared the strongest possible representations regarding Glubb and general situation.

tomorrow. It would be most difficult to suggest to Ibn Saud that he should prolong stay in Jedda. He becomes more "royal" every time and I detect slight tendency to set up Yusuf Yasin as a screen, although, of course, he is merely the King's jackal.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 71)

E 1010 387 251

No. 44

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. (Received in Foreign Office, February 28)

(No. 18)

(Telegraphic)

February 27, 1931

YJC R telegram No. 24

I agree with proposals in second paragraph of your telegram subject to following modifications —

- 1 Glubb should meet Ibn Zeid at any place which is agreed upon as most convenient, and not necessarily in Wadi Sirhan
- 2 Add to third suggestion in second paragraph "and for mutual restoration of bond in future"

it advisable that either Glubb or Ibn Zeid should be accompanied by sheikhs on that occasion. Presence of sheikhs at so early a stage might lead to risk of unpleasant incidents, such as occurred during sitting of MacDonnell Commission, and I consider it desirable that friendly personal relations should be established between Glubb and Zeid before sheikhs are summoned

It is important that both Glubb and Zeid should be vested with executive powers by their respective Governments

[6131]

R 3

As regards Jedda telegram No. 42 to Foreign Office, my telegram No. 15 did not mention that they should take place wherever might be agreed by both parties. (Repeated to Jedda, No. 17)

E 1010 387 25]

No. 45

Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda)
(No. 39)
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, February 28, 1931
My telegrams Nos. 33 and 34 of 26th February, Transjordan-Illyria No. 15
no situation.
You may adopt modifications proposed in Transjordan telegram No. 15
Colonial Office repeated to you as No. 17
(Addressed to Jedda, No. 39. Repeated to Transjordan No. 29)

E 1011 387 25]

No. 46

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson (Received March 1)
(No. 30)
(Telegraphic.) Jedda March 1 1931
I SENT memorandum to Minister for Foreign Affairs late on evening of 28th February with covering note formally requesting audience, and intimating that I am instructed to obtain definite reply as soon as possible. I will, if necessary, make it clear to the King that this means within four days from delivery of memorandum. Audience has now been fixed early on 2nd March. I modified paragraph 2 in accordance with High Commissioner's suggestion. I redrafted paragraph 3 in form given in my immediately following telegram. (Repeated to Transjordan, No. 73)

E 1012 387/25]

No. 47

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson. (Received March 1)
(No. 31)
(Telegraphic.) R Jedda March 1 1931
FOLLOWING is text referred to in my immediately preceding telegram —
It is important, in opinion of His Majesty's Government, that the Sheikh of Kuwait should be in a position to exercise executive powers, and that he and Captain Gubb should be in a position to identify their tribesmen, to identify loot, and to answer accusations, &c., in respect of raids subsequent to 1st August.
(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 74)

E 1023 4 25

No. 48

Colonial Office to Foreign Office (Received March 2)
Sir,
Colonial Office February 28 1931
WITH reference to the letter from this Office of the 10th February, I am sending you a copy of a despatch from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf regarding possible Persian Gulf negotiations, and to state that the whole question of future negotiations with Ibn Saud will no doubt be considered on the receipt of the despatch foreshadowed in Sir Andrew Ryan's telegram No. 12 of the 23rd January, a copy of which formed the enclosure to the letter to this Department of the 26th February.

I am, &c.
J E W FLOOD

Enclosure in No. 48

Lieutenant-Colonel Bacon to Lord P. (No. 3)

(No. 3. Confidential)

My Lord,
Buckingham Palace, January 31, 1931
I HAVE the honour to invite a reference to Sir Andrew Ryan's telegram No. 12 of the 23rd January, 1931 to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in which he said that he intended to review the position as seen by him, in regard to the Persian Gulf negotiations.
As Ibn Saud has now left Nejd, there is no likelihood of a meeting between him and myself taking place in the near future, and I would, therefore, also venture to put my views regarding the Persian Gulf negotiations before His Majesty's Government. They may perhaps be of interest to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda, and assist him in any discussions that may take place with King Ibn Saud.

3. During the Akhwan rebellion, His Majesty's Government informed the

Sheikh of Kuwait did not in accordance with the wishes of His Majesty's Government, some supplies did reach the rebels, but they were certainly very limited in amount and I believe that a considerable proportion came from Basra and other ports. I have frequently endeavoured to obtain accurate information as to what actually did bring about the final collapse of the Mutair and Ajman. They had arms, and they had men, and no encounter on a

is to the effect that their final collapse was almost entirely due to the fact that they had run out of supplies of every kind, both of food and of ammunition and that they knew that they could look for no support either from His Majesty's Government or the Sheikh of Kuwait. They could obtain no shelter in Iraq or Kuwait, and had, therefore, been obliged to march considerable distances, and were at the end of their resources. This state of affairs was brought about very largely by the measures enforced by the Sheikh of Kuwait, acting on the advice of His Majesty's Government. I believe that His Majesty's Government recognise that this is so, and have every desire to implement their undertakings to the Sheikh to bring about a cessation of the blockade and a restoration of the former prosperity of Kuwait.

5. I discussed a few days ago with the Sheikh the effect of this blockade on his territory, and asked him what the estimated loss caused to him by it had been. Sheikh Sir Ahmad told me that before the blockade the revenue of Kuwait amounted to between 7 and 8 lakhs of rupees. Kuwait is the largest Arab town in Mesopotamia or Arabia after Bagdad—a fact which possibly may not be realised. The Sheikh told me that despite the fact that taxation was exceedingly light, 4 per cent on imports and 2 per cent on exports, before the blockade Kuwait was one of the most prosperous cities in Arabia and the State paid all its expenses comfortably and generally had a balance to devote towards improvements &c. Nowadays, the revenue was below 2 lakhs and despite the most stringent economy the State had last year been unable to balance its budget and the deficit had been made good by contributions from the private estates of the ruling family.

6. I asked the sheikh to what he actually attributed the blockade, and he said "entirely to the influence of the Quasabi family." I do not think this statement is wholly correct, though I think it is very largely so. I believe Ibn Saud, in the past at any rate, was actuated partly by personal ambition to round off his territories by reducing Kuwait to the status of a feudatory. On the other hand, I do not think there is the least doubt but that the blockade was originally imposed owing to the influence of the Quasabis, and that nowadays it is maintained owing to them.

7. The Quasabis, as His Majesty's Government are aware, are Ibn Saud's bankers. They are of humble origin and entirely self-made men, and, I believe, in former years were twice made bankrupt. Subsequently, however, they got in touch with merchants on the Hasa Coast (Hoffuf &c) and gradually amassed a considerable fortune by lucky deals in pearls and other means, and ultimately started financing Ibn Saud. For some years they farmed the Hasa customs, and then prevailed on Ibn Saud to divert trade with Nejd from Kuwait to Bahrain, Uqair and Hoffuf, supported in this by the influence of the Hasa merchants. They are said to receive a salary of 5,000 rupees a month from Ibn Saud and to make enormous profits on goods ordered by him from India. It is currently reported that they are owed 7 to 8 lakhs by Ibn Saud at the present time, and I think there is no doubt that they wield much influence with the King.

8. To turn now to Ibn Saud's desiderata. He has stated (*vide* Mr. Bond's report for Foreign Affairs) that there are three questions which he wishes to raise in connexion with the Persian Gulf.—

- (1) Customs and transit dues collected in Bahrain on goods imported into Nejd.
- (2) Certain points relating to the nationality and passports of Hejaz Nejd subjects in the Persian Gulf.
- (3) The position of Ibn Saud's agents in Bahrain and Kuwait.

As regards (2) and (3), I see no particular difficulty in discussing these matters with Ibn Saud. I do not know what he wishes to discuss regarding passports, &c, but the matter will probably be capable of settlement without much difficulty. As

regards (1), I pointed out to him that the grant of consular status to his agents in Bahrain and Kuwait would inevitably lead to similar requests from Persia and Iraq, he would not raise the matter. Moreover, there is no doubt that the Syrian entourage of the King told me this himself in Bahrain, and probably they would not welcome an increase in the Quasabi prestige in Bahrain, and, therefore, their influence would be utilised against the proposal.

9. The most important question, however, is that of Bahrain transit dues. As regards them, I think it might be pointed out to Ibn Saud that these dues are very definitely levied for services rendered. The Bahrain Government have

facilities that are provided in a civilized port, so far as their finances permit. They are even now contemplating an extension of the pier which will cost a large sum of money, and will enable lighters to come alongside at all states of the tide. Further the transit of goods—and Ibn Saud's imports are frequently on a very large scale—involves clerical labour, and the provision of guards, watchmen &c.

10. The Hejaz Government benefit by all these facilities, and it is not much to ask that, in return, they should pay the very modest rate of 2 per cent. customs duty and the request that these transit dues should be waived is, in the circumstances, wholly unreasonable.

11. If Ibn Saud chooses to tranship his goods on the high seas, then obviously he can avoid payment, but so long as he utilizes the facilities provided by the Bahrain Government he has no reasonable ground for protest if he is asked to pay something towards their cost. It is not a tax levied by the Bahrain Government on his goods but a charge made for definite services rendered.

12. I do not think, therefore, that there should be any particular difficulty in discussing the demands of Ibn Saud in connexion with the Persian Gulf. We are on very strong ground in maintaining the present position. The question

now arises as to whether any pressure can be brought to bear on him to relax the Kuwait blockade. Possibly, Ibn Saud may have abandoned his personal ambition to include Kuwait in his territories, he has many other preoccupations and his attitude towards Kuwait has been markedly more friendly of late, some Bedouin have been allowed to purchase goods in Kuwait, though the caravan traffic is still entirely prohibited.

13. There is still, however, left the influence of the Quasabis, which will certainly be exerted for the maintenance of the blockade. If I was discussing this with Ibn Saud, I should point out that he owes practically everything to Kuwait. Kuwait gave him and his family shelter when they were refugees. It was with the help of the Kuwait tribes and the support of Sheikh Mubarak that he set out on the conquest of Arabia, which has led him ultimately to his present high position. So intimate were the relations between Kuwait and Ibn Saud that Ibn Saud was quarrelling with the Turks, he used to send to Sheikh Mubarak letters received from the Turkish authorities, and Sheikh Mubarak used to write the replies and send them with Ibn Saud's own seal, which was in his possession, for Sheikh Mubarak had the reputation of being a skilled and forcible writer. Ibn Saud is undoubtedly impulsive, and is occasionally of a "grand geste" type. It is possible—though perhaps not probable—that if an appeal was made to him on behalf of Kuwait, pointing out the ruin that his present policy was bringing on this small principality to which he owed so much and how unworthy his attitude was having regard to all the circumstances of the case, he might respond. I believe that he would if he were entirely free in the matter. He is, however, apparently almost at the end of his financial resources. He owes already a considerable sum to his bankers, the Quasabis, and may have need of further assistance from them and they are doubtless capable of bringing much pressure to bear on him. If then this method of approach fails, there would seem nothing for it but to adopt a sterner line and to hint to Ibn Saud the possibility of retaliation.

14. Ibn Saud clearly realises that it is in our power to retaliate. When I last year, he said to me: "I am not friendly with the British because I particularly love them but because I realise that they have got me by the throat." The best retaliation that I can think of would be the raising of the Bahrain transit dues to 5 per cent. We imposed a reduction of the dues on the Sheikh of Bahrain forcibly and against his wishes. They are a constant grievance to the sheikh, and moreover the Bahrain State is at present passing through a period of acute financial stringency. I doubt whether it would be necessary to put the threat into execution. The intimation would, of course, have to be tactfully conveyed, but I believe that, if Ibn Saud saw that His Majesty's Government intended to get their way in this matter, he would yield, and this view I may mention is shared by Colonel Dickson, who knows Ibn Saud intimately. The question of the blockade of the Persian Gulf is a delicate one, and one which might be supported by Fudh Haima as a blow to the Quasabis, and possibly Hafiz Wahba would use his influence on the same side. There would therefore be some counterpoise to the Quasabi influence which might induce Ibn Saud to agree to a restoration of the previous caravan traffic between Nejd and Kuwait and a restoration of the prosperity of this city.

15. To sum up:—

- (i) The blockade is slowly ruining Kuwait at the present time.
- (ii) It is, therefore, most important that His Majesty's Government should implement their undertaking to the sheikh to try and bring about a cessation of the blockade with as little delay as possible.
- (iii) I would myself in the first instance make an appeal to Ibn Saud's better nature, pointing out all he owes to Kuwait and the harm that his present policy is causing. It is probable however that his present financial straits and the influence in consequence exercised over him by his bankers, the Quasabis, would prevent his modifying this policy. In this event the only course to adopt would seem to be to hint at retaliation, or to employ other means of bringing pressure which may suggest themselves to His Majesty's Minister.

5

59

E 1082 387 '257

No. 41

Mr A Ryan to Mr A Henderson (Received 1891)

11 12

... that he was personally responsible for raids. As a
 he was entitled to explanation, and, failing proof, to satisfaction.

I said that I was not making accusations but stating facts as to belief on the frontier. I again referred to colourable reasons for the belief, beginning with Fuad a note of 20th November refusing to condemn raiders from Nejd until raids from Transjordan had entirely ceased. The King asked if that view was right or wrong. I said it was wrong. The King said he could not see his subjects robbed and plundered. I reproached him with the failure to answer British memorandum of October. He quoted Fuad's interim reply, which I refused to take seriously and with which I had in any case dealt in conversation on 3rd February with Yusuf Yasin. Discussion became more and more diffuse. At intervals I reverted to the gravity of the situation and need for explicit reply to the British proposals. The King suggested the following (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) suggestions, viz., (1) steps should be taken to ascertain which side started the raid after 1st August and that side should bear the guilt of treachery. (2) no raids to take place during proposed meeting and stringent measures to be taken by both sides to restrain tribes. (3) mutual restoration of loot at some stage of meeting which he seemed to think might last some time. I promised to put forward any

[illegible]

his desire to bring article 3 of Hadda Agreement into force as stated by Yusuf Yasin on 3rd February. (2) King sees no practical advantage in proposed meeting on the start of MacDonnell enquiry and

No. 50

to present date, viz., 1,108 British Minister, the King will order proved claims of Transjordanian tribes to be met.

(Telegraphic) R

Ledda, March 4, 1951

4. As regards principles to be observed by representatives, the King suggests following (a) Meeting to take place at or near frontier as agreed upon from time to time (b) Telegraphic communication be maintained by means of Lauf wireless (c) Representatives to exchange information regarding all raids (d) Raids in the nature of theft to be immediately reported and criminals pursued by Government in whose territory the crime took place and stolen property to be returned against receipt. (e) Representatives to exchange information regarding big raids and to meet, if necessary, with a view to settlement. Each representative to submit proposed settlement to his Government for sanction in order to ensure its effectiveness (f) Representatives to confine themselves to matters relating to raids and to deal with nothing else. (g) Representatives to treat each other with courtesy and meet as equals. On receiving assent of His Majesty's Government to the above it will be possible to instruct His Zaid accordingly.

5 Paragraph 5 of British memorandum speaks of inability of Transjordan to guarantee maintenance of improved situation unless camels captured from their tribes are restored. When similar language was used in a note from Hejaz Ministry for Foreign Affairs His Majesty's Government did not agree, and British Minister also stated during his recent audience that this theory was wrong (this is a specious attempt to pervert my criticism of note of 20th

November). King thinks it surprising that what on his side is wrong is accounted acceptable on the other side

6 King agrees that by Arab standards raids should have ceased during MacDonnell enquiry, but it was Transjordan that failed to respect this principle. Their tribes began to raid as soon as MacDonnell embarked on his mission as is proved by raids of 26th July, 21st August, 1st September and 2nd September. Their raids have since gone on. Transjordanian tribes began and Nejd raid (of September, presumably) came later

Although it was a matter of reciprocity, investigation was made, number of camels looted proved to be only 120. 86 of these which belonged to Transjordanian tribes were restored, the rest being returned to Nejd owners. This proves that treachery was not on Nejd side but on that of Transjordan

7 The King cannot admit accusation against Neshmi, who merely worked for security of those for whom he was responsible. He was removed from his post only to avoid controversy with His Majesty's Government

He did his best for peace, but Transjordanian tribes have always been the beginners of evil conduct, and Nejd has sometimes had to defend themselves

8 King is prepared to instruct Ibn Zeid to meet Glubb when he receives reply of His Majesty's Government

As for restitution of loot to Transjordanian tribes, it cannot be undertaken

9 The King informs His Majesty's Government, with thanks for their offer

If he needs any help it is the promise of His Majesty's Government to hand over criminals if they flee from punishment into Transjordan

King awaits reply in order that he may send necessary instructions to Ibn Zeid

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 70)

E 1092 387 25,

No 51

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda)

(No. 42)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, March 4, 1931

YOR R telegram No. 32 of 3rd March: Transjordan-Hejaz-Nejd frontier situation, last paragraph

Your telegram No. 53 has not yet been received, but it would, I fear, in any case have been impossible to send you further instructions in time to enable you to take further action to-day

Meanwhile please telegraph briefly your estimate of (a) probable effectiveness of action with present issue and (b) disadvantages of your possible recall for

which you consider effects of such step would be

(Repeated to Transjordan)

E 1137 387 25

No 52

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 54)

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, March 5, 1931

YOR R telegram No. 42

(a.) Ibn Saud treats diplomatic notes as moves in the game. My recall for consultation would impress him with gravity of situation more than anything that can be said or written. This alone would probably not compel compliance with all your demands, some of which are almost impossible of acceptance from his point of view, e.g., giving of full powers to subordinates and public disavowal of Neshmi. His Majesty's Government have on their side gone too far to recede without putting the King in a position to say he has called their bluff. My departure, if represented as being for consultation, would show they were serious without committing them finally to more drastic action (e.g., occupation of Wady

Sirhan), which would still be almost certainly necessary to enforce complete submission. Its effectiveness would be greater or less according to whether I left by sloop or steamer, the facts were published or not, my wife left or stayed behind, and vice-consul were appointed Chargé d'Affaires or left merely for routine business

(b.) Question cannot be isolated. Recall even for consultation would present the appearance of rupture of relations. No one here will believe that sole reason for this is the latest turn in the situation, which has lasted for a year and present

His Majesty's Government towards (group omitted), which is based on appreciation by a single expert known to be repugnant to Ibn Saud

It would be that His Majesty's Government had changed former friendly

(group omitted) Appointment of a British Minister crowned his success. Appearance of rupture would be his first serious set back in thirty years. Detailed effect cannot be analysed briefly, but comes under the following heads—

- 1 Atmosphere for Iraq negotiations would be hopeless even if Nuri still came. At best they cannot, in my opinion, succeed without your mediation at crucial moment
- 2 [Group undecipherable] pilgrimage and local exchange situation, is now very precarious, might easily be affected and the King's position in his dominions might be shaken
- 3 All negotiations on air matters and minor questions like claims, &c. would have to stand over. Atmosphere in which they were eventually resumed would depend on outcome of crisis and might be either more or less favourable than now
- 4 All orientals over-estimate personal factor. Ibn Saud quite possibly thinks that I have worked up this crisis. In the interest of future good relations you might have to consider replacing me. If you could do this without loss of face it would not be a bad thing, especially if my successor spoke Arabic

Possible course as regards Nos. 3 and 4 would be to remove me now as for consultation, either let Transjordanian frontier situation develop on its own lines or deal with it by force, refuse to send me back pending settlement by special mission, not including myself, of all outstanding questions, and eventually to appoint new Minister

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 73)

E 1003 2 25

No 53

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda)

(No. 43)

(Telegraphic) R.

Foreign Office, March 6, 1931

YOR R telegrams Nos. 46 and 47 of 27th February: Iraq-Nejd relations

I approve your language on all points

(Addressed to Jedda. Repeated to Bagdad)

E 1146 387 25

India Office to Foreign Office (Received March 6th)

517.

India Office, March 6, 1931

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to transmit to you for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram sent to the Government of India respecting the situation on the frontier between Transjordan and the Hejaz-Nejd

I am &c.

S F STEWART

Enclosure in No. 54

Secretary of State for India to Government of India

(Telegraphic)

India Office, March 5, 1931.

THERE is some danger of a serious situation arising as between His Majesty's Government and Ibn Saud in connexion with latter's failure to meet demands of His Majesty's Government arising out of Hejaz Nejd raids into Transjordan (see Foreign Office telegram) to Jeddah Nos. 20, 21 and 22 of 4th February, copy by mail of 12th February and connected correspondence). No effort is being spared to secure friendly settlement, but danger that this may prove impossible, though not immediate, cannot be overlooked.

Steps to be taken in that event have been under consideration and it has been tentatively proposed that failing satisfactory settlement we should take either —

(a) Diplomatic action such as withdrawing Minister from Jeddah, either indefinitely or for consultation with His Majesty's Government, or

(b) Active coercive measures in one of the following alternative forms —

(i) Armoured cars to cross Hejaz frontier supported by aircraft reconnaissance since round up tribes and drive off caravans to numbers of those looted, latter to be held as hostages by Transjordan Administration

(ii) If Nejd tribes have withdrawn from frontier during period of strained relations, Kuf to be occupied by force of armoured cars and Transjordan Frontier Force

In case these proposals have to be considered further please telegraph as early as possible any observations you may wish to offer, with special reference to any probable effects on political situation and Indian Muslim opinion

E 1155 723 25)

No. 55

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson — (Received March 7)

(No. 57)

(Telegraphic)

Jeddah March 7, 1931

Y.O. R. telegram No. 17

I concur in your proposal. If present crisis ends happily I propose, after short suitable interval to address written communication to the Minister for Foreign Affairs with reference to correspondence exchanged last year in connexion with transfer of Air Force following your instructions up to "by air if necessary"

As regards location and number of landing grounds, it will be remembered chief pilot advised in favour of establishing one at Jinnah Island. If this would suffice, matter might be much easier. In any case I think it will be better to elicit King's views on general question before making any statement on my side regarding that aspect of it

E 1149 387 25)

No. 56

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jeddah)

(Nos. 44 and 45)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, March 7, 1931

Y.O. R. telegrams Nos. 52, 53, 54 and 56 of 3rd, 4th and 5th March Transjordan Hejaz Nejd frontier crisis

His Majesty's Government consider that essential object should now be to bring about immediate meeting of frontier authorities, and thus to secure that question be dealt with on a basis of direct communication rather than on international basis. Hejazi reply, though in many ways evasive and unsatisfactory, appears not to exclude such method of settlement. Unless there is sudden deterioration in frontier situation, question of resort to drastic measures, such as your withdrawal, need

not now be further considered, though possibility of such necessity arising must not be excluded. As soon as you receive the telegraphic concurrence of the High Commissioner for Transjordan, to whom this telegram is being repeated, you should address communication to the Hejazi Government on following lines —

(R) 2. "His Majesty's Government note (1) that King declares his desire to bring article 3 of Hadda Agreement into force, (2) that he agrees to immediate meeting of Captain Glubb and Abdul Aziz-bin-Zeid, subject to prior understanding on certain general principles, and (3) that he agrees to mutual restoration of loot being arranged for during meeting

3. "Provided meeting takes place in immediate future His Majesty's Government are prepared to agree to its being governed by all the principles suggested in your telegram No. 44. They note, however, that King desires that each representative should submit proposed settlement to his Government for sanction. His Majesty's Government would greatly prefer that local representatives should be given full power to dispose finally of all questions regarding raid claims, and they are prepared to give full powers to Captain Glubb if King will give equally full powers to Ibn Zeid. If, however, His Majesty feels unable (see your telegram No. 54) to give the latter such authority, they are prepared reluctantly to acquiesce in any settlement reached by Captain Glubb and Ibn Zeid being referred by these officials to their Governments for sanction. In that case, however, it should be understood that the necessary sanction shall be given without undue delay.

4. "In reply to the King's request for proposals as to the liquidation of past raids since the opening of Mr. MacDonnell's enquiry (your telegram No. 56), His Majesty's Government propose that Captain Glubb and Ibn Zeid should be empowered personally—

"(a) To examine claims respecting all raids which have occurred since the agreed date of 1st August

"(b) To summon representative leading sheikhs of the tribes involved on either side

"(c) To supervise the arrangements for the immediate restoration of loot on either side, in the light of the result of their joint investigation, as soon as requisite sanction has been received

5. "As regards (b), the Transjordan Government are prepared immediately to arrange for the Transjordan sheikhs concerned to hold themselves in readiness to proceed to the meeting place, and His Majesty's Government rely on Ibn Saud to make corresponding arrangements in regard to representative leading sheikhs from the Hejaz Nejd

6. "It has always been the intention of His Majesty's Government that Captain Glubb and Ibn Zeid should also discuss measures for regular co-operation on the frontier in future in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Hadda Agreement

7. "His Majesty's Government note that King proposes mutual undertaking that no raids should take place during proposed meeting (last paragraph of section 1 of your telegram No. 59). They consider that immediate effect should be given to this proposal by means of simultaneous public announcement by both sides categorically forbidding and disavowing all forms of raiding, and intimating that offenders will receive exemplary punishment. As soon as His Majesty's Government are informed that Ibn Saud is issuing this announcement, they will arrange for simultaneous issue of similar announcement in Transjordan

8. "His Majesty's Government request to be informed in the immediate future of the place and date which the Hejazi Government propose for the meeting, and they will be glad to learn that the necessary instructions covering all the above points have been issued to Ibn Zeid (see section 8 and last paragraph of your telegram No. 59) in order that they may issue corresponding instructions to Captain Glubb." (End of R)

(Addressed to Jeddah, Nos. 44 and 46. Repeated to Transjordan.)

E 1214 387 25

No 57

India Office to Foreign Office - (Received March 11)

Sir,

India Office, March 10, 1931

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to transmit to you, for the Government of India on the subject of situation on the frontier between Transjordan and Hejaz Nejd

S. I. STEWART

Enclosure in No 57

Government of India to Secretary of State for India

No 707 S)

Telegraph)

Delhi, March 9, 1931

Present temper of Indian Moslems is uneasy and uncertain their chief perturbation being over alleged failure of their own leaders and of Government

Congress to establish virtual Hindu rule in India under new Constitution

protection they consider necessary in the event of final failure of Hindu Moslem negotiations. Concurrent with apprehensions regarding the future, there is

Province Administration to suppress recent disorders in Peshawar district, which is contrasted unfavourably with what is represented as greater lenience shown to agitation in Hindu India. Real, though more remote, concern is also felt at the latest statement of His Majesty's Government's Palestine policy, which is represented as a surrender of the Moslems to Jewish interests.

Emergence of major friction with Ibn Saud is likely, at this time, to still more excite Moslem opinion, and affect in the present delicate political situation in India might be serious. We strongly trust, therefore, that His Majesty's Government will succeed in their efforts to secure friendly settlement without recourse to overt action, particularly in the form of active coercive measures referred to in your telegram

E 1233 387 25]

No 58

Sir A. Ryan to Mr A. Henderson (Received March 14)

No 61)

(Telegraphic.) R

Jedda, March 14, 1931

FOUR telegram No 45

I addressed to Minister for Foreign Affairs on 10th March further with formal introduction, and, except for verbal alterations, reproduced your

Following is full summary of Hejaz Government's counter memorandum enclosed in note of 12th March, which, like mine, requests earliest possible reply:-

"The King has carefully considered further memorandum of 10th March.

"2. The Hejaz Government note acceptance by His Majesty's Govern

All powers to settle all questions of raids definitely in view of distance which separates him from Central Government and fact that latter have no means of rapid communication with frontier area such as to enable Ibn Zeid to receive all necessary information in good time. For this and other internal reasons

Hejaz Government would prefer that His Majesty's Government should accept all points indicated in paragraph 4 of memorandum of 3rd March. They agree that both Governments should, within shortest possible time, and without undue delay, make their observations and accept or criticise decisions arrived at by the two representatives after they have been received

"3. The Hejaz Government agree that Ibn Zeid and Glubb should examine raids from date on which MacDonnell started work up to present time by oral exchange of information. They see no practical advantage in their forming themselves into a tribunal entitled to investigate and

particularly if it is intended to summon sheikhs in order to obtain information from them during the meeting. Experience has shown that a meeting in one place of sheikhs when raids and attacks have produced spirit of hostility leads to quarrels, and such disputes in isolated frontier places may cause dangerous incidents. The Hejaz Government consider practical course to be the following:-

Each representative to take with him all necessary information regarding previous raids

"(b) Claims in respect of those raids to be examined during meeting decisions to be taken in cases where representatives are satisfied of the truth thereof. These decisions to be submitted to their Governments by quickest means; and restitution to be effected immediately on sanction being given

"(c) As regards claims about which representatives are at variance, each shall forward to his Government summary of conversations and shall indicate proof tendered, so that the Governments may communicate with each other with a view to agreeing on best manner of settlement

"(d) Each representative to be entitled to request prolongation of meeting in order to obtain further information which he may find necessary in the course of discussion

"(e) Representative of each Government will thus act as agent for respective tribes, and it will be for him to defend their rights. In this way many difficulties and dangers can be avoided which would be likely to arise in the neighbourhood of the frontier, if tribal chiefs should meet in remote places

"4. The Hejaz Government see no objection to Ibn Zeid and Glubb exchanging information about raids, and they will instruct Ibn Zeid in accordance with provisions of Hadda Agreement

"5. The Hejaz Government are prepared to act in accordance with proposal made by the King in his conversation with Sir A. Ryan as regards definite prevention of raids on both sides during meeting of representatives to discuss raids, and they are prepared definitely to prevent raids by their subjects when meeting is announced

"6. The Hejaz Government, though strongly desirous that meeting should take place as soon as possible, regret inability to fix exact date because of recent damage to Jauf. Instrument which was once damaged was despatched some days ago by car from Jedda. At the earliest moment His Majesty's Government will be informed of time at which meeting will be possible. Hejaz Government cannot fix place either before consulting Ibn Zeid. If His Majesty's Government like to suggest place, Hejaz Government will enquire of Governorate of Jauf whether it will be convenient or whether Governorate has alternative suggestion to make

"7. The Hejaz Government note amongst points left unanswered in their memorandum omission to reply to paragraph 9 thereof"

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 82)

No. 62

*High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies —
(Received in Foreign Office, March 27)*

(Telegraphic)

(R) YOL R despatch No 66

YOL R telegram No. 40

I do not consider that attendance of shukhs is essential for the settlement of the majority of the claims, but in cases where Glubb and Hejaz representatives cannot agree as to facts, they must, in my opinion, be authorised to summon shukhs to give evidence on oath of such cases. Reference to Governments concerned as suggested by the Hejaz Government would be ineffective.

2. To minimise danger of incidents when shikhs are summoned for this purpose, I suggest that both Governments should take guarantees from shikhs concerned binding them over to good behaviour on pain of heavy punishment, as was done after Hamid bin-Tari incident (see my telegram No 112 of 25th October 1930).

3. As regards surrender of criminals in my telegram No 5, I have suggested that the British Government should be satisfied with the capture and handing over to British authorities of the Beni Auya chiefs concerned in raids dealt with by MacDonnell. I consider it more satisfactory that surrender should be based on a formal extradition agreement complementary to Hadda Agreement to be concluded between His Majesty's Government and the Sand.

6. It is desirable that 1st August should be clearly specified as the date from which claims would be considered by representatives.

8. Three or four raids have recently been carried out by Transjordan tribes, and I strongly recommend that, in view of deterioration of frontier situation, a meeting should take place between Githib and Ibn Zaid as early as possible.

6. As details of procedure are still under discussion, I consider first meeting should be confined to arranging groups for joint policing of frontier and exchange of information to prevent further deterioration.

7 I suggest first meeting should take place on 1st April at Al Moaiet, in
W. or urban or at any other place near frontier which Hajar Government may

Representatives should bring not more than twenty men each, and each should make their own arrangements for tentage and supplies, neither being formal host or guest of other.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for the Transjordan - (Received in Foreign Office, March 17)

Colonial Office, March 16, 1931

Telegraphic

Please telegraph (1) whether you consider attendance of Sheikh essential in order to arrive at truth and obtain satisfactory and speedy settlement of claims, (2) whether there is, in your opinion, substance in Ibn Saud's objections to their attendance, (3) if answer to (1) is in affirmative, any suggestions you can make

meeting of shakhs of two sides such as Ibn Saud anticipates. Also telegraph may flee from punishment into Transjordan and any suggestions as to place and date of meeting. I am aware of objections to certain of proposals made in paragraph 3, but shall be glad of comments on any other points which you may wish to make.

(Reported to Jeddah, No. 48)

No. 40

Sir A. Rym to Mr A. Henderson.—(Received March 23)

No. 65.

tegraphic } R.

Leida, March 23, 1931

CHAAF received information from the Foreign Affairs (1321st) March company on 10 March 1968. The report was that the North Vietnamese had another raid in February, but report is meagre and is not vouches for.

At a second hearing, the court said that the book is critical but it is not vicious and is not libelous.

Details are being sent to London in separate telegram with request that they should be forwarded to London by bag

No. 634

Sir A. Ryan to Mr A. Henderson — (Received March 27)

(No. 64)

(Telegraphic)

Juda, March 27 1932

MY immediately preceding telegram

Shortness of Nuri Pasha's stay here will make it difficult to refer to you on points arising during visit. I take it that you would prefer me to remain *sic*: I refrain) as far as possible from intervening. My ability to do so usefully may in any case be affected by recent deterioration of relations between His Majesty's Government and Ibn Saud.

I should nevertheless like to have your guidance as to whether, in the case of acute difference, I should attempt mediation either personally or on your behalf. If so I suggest following lines for consideration:-

I Desert posts have not been mentioned in recent correspondence. I presume that His Majesty's Government wish for their own reasons to maintain their previous attitude. If question arises and again proves insoluble arrangements made at "Lupin" conference might be renewed with provision that the six months will run from now.

2. *Hon. Poincaré*.—If Ibn Saud hesitates he should be held to the promise given not only to Iraq but to His Majesty's Government to sign agreement provided extradition negotiations are initiated, but without reference to their course. I assume that signature of agreement as initialled will be satisfactory.

01317

unless parties mutually agree to amendments like those suggested by High Commission on 25th March, 1930.

3 *Extradition*.—I would propose to use good offices in favour of any compromise regarding political offenders resembling that contemplated in 1922. The King's proposal to postpone actual payment until other outstanding questions have been settled.

4 *Ibn Mas'kur*.—To be treated as separate question. I might endeavour to promote friendly arrangement as regards handing over of relatives and properties and acceptance of the situation [1 group omitted] facts in regard to the man himself and arms alleged to have been surrendered by him.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 87)

E 1555 387 25

No. 64

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda)

(No. 50.)

Telegraphic

Foreign Office, March 27, 1931

REFERENCE to telegram No. 29 of 25th March from Transjordan to Colonial Office, repeated to you, No. 23. Transjordan-Nejd frontier crisis.

His Majesty's Government agree that preliminary meeting should be held as soon as possible, as suggested in paragraph 5. Please inform Hejazi Government of proposals in paragraphs 6 and 7 of Transjordan telegram under reference and try to obtain a favourable reply so that necessary arrangements can be made.

impressed in paragraphs 1 to 4 of his telegram, and further instructions will be sent to you.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 42)

E 1500 1690 25

No. 65

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson. (Received March 30)

No. 80.)

Sir,

Jedda, March 6, 1931

IN my despatch No. 13 of the 11th January, 1931, I mentioned that the festivities at Wadi Fatma on the 9th January in honour of Ibn Saud's accession included a Nejd war dance. I did not at the time attach any particular importance to this. It now comes into the same setting as certain more recent manifestations which throw a curious sidelight on the internal situation in this country.

2. The King returned to Mecca for Ramadhan and spent the ensuing festival there. Mecca and Jedda were presently all agog on hearing that the King and princes of the Royal house had danced in public during the feast. Shortly after, as you know, Ibn Saud came to Jedda. He arrived on the 26th February, the principal object of his visit being to gratify the cherished ambition of Mr. Charles R. Crane, a former American Minister and sympathiser with Syrian revolutionaries, to make his acquaintance. This had been engineered by Mr. Crane. The King was all out to do honour to his guest.

3. Various functions were arranged for the King's stay in Jedda. The Diplomatic Corps were invited to several, as was Mr. Crane. We all dined at the municipality on the King's invitation. We all drank tea with Mr. Philby whose house His Majesty honoured. But the close of the proceedings was a review on the 27th February held mainly, it would appear, to provide local colour for Mr. Crane's edification. There was a small march past of the infantry of the 'regular army.' It was followed by a much larger parade of men-at-arms

from Nejd who had come back with the King. This was carried out with some show of military order, but it was followed by a dance similar to that given at Wadi Fatma though on a much larger scale. Many of the Royal princes took part in it. The leader was the King's son, the Emir Faisal, so that the Diplomatic body enjoyed the unusual spectacle of seeing the Minister for Foreign Affairs execute a public dance in front of them. He was most graceful, and he twirled a sword very prettily. He wore an agreeable smile, though it became a little set as the afternoon wore on—it is said that he collapsed at the end of the similar dance in Mecca. Altogether he showed to infinitely greater advantage than when he is conducting the foreign business of his country.

4. All the participants in the dance were Nejdies. The infantrymen of the regular army were not allowed to take part.

The King graciously accorded permission. Next day it was announced that the people of Jedda had expressed a desire to show what they could do in the way of a display. The King left Mr. Philby's party on the 28th February somewhat early because he had promised to return to the palace for this Jedda performance. I understand that it was on the same lines as the Nejd display, although less formal. After that the King was back in Mecca.

including one on the 3rd March, when the lead was said to have been taken by the Hadramis, and several gay parties running to many hundred people in a surged past my house on their way back from the palace.

5. On the 2nd March Mr. Philby gave me his account of the festival at Mecca. It began more or less by accident, he said, when a crowd of Meccans gathered to see the King's son dance.

There it was that the King's son danced. He was most graceful, and he twirled a sword very prettily. He wore an agreeable smile, though it became a little set as the afternoon wore on—it is said that he collapsed at the end of the similar dance in Mecca.

The King graciously accorded permission. Next day it was announced that the people of Jedda had expressed a desire to show what they could do in the way of a display.

The King left Mr. Philby's party on the 28th February somewhat early because he had promised to return to the palace for this Jedda performance. I understand that it was on the same lines as the Nejd display, although less formal.

After that the King was back in Mecca.

6. The Mecca "Umm-al-Qura" of the 27th February records the performance at Mecca in an article headed "The Speech of the Sword." It makes no mention of the dance at Wadi Fatma, but says that on the second day of the festival, which the princes joined, and that the King threw off his cloak, drew his sword and played with it too, "remembering the old days of his fights." The writer describes this sword play as a voiceless speech, because every glance and gesture of the King meant many things.

7. The King himself mentioned in my hearing at one of the functions in Jedda that the Nejd war-dance was a revival, the custom having been in abeyance for over fifteen years. Mr. Philby's version of the Mecca demonstrations ignores the fact that there had been an organised dance at Wadi Fatma on the 9th January, but he too says that these things are the revival of an old custom.

8. Ibn Saud started the organisation of the Akhwan colonies round about 1912. They were clearly designed to provide easily mobilisable fighting forces, fanned by zeal by the present Wahhabi doctrine. The rebels of 1929 turned a portion of this instrument against the King. It is difficult to judge how far the revolt permanently impaired the value of the Akhwan as a military machine, but one of the complaints of the rebels was that the King had ceased to be a good Wahhabi. This is true to the extent that, as he has risen, he has had to make many compromises with modern progress and some with less rigid forms of Islam. One sees in his toleration and encouragement of the recent manifestations an indication of his desire to ride on a looser rein a section of his subjects who like things repugnant to the true Wahhabi of the old school—the music of the drum, for instance. Although this new liberty has been allowed to both Nejdies and Hejazis,

significant that the easing of the safety valve has taken place in Mecca and Jedda, places with no real appetite for Wahhabism in any form. The King would appear to be reinsuring with the less puritanical elements. His personal participation and that of the princes in the dancing have enabled him to appear as a monarch who not only likes to see his people have a bit of fun, but is democratic enough to join in it.

9 Townsman count for little in this country, and it would be a mistake to precede paragraph. The spectacle of the dancing crowd outside my house

of the cheerfuller phases of European revolutions which have ended in the downfall of Kings, but I should be slow to suggest that Ibn Saud's complaisance denotes, in an Arabian setting, any consciousness of a serious weakening in his position.

10 I am sending copies of this despatch to the High Commissioner at Bagdad, Cairo, the Honourable the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and to the Secretary to Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department.

I have, &c.
ANDREW RYAN

E 1601 589 26

No. 66

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson. — (Received March 30)

(No. 81)

Sir,

Jedda, March 6, 1931

IN my despatch No. 80 of 12-day date I have had occasion to mention the visit of Mr. Charles R. Crane to Jedda. As this event has attracted a good deal of attention it may be worth while to make it the subject of a report.

2 It will be remembered that Mr. Crane visited Jedda at the end of 1926 as recorded in the Jedda report for December of that year. He did not then meet Ibn Saud, but they exchanged presents. His recent visit would appear to have been arranged by Mr. Antonius, who was formerly employed in the Palestine Administration, and who visited Sir G. Clayton here at various times from 1925 to 1928. I first heard of it from Mr. Philby, shortly before I received a telegram from Sir John Churchill on the subject.

3 Mr. Crane's personal visit to Ibn Saud. He arrived here on the 25th February and left on the 2nd March. He was accompanied by Mr. Antonius. He stayed, by his own request, at the house of a local notable who had entertained him in 1926. He saw a great deal of the King in one way or another, both by special arrangement and at functions.

4 In 1926-27 Mr. Crane was *malin* in French and British official circles because of his association with Syrian revolutionaries. I have no full information on the subject, but my French colleague here tells me that, in his opinion, French authorities took a rather exaggerated view. He seems to regard Mr. Crane as a man who has money to burn, although he does not burn it as freely as he is sometimes expected to do. My own observation tends to confirm this. Mr. Crane called on me, and I entertained him a little during his stay without going beyond the courtesy which it is natural to show in this place to any distinguished visitor. He rode his hobby all the time, enacting from Turkey to the Far East, and he seemed to be merely an interested, though sympathetic, observer of experiments in uplift in the various countries. He dwelt greatly on the many things he had seen disappear "into history."

5 Mr. Crane is interested in the Yemen, and is said to be building a road there from benevolent motives. His visit to Jedda was heralded by rumours that he was going to give or lend Ibn Saud a handsome sum of money. I have not yet heard what passed between them, except that, when the King drank tea at Mr. Philby's on the 28th February, the conversation turned on artemesian wells, and Mr. Crane offered to arrange for his engineer in the Yemen to call in at Jedda on his next voyage up the Red Sea to size up the possibilities of boring hereabouts. The King, who toys a good deal with the idea of finding new water in his

Domain, accepted the offer. The conversation, in which it was made and accepted and at which I was present, appeared to be quite accidental.

I am sending copies of this despatch to the High Commissioner for Egypt, the High Commissioner for Transjordan and the political resident and Commander-in-chief at Aden.

I have, &c.
ANDREW RYAN

E 1606, 387/25]

No. 67

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson. — (Received March 30)

(No. 85.)

Sir,

Jedda, March 7, 1931

WITH reference to my telegram No. 33 of the 4th March I have the honour to forward herewith a full record of my discussion with Ibn Saud on the 2nd March regarding the Transjordan frontier question. The notes (1) addressed to me by the Minister for Foreign Affairs next day in reply to my communications of the 2nd February.

2 Before receiving your final instructions, I had given Sheikh Yusuf Yasin a list of various matters about which I wished to speak to the King. They included the Transjordan frontier question and the "Bisbee incident," which I dealt with on the 2nd March. There were four other matters of considerable importance, which I did not raise for the reason given in the enclosed record.

3 On the evening of the 3rd March, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin informed me that the King would be glad to receive me again to discuss the matters mentioned in my list.

4 On the 4th March, I went to the palace at 9.30 a.m. and was received by the King in the audience room. As I was about to enter, the King's door opened and Mr. Antonius came in. He was accompanied by Mr. Philby and Mr. Clayton.

5 No allusion was made on either side to the frontier question. When we left the audience room, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin observed that we were getting on well. He then remarked that one grave question overshadowed everything else. He passed this conversation, although we met on the 5th and 6th March to discuss other things.

6 The King and the Sheikh would appear to have kept the matter within the smallest possible circle. I have had no indication that anyone outside the Palace and the Legation knows of the crisis. I doubt whether even Mr. Philby, in spite of his constant frequentation of the King and his *Emine* *grise* reputation, has been told anything important. If he has, he has had the sense to keep it to himself.

7 I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan.

I have, &c.
ANDREW RYAN

Enclosure in No. 67

Record of Sir A. Ryan's Audience with Ibn Saud on March 2, 1931

1 I WENT to the palace at 9.30 a.m. accompanied by Mr. Wakeley and Ismail Effendi, who interpreted. The King was attended by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, who was present throughout, except for short exits to get papers. I was with the King until about 11.45, and nearly the whole of the time was devoted to the Transjordan frontier question.

2 I had given Sheikh Yusuf some days before a list of seven matters which I wished to lay before the King in person. On receipt of my final instructions on the Transjordan question, I decided not to detract from its importance by discussing other matters. I made an exception to try to get the conversation on

I had to make about the Biscoe incident. After compliments, I told the King that I would confine myself to two subjects, and I disposed of the Biscoe affair in the manner recorded in a separate despatch to the Foreign Office. I then said I must turn to a much more difficult matter.

3. I told the King that I had addressed two communications to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 2nd and 3rd January 1936.

the date of my audience with him on the 11th June last up to that of my

the knowledge of His Majesty's Government and under instructions. They had been in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The matter was no longer in my hands, but I was instructed to follow up the two communications in which I had reproduced the views of His Majesty's Government by seeing the King personally.

4. The Government had said about Captain Glubb. I presumed that His Majesty had seen my note, and that I need not recapitulate its contents. I emphasised however, its importance. Most serious accusations had been made by the Hejaz Government against Captain Glubb. He had been charged with circulating false rumours and converting camels belonging to Nejd to his own use, which might impair the confidence of His Majesty's Government in Captain Glubb. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government, the accusations reflected on themselves, as they were made by the Hejaz Government.

5. My second purpose was even more important. His Majesty's Government had stated their position explicitly in the memorandum enclosed in my second note. The matter was therefore out of my hands, as I had said, but I had been instructed to supplement the memorandum and had two observations to add (I corrected this later by saying that there was a third). They were these —

- (1) I wanted to impress on the King the extreme gravity of the situation. To which I was capable
- (2) I was to say that His Majesty's Government wished me to obtain a definite answer before the King left Jeddah, and at latest before the evening of the 4th March, i.e., within four days of delivering the memorandum
- (3) I had to add, even at the risk of offending the King's person, that it was universally believed on the frontier that the large-scale raids from Nejd into Transjordan were carried out under his authority

6. As regards (3), I suggested, with an explanation that what I was about to say was in accordance with the belief entertained on the frontier. There had been no reference to the British memorandum of last October, but in a later note the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated that the Hejaz Government had not ceased until raiding from Transjordan had entirely ceased. In making this point, I was hampered by my inability to state that His Majesty's Government secretly knew that Ibn Saud had himself inaugurated the October raids. It was that within a few days of the delivery of the October memorandum, there had been two great raids into Transjordan, of the immensity of which the authorities at Jaufr had had previous knowledge as was shown by a telegram from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Legation sent on the day on which the raids actually took place. This warning was too late because of the circuitous route by which it was sent, Jaufr-Mecca-Jeddah-Jerusalem-Aminan, but it showed that the authorities of Jaufr, knowing of the departure of the raiders, could the more easily have rounded them up on their return. The 800 camels taken in these raids were, until recently at any rate, known to be kept close to the frontier. Finally when I had on the 17th February written to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin about alleged preparations for further raiding, he had written on the day of receiving my letter to say that the report was false. How could so swift a denial, without investigation, be given without suggesting that, if the report were true, the authorities in Mecca would have knowledge of the preparations?

7. I said I had nothing to add except to repeat that the situation was one of extreme gravity. The King's reply was not equally consecutive and necessitated discussion on points as they arose. The following account of what passed is based largely on notes taken by Mr. Wikeley, and gives the gist of the conversation, but it was so often led aside from its main source and at times so involved that there may be errors in the arrangement of the various passages.

8. The King said that it was not for him to speak about Captain Glubb. Thinking that he was going to pass my first note off in this way, I interpolated that His Majesty's Ministers had said a great deal. He said he had not finished what he was about to say. Captain Glubb had started the matter by allegations that the Nejd authorities were encouraging raids and distributing money. These allegations were false. The King rather qualified the express attribution of them to Captain Glubb by saying that they were false, whether it was Captain Glubb, or anyone else who was responsible for them, and he tried to make out that there was no definite attack on Captain Glubb personally. I pointed out that categorical accusations had been made in two written communications and by Yusuf Yasin in official conversations with me.

9. The King denied that En Neshmi any longer held any official employment in his service. He insisted that there were no preparations for raiding, and that the new Governor of Jaufr had been ordered to do all in his power to stop it. He had dismissed En Neshmi some time ago because of the views held regarding him in Transjordan and because he could not work in with the authorities there. As a matter of fact Neshmi was probably more capable than the new Governor whom he had sent when he appointed Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Zaid to his present post.

10. The King said that he would do all in his power to see that justice was done equitably with both sides. If crimes were committed they should be punished irrespective of side. His Majesty's Government were much stronger than he was. If they sought to ruin him or wished to humiliate him, it was not the treatment he expected of old friends. Transjordan and Hejaz Nejd should receive equal treatment. He held his subjects as completely as the ring on his finger. If offenders in Transjordan were punished he was ready to mete out twice the punishment to those on his own side.

11. The King said that the suggestion that raids were carried out under his authority reflected on him personally. It was, he intimated, false. He was entitled as a King to ask for an explanation of it, and if it could not be substantiated, to demand satisfaction. I said that I had not made an accusation but had told him what was believed on the frontier. I stressed the importance of such a belief being entertained. He said something to the effect that this was not an adequate excuse. I replied that I was making no excuse and repeated that I had made no accusation, but had stated a fact as to what was thought on the frontier. In order to emphasise the point without committing myself too far, I attempted again to develop the considerations stated in paragraph 6 above. When I again mentioned Fudhail Bey's note stating that raids from Nejd could not be condemned unless raids from Transjordan ceased, His Majesty asked whether that view was right or wrong. He evidently expected me to admit its justice. I said "Wrong!" During this portion of the conversation the King drew some

conclusions. He said that the accusations against Captain Glubb were made by His Majesty's Ministers. He said that he regarded anything I said as even more official than what his own Ministers said. I replied that in anything I did say, I certainly spoke as the representative of my Government, but pointed out again that what I had said was not that the King had encouraged raiding, but that he was generally believed on the frontier to have done so. (I was careful throughout this passage of arms neither to express disbelief in the King's complicity nor to assert His Majesty's Government's belief in it.)

12. The King said that he could impose his authority on his tribes, and referred at one moment to the action he had taken against Faisal-ud Dawish and others. He could not, however, see his subjects killed and plundered. I worked back to the failure of his Government to answer the British memorandum of October. He said that an answer had been sent raising one point on which a reply had been awaited. I told him that I remembered the note to which he referred and asked him whether he, as the head of a great Government, meant to say

restored, else the Howaitat could not be restrained. I asked how it was that, if there was any good answer about the October raids, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had ignored the notes of the Legation regarding them, His Majesty had the reputation of giving personal attention to the petitions of the meaneest of his subjects. His Government appeared to think that they could leave unanswered important communications from His Majesty's Government like the October memorandum and the protests regarding the October raids.

17 The King's final points were as follows. —

- (1) He tried to preserve the best relations with His Majesty's Government and with British officials
- (2) He had full authority over his subjects and was ready to inflict merited punishment
- (3) He would never accept that his subjects should be treated inequitably

On hearing his final points, I thanked the King for what he had said about his desire for good relations and asked permission not to tire him any longer. I withdrew with the feeling that he was impressed by the magnitude of His Majesty's Government's demonstration, but not fully conscious of its categorical nature. He contained himself admirably throughout the audience and never forgot his habitual courtesy although at moments he spoke with emphasis and an appearance of strong feeling. On my side, I said all I could to impress on him the importance of replying definitely to His Majesty's Government's memorandum, but I was somewhat cramped in my style by not knowing what His Majesty's Government had said in its reply, which was not a story on all points.

B 1637 387 25

No. 713

Santa, March 30 1951

I sent urgent note on 24th March as instructed. Following is the gist of Hejaz Government's reply dated 20th March:—

(Repeated to Transjordan, No 90)

[illegible]

[E 1515/27 25]

No. 69

Mr A Henderson to Sir A Ryan (Jedda)

(No. 52)

(Telegraphic) R.

Foreign Office, March 30 1931

YOUR despatch No 41 of 2nd February Ibn Mashhur

I approve your language

Since "Lupin" Conference His Majesty's Government have not advanced matters by intervening in this question, which concerns the two Kings alone. In these circumstances, unless you see objection, you should reply to Hejazi note on following lines -

Question of Ibn Mashhur was discussed by two Kings at "Lupin" Conference. Two Kings agreed as to disposal of case, and any interest since taken by His Majesty's Government has been taken by them purely as friend of both parties anxious to assist establishment of good relations between them. In present circumstances, however, His Majesty's Government can only disinterest themselves from it and leave it to direct settlement with King Feisal and Iraqi Government

(Repeated to Bagdad No 130)

[E 1516/733 25]

No. 70

Mr A Henderson to Sir A Ryan (Jedda)

(No. 53)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, March 30 1931

YOUR telegram No. 57 of the 7th March Facilities for flights along the Hana coast

I approve your proposed course of action

Air Ministry suggest that when you broach question of landing grounds you

but that, if marked landing ground is available on Jinnah Island for use in emergency, this would somewhat allay anxiety of His Majesty's Government pending provision of other two

E 1668 367/25]

No. 71

Sir A Ryan to Mr A Henderson - (Received March 31)

(No. 72)

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, March 31, 1931

MY immediately preceding telegram.

I feel bound to express the opinion that combined effect of Ibn Saud's proposals up to date will deprive meeting of any practical (group undecyphered), as a means of establishing the co-operation which His Majesty's Government desire. He is unwilling to give Ibn Zeid power to take any important decisions. What he really contemplates is a duel *ad referendum* between the two backers of the proposal. Discussion of joint measures will be excluded.

Above appreciation is based on correspondence exchanged. I have refrained from 2nd March from personal discussion in order to avoid the fact that Hejaz Government are directly up against His Majesty's Government. The latter can alone judge whether it suits them to agree to meeting on Ibn Saud's terms, but it should be realised that it will almost certainly be nothing more than a fresh round in the game of evasion which he has played so successfully during the last months and will merely postpone necessity for taking stronger line if you intend to enforce the essence of your demands of 20th February

(Repeated to Transjordan, No 91)

[E 1637/387/25]

No. 72

Mr A Henderson to Sir A Ryan (Jedda)

(No. 54)

(Telegraphic) R.

Foreign Office April 2, 1931

YOUR telegram No. 71 of 30th March - Transjordan frontier situation. His Majesty's Government's proposal is that, while discussions continue between two Governments with a view to agreeing on details of procedure to be adopted by Captain Glubb and Ibn Zeid in examining claims arising from raids since 1st August, these two officials should meet immediately, even if only for purpose of making contact and exchanging information and views in order to promote co-operation in prevention or limitation of further raiding from both sides. Points still under discussion with Hejazi Government will therefore not arise in connexion with meeting and need not delay it. His Majesty's Government certainly insist on their view that this preliminary meeting should take place immediately

2. High Commissioner, Transjordan, is being requested to telegraph to you suggesting new date for meeting and suggesting material for reference of use of Jaul wireless raised in Hejazi note of 20th March

3. On receipt of his views, and unless he demurs, you should address Hejazi Government in accordance with paragraph 1 above, proposing date suggested by High Commissioner, repeating proposal that meeting should take place at Al Meisiri or other place near frontier which Hejazi Government may select, and embodying High Commissioner's reply regarding wireless

4. You should thereafter make every effort to secure that Hejazi Government accept proposal for meeting without raising further difficulties.

Above telegram was drafted prior to receipt of your telegram No 72 of 31st March, which, however, does not modify above instructions

(Repeated to Transjordan, No 44)

E 1669 2 25

No. 73

Mr A Henderson to Sir A Ryan (Jedda)

(No. 57)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, April 3, 1931

YOUR telegram No. 68 of 27th March Iraqi Prime Minister's visit to Jedda

You should refrain from intervening unless requested by either side. In that case you may use your good offices in personal capacity with a view to removal of differences

You will of course appreciate that, if intervention on your part is to be successful, it is essential that neither Nuri nor Hejazi Government should however wrongly form impression that your suggestions are a *propos* or the other

As regards individual questions mentioned in your telegram, His Majesty's Government agree generally to lines you propose to follow except in the case of (a) extradition and (b) the Mashhur trial. These were only proposed to offer extradition concession in 1929 as a means of promoting a comprehensive settlement of the principal matters then in dispute between the two countries. Those conditions no longer obtain, and it is therefore advisable that you should avoid any language which might give the impression that you are proposing to do so in 1931

As regards Ibn Mashhur, please see my telegrams No. 52 of 30th March and No. 55 of 2nd April

As regards (2), your assumption is correct
(Addressed to Jedda, No. 57, and Bagdad, No. 134)

E 1727 387 25]

No. 74

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 7)

(No. 76)

(Telegraphic) R.

Jeddah, April 6, 1931

(A note of 5th April Minister for Foreign Affairs complains of following.—

- 1 British aircraft have recently violated Hejaz Nejd territory by repeatedly flying over Qariyat and Wadi Sirhan and between Qariyat and Jarf
- 2 Transjordan caravans circulating near frontier have crossed it several times and moved about in Hejaz Nejd territory, to which Hejaz Nejd Government cannot consent

Minister for Foreign Affairs protests, and requests punishment of those responsible. He also states that the Government cannot know

that the Government is taking steps towards improving good relations at the time when Hejaz Government, in conjunction with His Majesty's Government, are earnestly striving to overcome frontier difficulties, and confidence that His Majesty's Government will rigorously prevent repetition of such dangerous accidents

(Repeated to Transjordan No 94)

E 1780 387 25]

No. 75

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 7)

(No. 70)

(Telegraphic)

Jeddah, April 7, 1931

MY immediately preceding telegram

has been received. I am sorry to hear that the Government is taking steps to convert ordinary motor cars into extemporised armoured cars.

I cannot vouch for the last two items, and reports of unusual movements of troops are [omitted] too common in this country to deserve much attention. Language of last notes read in conjunction with other recent communications suggests, however, the bare possibility that the King may be trying to work up justification for some kind of forward action. I think such action unlikely, but possible. I am sure that the Government will feel that the situation of Iraq negotiations, and recent indications point to easier situation between him and Iraq. I am sure that the Government will feel that the situation is equally due to apprehension as to intention of His Majesty's Government. I am reporting by letter conversation with Yasin on 1st April when he called for the Government's Government as regards Transjordan and the severity of my own language then. I am sure that the Government will feel that the situation is of the capital importance of the frontier question

(Repeated to Transjordan, No 95)

E 584 584 26]

No. 76

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jeddah)

(No. 137)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 8, 1931

YOU recorded in your despatch No. 186 of the 23rd July, 1930, the substance of the possibility of the Hejaz-Nejd entering the League of Nations, and this question has since been examined in all its aspects, as a result of your discussions

with members of my department during your visit to London in October of last year.

2. I recognise that from considerations of local expediency there are certain important arguments which might be adduced in favour of the Hejaz-Nejd becoming a member of the League. It could be pointed out that membership of the League might conceivably lead the Hejazi Government to adopt a policy of co-operation with other countries in regard to various matters of international concern, and that the participation of the Hejaz and Nejd in the normal activities of the League would be of special value in connexion with such matters as the development of international communications (more particularly by air) and of international health control although it may be doubted whether British interests would be best served by laying stress on the international aspect of the Arabian air route and of the sanitary control of the Mecca Pilgrimage. An admission of Ibn Saud's territories to the League on the relations between the Hejaz Nejd and Iraq. Since Iraq appears likely to become a member of the League in 1932, it would no doubt be to the good that the Hejaz Nejd should thenceforward be on a similar international footing, and the fact that both countries had undertaken the common obligations incumbent upon members of the League might conceivably facilitate the settlement of possible future disputes between them.

3. From the point of view of the League of Nations itself, on the other hand, it is not clear that that body would necessarily be strengthened by the admission to membership of a country where conditions are so primitive as to make it difficult, if not impossible, for it to participate at present in general measures for furthering the cause of civilisation. The activities of the League in such fields as the suppression of slavery are already somewhat weakened by the presence in the League of certain countries in which slavery exists, such as Abyssinia, whose influence is occasionally exercised against progressive measures. For this reason, an application for membership of the League by the Hejaz Nejd might not be welcomed by all members of the League.

4. It is true that the admission of the Hejaz Nejd to the League might give rise to serious difficulty if an application on the part of Ibn Saud to be admitted to the League were to be made at the same time. It is true that domestic slavery in the Hejaz Nejd, the apparent absence of any intention on the part of the Government to suppress it, and the difficulties King Ibn Saud is understood to be raising to the inclusion of anti-slavery provisions in the treaty of peace, might be regarded as a serious obstacle to the admission of the Hejaz Nejd to the League. It is true that the League of Nations, devolving from article 23 of the Covenant, even though similar difficulties may have been surmounted or ignored in certain other cases. If His Majesty's Government were too active to encourage King Ibn Saud to seek admission to the League, they might be regarded as being responsible for any rebuff which he might eventually encounter as a consequence of compliance with their advice.

5. Further, the League of Nations, in considering an application for membership, requires to be satisfied that the applicant State possesses established frontiers. It is true that the Hejaz Nejd has no established frontiers, but it is possible, too, that the question of the frontier between Asir and the Yemen. It is possible, too, that the question of the frontier between the Hejaz Nejd and the Yemen might be raised by the exchange of notes on this subject attached to the Treaty of Jeddah, might arise in this connexion. There would be some inconvenience in the discussion of either of these questions at Geneva at the present time.

6. I now turn to the legal aspect of the question, on which I understand that the Hejazi Government have invited the views of His Majesty's Government. The main point to be considered in this connexion is the fact that the Hejaz is already included in the annex of the Covenant of the League of Nations as one of the "original members of the League of Nations signatories of the Treaty of Peace" and therefore comes within the words of article 1 of the Covenant—

"The original members of the League of Nations shall be those of the signatories which are named in the annex to this Covenant."

7. It is clear, however, that the mere inclusion of the name of a State in the annex does not, by itself, make that State a member of the League, because there must be, on the part of the State, some act undertaking the obligations of the Covenant, and, in the case of those States enumerated in the first part of the annex, this act is the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, which contains the Covenant. The question is therefore, in the first place, whether the Hejaz could now, by ratifying the Treaty of Versailles, *ipso facto* become a member of the League. The answer depends upon the effect of the events which have taken place since the signature of the Treaty of Versailles by plenipotentiaries of ex-King Hussein, and the question appears really to turn on the point whether the Hejaz still exists to-day as the same international unit which it was in 1919. It is clear that the mere fact that the former reigning dynasty has been deposed and replaced by another does not, in itself, affect the continuance of the Hejaz as the same international unit, any more than in other cases a revolutionary change of régime in a State involves the extinction of the former State and the creation of a new one. In the present case, however, something more has occurred. The present ruler of the Hejaz is also ruler of Nejd, and was ruler of Nejd before he became ruler of the Hejaz, and the question of the precise character of the union of the two States under his rule is therefore of decisive importance.

8. You will have observed that, in a reply to a question in the House of

of the Hejaz and of Nejd are recognised by His Majesty's Government as separate sovereign States under one ruler, King Abd-el-Aziz-bin-Saud. The form of the reply might suggest, though it does not necessarily imply, that His Majesty's Government regard the Hejaz and Nejd as being two entirely separate States in international law, united only in a personal union by reason of the fact that they

to say that the Hejaz continues as the same international unit, and could now ratify the Treaty of Versailles and claim to become a member of the League of

Hejaz a separate member of the League of Nations, but could also apply later for separate membership in respect of Nejd. Various inconveniences would

become a party to the treaty for all purposes, a result which might even produce complications in connexion, for instance, with such subjects as that of German reparations. Moreover, it might be asked by other parties to the Treaty of Versailles whether the deposit of a ratification of the treaty more than ten years after it had come into force was now permissible, at any rate without the consent of the other contracting Powers.

adduce the declaration made by King Ibn Saud himself at the time of his election as King of the Hejaz that the administration of the Hejaz would be kept separate

this view does not appear to His Majesty's Government to be the correct legal interpretation of the situation. While it is both theoretically and practically possible for two countries which have democratic parliamentary institutions, and in which the King is a constitutional monarch, to keep their separate international status in spite of having a common King, and to contend that they remain in international law two entirely separate units, as in the case of the former union of England and Hanover, it seems difficult to contend that this can be the case where the common King is not a constitutional monarch, but virtually—as is King Ibn Saud—an autocrat, who is himself the Government of the country. In these circumstances a common King involves also virtually a common Government even if, for purposes of administration, &c., the two countries are kept more or less distinct. The relationship of the Hejaz and Nejd under the present régime appears to be much more in the nature of a "real union," such as that of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, than in the nature of a "personal union." This impression is confirmed by the manner in which the foreign affairs of the two countries are conducted. They have only one Foreign Office and one Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the recent treaties of King Ibn Saud are not signed by him in duplicate, one as King of the Hejaz and another as King of Nejd, but are signed by him as King of the Hejaz and Nejd.

10. In the circumstances the exact relationship between the two countries may fairly be said to be known only to Ibn Saud himself. For the reasons given above, however, His Majesty's Government consider that, for the present purpose, the Hejaz and Nejd should be regarded as a single State. It follows that in international law both the Hejaz and Nejd have disappeared as separate international units, and a new unit, consisting of the union, has taken their place.

of Versailles, because the former State of the Hejaz has really ceased to exist, and it would be impossible for the Hejaz separately to become a member of the League of Nations, because it does not exist as a separate State. The only way, then, in which the Hejaz and Nejd could obtain membership of the League of Nations would be to apply for it and be elected under the second paragraph of article 1 of the Covenant, and the new member would be the joint Kingdom of the Hejaz and Nejd.

11. I would point out, in order to avoid misunderstanding, that the creation of a new State out of two formerly separate States united in a real union does not, under the principles of State succession, involve the extinction of all the international obligations of the two component States. The foregoing view of the matter does not imply that King Ibn Saud is entitled to ignore the obligations previously contracted by the Hejaz and Nejd when they were separate international units.

12. Should the Hejazi authorities again approach you in regard to the question of the admission of the Hejaz and Nejd to membership of the League of Nations, you should refer them to paragraphs 9 and 10 of this despatch, and may discuss the question generally with them in the light of the considerations set forth above.

13. All these considerations are, however, subordinate to the general principle that His Majesty's Government desire to see membership of the League of Nations as nearly universal as possible. They cannot, consistently with this principle, do anything to dissuade a State which is now outside the League but wishes to come in from applying for membership. If, therefore, the Hejazi Government express such a wish, you should say that His Majesty's Government welcome their decision and will support their candidature at Geneva.

I am, &c.
ARTHUR HENDERSON

E 1790.1630 25

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 96.)

Sir,

Jeddah March 14, 1931

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith an appreciation of conditions in the Hejaz by Haji Abdul Majid, the Malay Pilgrimage Officer attached to this office, of the Malay civil service, and whose work here and during occasional visits to Mecca, gives him special opportunities of observing the reactions in the Hejaz of a conquering but somewhat decadent Wahabism, of considerable value.

2. I agree generally with Haji Abdul Majid's views, although I doubt personally whether Ibn Saud has yet reached the point at which he would for a monetary consideration encourage any scheme for rebuilding shrines already destroyed. There is no doubt, however, that growing financial stringency with its hampering effect on the King's convenience and ambitions, is a cardinal feature of the situation.

3. I have dealt separately with two matters to which reference is made in the enclosed paper, namely, the significance of the recent revival of Hejazi dancing and the difficulties with which the Government have had to cope during the past few weeks owing to the exchange crisis.

4. I am distributing copies of this despatch and enclosure to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, his Excellency the

Governor of the Straits Settlements, His Majesty's High Commissioners at Baghdad, Jerusalem and Cairo, the Honourable the Political Resident at Bushire and His Majesty's Political Resident at Aden

I have, &c
ANDREW RYAN

Enclosure in No. 77

Present Conditions in the Hejaz

The Wahabi regime in the Hejaz is, to the outside observer, synonymous with the Islamic glory of the days of the famous four Caliphs, and Abdul Aziz-bin-Saud, the Wahabi King, is hailed as the greatest Arab hero of modern times. It will be misleading not to admit that out of chaos and turbulence, which was the order of the day in the Hejaz during both the Hashimite rule and that of the Turks, Arab unity to a considerable extent in the central block of the peninsula stretching from the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf has been accomplished and peace and security to life and property, particularly in the zones traversed and frequented by pilgrims from overseas, have been effected for which the Moslem

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all Moslem hearts beat with pride for it, and adopting Wahabi doctrines which primarily aim at removing superstitions and a reversion to the simple ways of the Prophet, they expect to see advancement and progress in their own well

that, in the first Moslem Congress convened by Ibn Saud in 1926, many of the Moslem representatives, encouraged by the public declaration of the erstwhile Moslem hero on his entry to and occupation of Mecca that he was there to serve Islam and the Moslems, conjured up visions of a united Moslem Empire indeed, the speeches made at the said congress savoured much of the idea of forming the republic. The failure by non-attendance of the Moslem Congress in

Saud who by this time had made it evident, directly and indirectly, of his determination to rule the Hejaz by himself and for himself. And it so happened that the year 1927 saw the record number of pilgrims visiting the Hejaz, so that the record amount of revenue accruing therefrom proved too much for the simple

and outlook. The Mehmud incident in the same year, however, thanks to the stubbornness of the Egyptian Government over a principle which they deemed it

its fanatic followers to suspect of his motives other than that, according to his

Hejaz." Nevertheless, modern means of communication, such as the automobile, the telephone and the radiograph, appealed to him as military measures for strengthening his position, and these he soon introduced to the country without taking into consideration the fact that his own people were so backward and far from ready to make use of, much less to appreciate, them. The revolt of almost

and Ibn Thantun, signifies not only the unfulfilment of secret treaties or personal understanding between them, but also a divergence of policy to be pursued in future by the King. Hitherto he planned all his movements and his campaigns with his supporters for the spread of Wahabism, but now he disposes offensive and defensive measures with his counsellors for the safety and expansion of his Empire. That the latter policy is becoming more and more expensive to be effective in the way satisfactory to him is evident from the fact that pilgrim taxation (which, by the way, is in the Hejaz by far the main source of revenue) has to be increased year by year, so much so that the Moslem world already begins to wonder where such increases will stop. Perhaps the weakest point in his Government, that is severely criticised behind the scenes by those who are directly effected is that no provision whatsoever seems to have been made "for

rainy days," so that during a lean season, such as is being experienced now, the wealthy inhabitants are called upon to replenish his exchequer by loans which are as uncertain of being repaid as the East is always uncertain of the morrow. It is said that the old Kamakam (Governor) of Jeddah, Haji Abdullah Ridha, left the country ostensibly to recruit his health, but in reality to avoid repeated demands from the King for monetary loans. So absorbed is Ibn Saud now in his empire building schemes that the hitherto very stringent laws about smoking in the streets of Mecca and other similar fanatic measures have been relaxed and so engrossed is he in securing money almost by fair means or foul in order to advance those schemes that it is said, if some wealthy Moslem submit it to him that if he is allowed to rebuild those places of reverence that the Wahabis destroyed in the holy cities of Mecca and Medina in 1924-25, he will pay the King a handsome sum of money. Ibn Saud will have to think twice before he

noticeable even to the man in the street, who, groaning under the effects of the prevailing trade depression, grumbles at the extra burden put upon him by increased taxes. Reports of careless management of the King's Motor Transport De

only help to add further dissatisfaction in the public mind. Government officials, except the few who are immediately about the person of the King, begin to lose faith when their salaries, besides being several months overdue, are reduced. Wild rumours are c

currenty, th

the best

Mecca, believed to be the hardest of Arab hearts

even from the days of the Prophet, as easily as he did conquer the city seven

fewer than in that of his elder brother, Emir Saud), have already earned the reputation of being the friends of the immoral section of Mecca and clean-

minded or level-headed men wonder, unless they change their conduct, if they can be strong enough to rule the country between them and keep the turbulent

spirit of the Meccans as well as that of the untutored Bedouins in subjugation when the time comes for them to take over the reins of government. It would not be quite unjust, under the circumstances, to conclude that Ibn Saud is now

no more a Wahabi, in the sense of being a Moslem puritan, than the average follower of the Prophet in any of the four orthodox sects, Wahabism being to him, as it was to his ancestor who first espoused the Cause, a means whereby to

achieve an end. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that Ibn Saud by his conquest of the Hejaz, was greatly responsible for bringing the movement into the lime-light of the Moslem world, and for its ultimate acceptance Wahabism must depend on the merits of its own doctrines. And the Hejaz, or rather Mecca, its

will always remain as the principal seat of Wahabi education and influence so long as Ibn Saud or his line of descendants is on the throne, and this, if for no other reason, but to save his reputation as the Wahabi King

March 4, 1931

Haji Abdul Majid

E 1858 2, 25]

No. 78

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 81)

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, April 9, 1931

MY telegram No. 80

Negotiations took place in Mecca. Settlement on all important points was completed yesterday afternoon. There was no need for my intervention.

Following is summary of what Nuri Pasha told me spontaneously after dining at the Legation last evening:

1. *Desert Posts*.—Arrangements made on board "Lupin" seem to have been renewed.
2. *Ibn Vassilage*.—Agreement and attached protocol were signed on 8th April after much discussion of details, mainly drafting points I gather.
3. *Extortion*.—Text of treaty and accompanying letter to be written by Nuri were agreed. He says latter will not go to Parliament and that combined texts have given Ibn Saud great satisfaction. Minister for Foreign Affairs signed yesterday, Nuri to day.
4. *Ibn Masbuh Pasha* claims to have satisfied the King. Nuri did not mention to me remaining questions enumerated in my telegram No. 68. He said the King had raised other questions about Wafis, &c., but had been induced to postpone them. Pasha added this morning that he had conceded some points regarding Wafis. I am telegraphing separately about matters not directly connected with main negotiations.

I have not heard Hejaz Government's version, but Yusuf Yasin who came to dinner was full of joy.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 97.)

E 1859 387 25]

No. 79

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office, April 10.)

(No. 32)

(Telegraphic)

April 8, 1931

FOLLOWING addressed to Jedda, No. 30

"Reference Secretary of State's telegram No. 45, repeated to you No. 56. I concur in proposed reply contained in Foreign Office telegram No. 64 to you.

"I suggest 20th April as date of meeting.

"Direct communication by wireless between Glubb and Jaufr would be advantageous and should be instituted without delay. Wireless call sign of Glubb is ZEB, wave length 1,250 metres. Please inform me of call sign and wave length of Jaufr wireless. I shall be grateful if you will make it clear to Hejaz Government that use of wireless is intended to expedite and facilitate exchange of communications between Glubb and Ibn Zeid, and not to supersede direct communication. I shall inform Hejaz Government that Transjordan authorities have at all times done their utmost to prevent raiding by Transjordan tribes, and will inflict exemplary punishment on any Transjordan tribesmen who raid during meeting of Glubb and Ibn Zeid."

E 1882, 387, 25]

No. 80

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 10.)

(Nos. 87 and 88.)

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, April 10, 1931

(R.) TRANSJORDAN telegram No. 30 to me, repeated to Colonial Office, No. 32

I have communicated note to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day embodying paragraph 1 of your telegram No. 54 and contents of telegram under reference as far as essential. I had already reproduced paragraph 7 of your telegram No. 45 in memorandum sent to Minister for Foreign Affairs on 10th March. (End of R.)

In that paragraph you proposed simultaneous public announcements.

Neither assurance given in Hejaz Government's reply of 12th March nor that proposed in last sentence of telegram under reference (which in form is expedient of such statement at present stage, especially as you are still considering Hejaz memorandum of 12th March as a whole. If, however, you think it should be made I can embody it in supplementary communication. (Repeated to Transjordan, Nos. 107 and 108.)

E 1967 387 25]

No. 81

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 94)

(Telegraphic) R.

Jedda, April 14, 1931

MY telegram No. 87

Following is gist of Minister for Foreign Affairs' reply of 13th April —

"We have no objection to the meeting, though it be only for exchange of information, seeing that His Majesty's Government insist. As, however, atmospheric conditions have made it impossible to communicate between Mecca and Jaufr, we will inform Ibn Zeid by mail car and will take the first opportunity of communicating with Jaufr to telegraph instructions to him to telegraph to Glubb with a view to agreement as to time and place of meeting.

"We have informed Telegraph Administration of sign indicated by you. They propose 'W' for Jaufr, 'Z' for Glubb. Wave length between 600 and 600 metres. Jaufr call sign is 'H R S', wave-length 600 metres.

"I will convey any further information about Ibn Zeid's movements at first opportunity."

I had only time for hurried glance at above note before previously arranged interview with Yusuf Yasin this morning. He said the latest news of Ibn Zeid was that he had gone to Qariat, but that his further plans were uncertain. I urged the importance of early meeting in view of recent incidents and offered to send any message to Qariat which might help. I expressed disappointment at the insistence on preliminary meeting being only for exchange of information. His Majesty's Government had contemplated discussion of joint measures as well. Hejaz Government had replied that measures were "known". Each side might know its own measures, but what His Majesty's Government wanted was collaboration. I urged greater elasticity in instructions to Ibn Zeid.

Yusuf Yasin promised to consult the King regarding the offer of assistance in communication and to have Ibn Zeid's instructions worded with suitable latitude.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 112.)

[E 1942 387 25]

No. 82

Mr A Henderson to Sir A Ryan (Jedda)

(No 85)

(Telegraphic) R

Foreign Office, April 15, 1931

MY telegram No. 50 of 27th March. Raiding situation on Transjordan-Hejaz Nejd frontier

Following are views of His Majesty's Government regarding reply to be returned to remaining points in Hejazi Government's memorandum of 12th March.—

2. As regards prevention of raiding for the future, you should point out that the Hejazi Government have failed to return adequate reply to proposal in paragraph 7 of my telegram No. 45 of 7th March. They merely repeat their original statement that they are prepared definitely to prevent raids by their subjects. ~~It is with this end in view, and in order to dispose once and for all of the rumours current on the frontier that Hejazi Government countenance or have countenanced raids on Transjordan tribes, that His Majesty's Government have proposed public announcement by both sides categorically forbidding and disavowing all forms of raiding by their tribesmen at all times, and intimating that offenders will receive exemplary punishment.~~

3. As regards other equally important aspect of the question, i.e., that of immediate restoration of loot, I observe from enclosure in your despatch No 96 of 10th March that you have passed upon the proposal in your memorandum of the 10th March to the Hejazi Government. Section 4 (e) of my telegram No. 45 proposed that representatives should be empowered personally to supervise the arrangements for the immediate restoration of loot on either side. Reply to Hejazi Government's memorandum must take this into account.

4. You should explain to Hejazi Government, with reference to points (a) to (e) in paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 81 of the 14th March, that His Majesty's Government have already (nearly reluctantly) agreed to decisions reached by representatives being *ad referendum*, on condition that the necessary sanction shall be given without undue delay, and that they do not consider it desirable that matters should any longer be postponed by discussion on points of procedure and details of minor importance. The main thing is that the representatives should be enabled to start work at once and should be empowered personally to supervise arrangements for immediate mutual restoration of loot without further delay.

5. His Majesty's Government agree that representatives should, in the first instance, take with them all available information regarding raids, but they must ~~as far as possible, reach their decisions without summoning tribal sheikhs.~~ At the same time, presence of certain representative sheikhs may clearly be necessary in order to establish the facts. It would be useless to expect the Governments concerned to investigate the truth of conflicting statements regarding what has actually occurred. The facts can only be determined on the spot. His Majesty's Government accordingly feel that, in cases where the two representatives cannot agree as to the facts, it is essential that they shall be empowered to summon those sheikhs whose attendance may be considered necessary in order to assist them in their task. His Majesty's Government appreciate danger of quarrels arising between the sheikhs at isolated meeting place on the frontier, but consider that this could be much reduced if guarantees of good behaviour are taken in advance by two Governments from sheikhs concerned, and if two representatives take reasonable precautions.

6. As regards scope of the representatives' discussions, His Majesty's Government are of opinion that they should deal with any raids which, owing to the date on which they occurred, fall outside the scope of the MacDonnell enquiry.

7. As regards the surrender of raiding criminals, you should explain that this is a question which does not affect the immediate issue, settlement of which

it should not be allowed to delay, but that His Majesty's Government hope to be able to deal with it in a separate communication in the near future.

8. Please address Hejazi Government accordingly
(Addressed to Jedda, No. 65. Repeated to Transjordan, No. 48.)

[E 1942 387/25]

No. 83

Mr A Henderson to Sir A Ryan (Jedda)

(No 86)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, April 15, 1931

MY immediately preceding telegram. Raiding situation on Transjordan-Hejaz Nejd frontier

1. *Announcement regarding Cessation of Raiding.*—I approve your ~~proposal that His Majesty's Government should issue an announcement to Transjordan, to whom position is being explained. His Majesty's Government have already undertaken that Transjordan authorities shall issue announcement as soon as Hejazi Government have done so (see my telegram No. 45 of 7th March, paragraph 7).~~

2. *Evidence of Sheikhs.*—It seems preferable to omit from proposed reply to Hejazi Government ~~the proposal that representatives will be called upon to give evidence on oath.~~

3. *Date of Raids to be Considered.*—Formula proposed is designed to exclude alleged Transjordan raid of 20th July (see your telegram No. 58 of 4th March, paragraphs 3 and 6). You will realise that 1st August is in fact the agreed date, to which His Majesty's Government must hold the Hejazi Government, if and when it becomes necessary to name an actual date. But present formula is perhaps less likely to give rise to argument, which would again delay meeting.

(Addressed to Jedda, No. 66. Repeated to Transjordan, No. 49.)

[E 1937 387/25]

No. 84

Sir A Ryan to Mr A Henderson—(Received April 10)

(Nos. 95 and 96)

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, April 10, 1931

YOUR telegrams Nos. 65 and 66

I repeat my statement as to the importance of the matter and greater impressiveness, I should like to be clear as to following—

I ~~reiterate my statement as to the importance of the matter.~~ If so I think I should state this categorically. Paragraph 7 of your telegram No. 48 suggested ~~that the representatives should be empowered to summon those sheikhs whose attendance may be considered necessary in order to assist them in their task.~~ I have with express reference to prevention of raids during meeting, which both sides have ~~to be peculiarly scandalous. I cannot trace any other "original statement."~~ May I alter language slightly to cover these points, without, however, omitting words "at all times"?

(R) Your telegram No. 48 is received and omitted portion from (e) to other side "inclusive. I have traced them in sections and will now incorporate them. (End of R.)

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 114.)

E 1997/387/25

No 85

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda)

(No. 70.)

(Telegraphic) R.

Foreign Office, April 17, 1931

YOUR telegram No. 95 of 16th April Raiding situation on Transjordan-Hajaz Nejd frontier

You may make slight alterations on the lines you propose

Your assumption regarding separate character of preliminary meeting is correct

(Addressed to Jedda, No. 70. Repeated to Transjordan, No 51)

E 2018/387/25

No 86

Sir A. Ryan to Mr A. Henderson. (Received April 18)

No. 88)

Telegraphic) R.

Jedda, April 18 1931

YOUR telegram No. 70.

I have to-day sent memorandum, which with necessary alterations reproduces your telegram No. 65 except as follows—

Paragraph 1 introduces statement of view of His Majesty's Government, but says that it does not affect arrangements for preliminary meeting, to holding of which as soon as possible His Majesty's Government attach importance.

Paragraph 2 Words "repeat their original statement" are replaced by "I have inserted after 'have proposed' "and that meeting should be preceded by "I have omitted "at all times" later in this sentence, and added new sentence "they consider this prohibition and disavowal should extend to all raids at all times."

Paragraph 3 mentions omission from your memorandum of 10th March owing to telegraphic error of one phrase and reproduces correct text of paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 45 from "(b)" to the end

Paragraphs 4 to 7 of memorandum correspond without material alteration to similarly numbered paragraphs of your telegram under reference

(Repeated to Transjordan, No 116)

E 2064 2084 25

No 87

Sir A. Ryan to Mr A. Henderson (Received April 21)

No. 108)

Jedda, March 23, 1931

2. As you are aware, the currency system of this country rests on a double basis—the English gold sovereign and the silver riyal the equivalence of which is 100 to the £ sterling. The face value of riyals in circulation is estimated at from £150 to £200.

It is reckoned for accountancy purposes into 11 piastres miri, which do not exist as actual currency, the base metal coinage consisting of nickel piastres, which are theoretically worth 22 to the riyal or 220 to the £ sterling, but are always somewhat depreciated in the market. The currency thus consists of gold pounds, silver riyals and fractions thereof and the nickel piastre and its fractions, one of which the quarter-piastre, is known as halala. I should explain that the

principal currency elsewhere in Ibn Saud's dominions, including Asir

3. Some weeks ago the riyal broke away from the sovereign and went down to 10 to the £ sterling. The Government

...ing the exportation of gold. The Government expressed its willingness to accept riyals for all purposes at 10 to the £ sterling, and enjoined this on everyone else. They secured the support of the Nederlandse Handel Maatschappij (Netherlands Trading Society), which undertook to take only other banking firm in Jedda, Messrs. Gellatly, Hunkley and Co. (Sudan) (Limited) took up a more conservative attitude and declined to commit themselves, although they are in fact dealing at the official rate up to a limit.

5. I enclose a translation of a communiqué issued in the "I min-al Qura" of the 6th March. The same number of the paper had a leading article attributing the crisis to the fraudulent manoeuvres of speculators, denying that there has been any real crisis at all and describing the action of the Government

6. The measures taken have produced stability for the time being. The riyal has been rehabilitated so much as to bring gold down to its level. In view of the poor pilgrimage prospects, it is difficult to see what the outcome will be in a country with no export trade and little capacity in the highest places for any debts. It is to be supposed that the level of prices will rise. The action of the Dutch Bank has been of material assistance to the Government, but it is not clear on what basis that action rests. When he embarked on it, the Mr. Jacobs, appeared to be confident and to think that the Hejaz was good for any amount up to the total value of riyals in circulation. He professed to rely on the honour of the Government and thus found common ground with Mr. Philby, who in one conversation suggested that anyone who did not share this simple faith might as well give up trying to do business here.

7. Mr. Jacobs seems to be a pretty astute financier. He has a more solid basis to work on. On the face of it his bank makes six halalas per £ of 1 per cent. As they are in effect lending gold or its equivalent abroad on the security of riyals, the value to them of these two profits would appear to depend not only on the eventual solvency of the Government, but on the length of time for which they have to carry any riyals not required for current business. They doubtless have some redemption arrangement, but I have been unable to ascertain its exact nature. It is within my knowledge that on the 3rd March the Minister of Finance produced a certain quantity of gold for this purpose. My latest information at the time of writing is that Mr. Jacobs is not as well satisfied as he was three weeks ago. He told a member of my staff on the 22nd March that he would get out of the arrangement if he could.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade

I have, &c.
ANDREW RYAN

Not printed

E 2209/387 25)

No. 88

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Transjordan
(Received in Foreign Office, April 25)

(No. 122)

Telegraphic)

Colonial Office, 24 April 1931
No. 110
Jedda, April 26, 1931
Following is summary of Hejaz Government's answering memorandum of 24th April enclosed in formal note to me of same date

1. Hejaz Government wish to explain that the steps taken with a view to the capture of Ibn Zeid will lead to its taking place within the next days. They have emphasised, and still emphasise, necessity for application of provisions of Hadda Agreement as regards cessation of raiding on both sides. They are doing what they can with this object, but they have already stated that their measures are unlikely to succeed unless similar measures are taken on other side. In their recent memorandum they expressed wish that raiding should cease at least during meeting, only they had not observed any tangible result from previous arrangements to prevent it. They are glad to intimate concurrence in publication of general announcement prohibiting raiding on both sides because they consider prevention of raiding essential now and in future and at all times.

2. They consider question of summoning certain sheikhs to meeting-place should be left to representatives, because it is of course understood that there will be no reciprocal trials or interrogation, but that attendance of sheikhs will be for representatives to consider and will be for the purpose of their personal consultation only. Representative of one party should have no right to interfere with sheikhs of the other party or to put questions to them.

3. Hejaz Government note that His Majesty's Government concur in principle that representatives' decision will be final and binding on the two Governments.

4. They note that His Majesty's Government concur in suggestion that representatives should be provided with all necessary information regarding cases. They have explained in paragraph 3 above their views as to attendance of persons concerned.

5. They agree that investigation should include all raids mentioned in paragraph 8 of British memorandum of 18th April.

6. They note paragraph 7 of British memorandum and await promised reply of His Majesty's Government regarding surrender of criminals.

(Repeated to Transjordan No. 204)

E 2180 387 25)

No. 89

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 26)

(No. 100)

Telegraphic)

Colonial Office telegram No. 74 to Transjordan
Jedda, April 26, 1931

I suggest phrase in formula beginning "upon receipt" should read "upon direct notification of names and other available particulars by Hejaz-Nejd frontier authorities to corresponding Transjordan authorities."

This would reduce area of possible dispute and facilitate practical co-operation on lines of article 3 of Hadda Agreement.

I suggest also, that communication should refer expressly to explanations furnished by Hejaz Minister in London.

Repeated to Transjordan, No. 126.

E 2181 387 25)

No. 90

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 26)

(No. 110)

Telegraphic)

MY telegram No. 98

Following is summary of Hejaz Government's answering memorandum of 24th April enclosed in formal note to me of same date

1. Hejaz Government wish to explain that the steps taken with a view to the capture of Ibn Zeid will lead to its taking place within the next days. They have emphasised, and still emphasise, necessity for application of provisions of Hadda Agreement as regards cessation of raiding on both sides. They are doing what they can with this object, but they have already stated that their measures are unlikely to succeed unless similar measures are taken on other side. In their recent memorandum they expressed wish that raiding should cease at least during meeting, only they had not observed any tangible result from previous arrangements to prevent it. They are glad to intimate concurrence in publication of general announcement prohibiting raiding on both sides because they consider prevention of raiding essential now and in future and at all times.

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(Repeated to Transjordan No. 204)

(Repeated to Transjordan No. 204)

(Repeated to Transjordan No. 204)

(Repeated to Transjordan No. 204)

E 2221 81 25)

No. 91

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 26)

(No. 122)

S)

Jedda, April 1, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jedda report for January and February 1931. The report has been prepared by pressure of other work, but I have thought it preferable to confine it to the first two months of the year in accordance with new arrangement mentioned in the prefatory note.

2. I am enclosing copies of the report to the High Commissioner in Cairo, Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, Bagdad, Basra, New Delhi, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Aden, Addis Ababa, Lagos, Khartum, Port Sudan, the Senior Naval Officer in Red Sea Sloop, and the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan.

I have, &c.
ANDREW RYAN

Enclosure in No 91.

Jedda Report for January and February 1931

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PREFATORY NOTE

IN view of the increased pressure on the Legation at Jedda it has been decided, with the approval of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to issue these reports at intervals of two months in future. It is hoped that this will not materially reduce their value to the recipients, and that it will enable the Legation to issue the reports more punctually, although on the present occasion special reasons have caused delay.

The following arrangement will be adopted in future:—

The main divisions will be retained as at present, namely, internal and cross-sections. Sub-sections will be shown by unnumbered cross-headings. The paragraphs will be numbered consecutively, and will be followed by a brief reference.

It is pointed out that the spelling of place-names is a matter of great importance in Foreign Office usage. Whatever may be said for or against it, it is convenient that the place where the Legation is situated should be known in English by a fixed name. If other posts can reconcile it with their philological principles to adopt the Foreign Office version it will be much appreciated. The Legation is anxious to receive suggestions from other posts as to the spelling of important place-names in their respective spheres.

AFFAIRS

Ibn Saud

1. The King returned to Mecca on the 20th January and spent the whole of Ramadan there. He came to Jedda on the 25th February and stayed over the end of the month. On the day of his arrival he held a formal reception of foreign representatives. The principal object of his visit was to receive the rich American Mr Charles R. Crane, who, having come from the United States specially for the purpose, arrived in Jedda on the 25th February, accompanied by Mr. G. Antonius. An account of a previous visit by Mr. Crane to Jedda will be found in the report for December 1928. It may be remarked incidentally that, at that time, he was well known in French and British circles owing to his connexion with Syrian revolutionaries. At present he creates the impression of being an innocuous old gentleman, with wide interests and a passion for recording the many things he has seen "into history." Ibn Saud showered attentions on Mr. Crane, for whose benefit a Bedouin review was held on the 27th February (see paragraph V). The foreign representatives were also present, and the King entertained them and Mr. Crane at dinner the same evening. On the following day he honoured Mr. Philby with his company at tea, the principal members of the party being much the same. Ibn Saud appeared to have derived benefit from his visit to Nejd and was in his best form during his stay in Jedda. The unusual coolness and pleasantness of the climate earned his commendation.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs

2. The unsatisfactory state of affairs resulting from the illness of Fuad Bey Hamza (December report, paragraph 1 (b)) continued throughout January, and no business could be done by personal interview. The Amir Faisal visited Jedda on the 8th and 9th January for the celebration of the King's accession. He received Sir A. Ryan at a specially arranged interview on the 8th January, but it was almost entirely of a formal nature. It was afterwards explained that he had visited Jedda as Viceroy of the Hejaz only. He returned on the 28th January, accompanied by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin. Owing to Fuad Bey's illness, which culminated in his departure for Egypt on the 30th January, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin became Acting Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, remaining at the same time private secretary, head of the Political Section of the Divan and general factotum to the King. The Prince having formally received the foreign representatives, Sir A. Ryan was invited to a reception on the 29th January arranged to receive His Majesty's Minister for business on the 30th January. When Sir A. Ryan went to keep this appointment the palace resembled that of the Sultan, with the Prince, the Under-Secretary, and the servants were to be seen, and Sir A. Ryan left, after a lively conversation with the A.D.C., who appeared as the only official. The Prince, however, did not appear, and Sir A. Ryan was greatly taken aback when Sir A. Ryan passed him without stopping on his way to the Legation. As for the subordinates, they were doubtless sleeping through the Ramadan fast. Notwithstanding all this, the reception accorded to the British representative on his first business visit to a new Minister for Foreign Affairs was of a high order of satisfaction, and after a first insufficient attempt to placate him, Sheikh Yusuf called and offered an unqualified apology. All was thus happily settled by dinner-time.

3. This incident, although regrettable, cleared the air. Sir A. Ryan had called on the foreign representatives on the 1st February and stayed half an hour at the British Legation. He had on the previous day received Sir A. Ryan for business, but after his round of visits he collapsed with severe malaria. He returned to Mecca on the 3rd or 4th February and went into the country for some time. He proved more reasonable in discussion than had

been anticipated. His chief, the Emir, recovered in due course, but up to the end of February he showed no interest in or capacity for foreign affairs. Sheikh Yusuf effectively dealt with them throughout the whole period. He is very much the King's man and Ibn Saud has shown a tendency to put him in the forefront, although it is clear that he himself still pulls the strings.

f. ad. ad. ad. ad.

4. The financial situation went from bad to worse early in the year. Pilgrims have come forward in somewhat greater numbers than was anticipated, but the total number from overseas seems unlikely to exceed 50,000. Revenue must suffer accordingly. The two most notable indications of Treasury straits have been a heavy increase in customs duty on most staple imports, which was announced in the "Umm-al Qura" of the 6th February; and a temporary decline of the silver currency, which became acute in February. The silver riyal, the value of which is officially fixed at 10 to the gold pound sterling, slumped to 13 or even lower in Jeddah and Mecca. The Government found themselves short of gold, although it always seems possible to produce some at a pinch. They made strong efforts to restore the balance between riyals and pounds. It may be said in anticipation of the next report that they succeeded, but only by prohibiting the export of gold and by arrangements with the Dutch Bank in Jeddah, the exact nature of which was the subject of a report in the "Umm-al Qura" of the 13th February. Drafts on foreign countries. It was suggested that Mr Crane might in some way come to the help of Ibn Saud. There is no indication that he did so. Further rumours of American financial assistance were floated when, about the same time as Mr Crane, Mr. Dickerson, the commercial secretary of the United States Legation at Cairo, visited Jeddah in the course of an extensive tour. On hearing that the bazaris were talking of an American loan to the tune of £1,000,000, Mr Dickerson laughed.

5. His Majesty's Minister took up with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin on the 5th February the outstanding claims of the Government of India, the Eastern Telegraph Company and Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. (September to November report, paragraph 3 (b)). The position at the end of February was that the Government still owed the Eastern Telegraph Company had some prospect of being paid, but the Government were trying hard to engineer a settlement in ryals, and Messrs. Gellatly Hankey's situation was a good deal easier. In the last named case the financial authorities on the 1st February deposited with the firm 55,000 ryals, with promise of redemption in six weeks to cover the balance of £5,000 still due in respect of their loan to the Government. At one moment it looked as though they might be hit by a refusal to accept drafts on customs, of which they held large quantities, in payment of duty, this being the only means of realising them without loss. The idea of thus dishonouring their own drafts was, however, relinquished by the Government. The wages of the unfortunate Sudanese chauffeurs (December report, paragraph (2)), were still greatly in arrear at the end of February.

6. The Government are heavily indebted to other directions. They are said to owe the Qusabi firm some £80,000 and the rich Governor of Jeddah £4,000. In January, however, the director of the Dutch Bank expressed the view that the whole floating debt did not exceed £500,000, and that the country should be solvent with good management. Good management is, unfortunately the last thing that can be hoped for. The only economy consistently practised is that of evading payment of debts, although certain services are starved, e.g., the supply of doctors in the sanitary service has decreased in recent years.

С. П. МАРШАЛ

7 There was no news of any important development in the interior in January and February, although silly rumours of the usual kind were circulated in connexion with the King's visit to Nejd, how, for instance, there had been dissension in the Royal family; the King had practically fled from Riyadh, &c. Early in January there were reports, more substantial in appearance, of trouble with the Ajman tribe, but they were not confirmed.

8. Ibn Saud's accession was celebrated in the Hejaz on the 8th and 9th January in a manner similar to that of last year (report for

January 1960, paragraph 23). The view held by some that such celebrations are un-Islamic seems to have been definitely set aside.

[illegible]

10 These events have probably a political significance. The Nejd dancing is a revival of a practice which has, it seems, been in abeyance for between twenty years, although the skill shown by the dancers proves that it must have been kept up somehow, even though not officially countenanced. It may be taken as a working theory, provided it be not assumed too confidently, that Ibn Saud is anxious to efface some of the differences between the Hejaz and Nejd and is prepared to ride his subjects in both kingdoms on a lower rein than is admitted by the extreme tenets of Wahhabism. Drums were a notable feature in the dancing demonstrations and even more musical instruments were doubtless tolerated. Ibn Saud built formerly on an aggressive policy which was turned against him by the rebels of 1925. He was obliged to make a deal or compromise with a world in which it pays to make friends and a few of which, in the Hejaz at least, has always been weak. He has been forced to find Modern to have much use for the devil, at any rate.

13. Front-End Question

Transjordan

MacDonnell Investigation.

11. No information reached Jeddah during January and February regarding the action taken by the M. Council. No M. Council report, or was any reply returned to the Hejaz Government's note of the 24th December regarding the Beni Atiya (December report, section 5 (a)).

Current Reading

[illegible]

13. Correspondence also passed concerning various raids alleged to have taken place in the latter part of 1914, as well as in the correspondence relative to the raids and remnants of raids mentioned in the last paragraph the Legation sought to impress on the Hejazi Government the importance of taking measures on their side as efficient as those adopted in Transjordan and more especially of arranging for direct communication between the authorities on both

sides of the frontier, as provided in article 3 of the Hadda Agreement. The correspondence thus bore not only on particular raids and rumours, but on the general situation. Its details were, however, submerged in the crisis to be described in the following paragraphs.

General Frontier Situation.

14. While the correspondence mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs was proceeding, the visit of Sheikh Yusuf Yasin to Jeddah at last enabled Sir A. Ryan to carry out, on the 3rd February, his instructions (December report, section 5 (c)) to discuss the general situation of the frontier orally. He took the Sheikh over the whole of the recent ground, reproached the Hejazi Government with their failure to reply seriously to the British memorandum of October, disposed of the interim reply which had been their only attempt at a direct answer up to date and strongly deprecated the practical condonation of Nejd raids in Fudh Bey Hamza's note of the 20th November. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin's reaction was unexpectedly favourable. He, indeed, made play with arguments on his own side. He developed the thesis that His Majesty's Government were

needed as a protection to Transjordanian raiders. He manifested openly the hostility of his Government towards Captain Glubb, a hostility dating from the time when that officer was employed in the Southern Desert of Iraq. He explained, however, that the Hejazi Government were preparing a statement of the measures they were taking on their side of the frontier. He added that the Hejazi agent at the Macdonnell investigation, to be Inspector of Bedouin on the frontier. En Neshimi had been removed from the Governorate of Jauf. The action contemplated in article 3 of the Hadda Agreement.

15. Before this conversation was reported home a storm of indignation had been aroused in Downing Street by a report from Captain Glubb. This report dealt mainly with the situation resulting from the last considerable raid from Nejd, which had taken place in October and the victims of which were the Howaitat tribe. Captain Glubb's main conclusions were that the Howaitat, deprived of the camels then captured, were in a state of starvation and could not easily be restrained from counter-raiding. The Howaitat, it was known to be pasturing close to the frontier, were seconded by En Neshimi, was directly responsible for the raids conducted or encouraged by the latter in 1930, and that the King was pursuing a deliberate policy of encouraging the Howaitat to raid. This report, which was endorsed, subject to some differences on points of detail, by the principal British authorities in Transjordan, including His Majesty's High Commissioner, who expressed an even more serious view of the consequences of a secession of Transjordan Bedouins to Ibn Saud, in view of the difficult situation it would create in the event of trouble in Palestine.

16. On receipt of this report, Sir A. Ryan, in his report on his own recent action, he suggested that, having regard to the more favourable turn taken by his conversations in Jeddah, it might be unwise to take so strenuous a line as that contemplated at home. There ensued an active correspondence, the result of which was that the Foreign Office consented to an attempt to reach an understanding with Ibn Saud, but indicated the lines on which the representations were to be made to him in a precise memorandum, the terms of which were in no way to be weakened and a copy of which was to be left with the King if Sir A. Ryan thought it advisable. Every effort was to be made to obtain a definite reply within four days and the King was to be informed, if necessary, that this was expected by His Majesty's Government.

17. On receipt of his final instructions His Majesty's Minister, who had contemplated a strong but conversational onslaught on the King, thought that on the basis of the representations was to be a long memorandum in set terms, it would, after all, be better to communicate it first to the Hejazi Government and see the King afterwards. His Majesty's Government having concurred, the

Legation forwarded it to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 26th February. The memorandum was accompanied by a short covering note requesting an early audience to discuss the question and intimating His Majesty's Government's desire to obtain a definite reply to their memorandum as soon as possible. A separate note sent earlier in the same day, also under instructions, strongly repudiated the aspersions which had been cast on Captain Glubb in the course of the investigation.

18. In their memorandum of the 26th February His Majesty's Government propounded the following points in the nature of suggestions or demands which

- (1) Noting Ibn Saud's expressed readiness to bring article 3 of the Hadda Agreement into operation and having in view the proved necessity for immediate co-operation between the authorities on both sides of the frontier, they proposed, in pursuance of Sheikh Yusuf Yasin's request for suggestions as to the method of initiating such co-operation, that Captain Glubb and Ibn Zeid should meet (a) to examine all representatives and claims regarding raids since the 1st August, (b) to arrange for immediate restoration of loot on both sides, and (c) to arrange for the intercommunication of information and mutual restoration of loot in future.
- (2) They asked that Ibn Zeid should be invested with full executive powers, and that he and Captain Glubb should have power to call upon the representative sheikhs to put forward claims, &c.
- (3) Having explained the inability of the Transjordan authorities to maintain the recent improvement of the situation unless immediate steps should be taken to return the loot captured from their tribes since the 1st August, His Majesty's Government dwell on various flagrant features of those raids, including the proved culpability of En Neshimi, and the statement widely believed and not effectively disproved that they "must insist that if this has not already been done, the strongest measures should be taken to counteract the effect of En Neshimi's action in giving countenance to raiding and to make it publicly known that His Majesty King Abdul Aziz expressly disapproved of En Neshimi's appointment to the command of tribes in the desert."
- (4) They asked the Hejazi Government to inform them as soon as possible whether they would receive full powers to deal with the matters proposed, including the immediate restitution of camels and other loot captured from Transjordan tribes since the 1st August. They added that Captain Glubb would be authorised to arrange for the restitution of any loot identified as having been taken from Hejazi or Nejd tribes.
- (5) Finally, His Majesty's Government, having regard to the urgent necessity for restoring the camels looted from Transjordan, offered British co-operation in the Wadi Sirhan, if the Hejazi Government should find themselves confronted with any practical difficulty in returning them immediately.

19. The sequel to this firm but ultimatum will be related in the next report. During the period under review it was decided under Captain Glubb's advice to introduce various modifications into the scheme adopted last autumn for the improvement of the frontier control on the Transjordan side.

Druse Refugees in Nejd

20. The question of the disposal of Sultan Al Atrash and his followers, who had been driven from their homes in the Nejd, was a subject of considerable importance. It was decided to ask Ibn Saud to move them further into the interior or that arrangements should be made for the party to be allowed to settle in Iraq. No

4.5.

"Don't imagine," etc.

the height of his pleasurable anticipation and full of preparations for the receipt of Sir A. Ryan, Sir F. Humphreys and Sir A. Ryan expressing regret that, owing to delay over pending oil negotiations, he was compelled to postpone his visit. His delay was not a great one, but it was enough to cause a great deal of trouble. Things would not have been so bad, had the delay been short or had not the Arab Alliance been so complicated. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin came to see Sir A. Ryan at the end of February. A tendentious statement was attributed to Nuri Pasha himself. In the course of a long conversation on the whole position Sir A. Ryan administered all the soothing syrup he could, but the outlook was not a happy one at the end of February.

[illegible]

the position as he himself saw it, giving reasons why, in his opinion, His Majesty's Government had never had a formal responsibility for the return of Ibn Mashhur though they had done all in their power to promote it. He strongly objected to the concluding phrase in the Minister's note, and elicited a lame explanation that it referred to the value not of British but Iraqi promises. The second conversation was acrimonious but fertile.

28 On the 2nd February the Legation had forwarded to the Minister for Foreign Affairs a list received from Baghdad of persons and property which they were prepared to hand over on the frontier at any date convenient to Ian Sand. In reply to an advance intimation of this on the 1st February, Shaukh Yusuf remarked that no arms were mentioned. This gave rise to some inconclusive correspondence between Sir F. Humphrys and the Iraqi Government and Sir Francis thought the matter had better be left for Nuri Pasha to discuss in Irbid. As for the Emir Feisal's note of the 25th January, which directly affected His Majesty's Government, they had not replied to it up to the end of February.

Peraton Could Negotiate

(a) The proposal that the Political Resident in Bushera should visit Ibn Saud (December report, 7 (a)) followed the King to Riyadh, but ~~was~~ him too late to be acted on. On his return to Mecca, he addressed a friendly letter to Sir A. Ryan on the 25th January expressing regret and offering to receive Colonel Biscoe in Jeddah. This suggestion was negatived by His Majesty's Government, and Sir A. Ryan was instructed on the 4th February to return a suitably polite reply. He conveyed the substance of this through Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, but owing to various delays postponed any direct communication to the King until he could make it orally. The general position at the end of February was that it was hoped that an opportunity for a meeting between Ibn Saud and Colonel Biscoe in Nejd might present itself later, and it was considered that there was no such emergency about the Kuwait questions as to necessitate their being discussed before the autumn. Meanwhile, it appears from various reports of the Political Resident that there has been a certain rapprochement between Ibn Saud and the Sheikh of Kuwait.

the Iraqi and Hejazi Governments regarding the allocation of the

£10,000 paid by the Hejazi Government last summer in fulfilment of the promise given by Ibn Saud to Colonel Biscoe in January 1930 (see report for September to November, 11 (b)). It was arranged that £7,000 should be given to Iraq and £3,000 to Koweit, as intended. The necessary drafts were sent by the Legation to Baghdad and Basrah on the 10th February, and the Hejazi Government were duly informed. They did not reply, but it is clear from the earlier correspondence and various conversations that they are unlikely to contest the allocation, which interests them only as far as it will affect the total amount eventually payable to Iraq under the settlement mentioned in paragraph 23.

A question which arose early in 1930 regarding the treatment of I. hejazis in El Hasa gave rise to instructions to His Majesty's Minister in May to make general representations on their behalf to the Hejaz Government, if he saw no objection. The execution of these instructions having been delayed for more or less accidental reasons, Sir A. Ryan reconsidered the matter on his return from leave. On the 10th February, 1931, he reported that, in his opinion, it would now be preferable to postpone action pending developments in connexion with the Hejazi Law on Nationality and the possible general discussion of Persian Gulf questions.

New Trade Route

26. Little more was heard in January and February of the proposed new route for pilgrims and trade from the Hasa Coast to the Hejaz (December report, section 8). The matter still appears to be engaging attention, however. In the course of general conversation at Mr. Philby's tea party on the 24th February, Ibn Saud admitted that it was intended to bore for water at Ras Tanuran, which has been thought of as a possible site for a future port. His Majesty said that no actual boring had taken place, but that he had ordered a start to be made after Ramadan.

Yemen and Asir

29. There were still no signs in January and February of any serious repudiation on the relations between the Imam and Ibn Saud as a result of the latter's annexation of Asir. Both sides have been reported to be strengthening their military forces. In January the Italian Government manifested in London its anxiety to see that the Imam and Ibn Saud should be able to settle their differences peacefully. His Majesty's Minister was authorised, if at any time he received categorical information pointing to a danger of conflict, to make representations to the Italian Government. On the 2nd February, Sir A. Ryan was directed to take no action. It seems improbable that Ibn Saud in his present financial straits, would embark on an adventure in the extreme south, though the temptation may ultimately be too strong for him, and there has been nothing to show that the measures which the Imam has almost certainly taken on his own side of the Asir frontier are more than defensive.

30. On the 14th February the Foreign Office reviewed the position in regard to Asir in an important paper addressed to the Colonial and India Offices. It was pointed out that the legal status of Asir was still uncertain, and that the treaty of 1917, which would justify such intervention, and on the 24th February Sir A. Ryan was directed to take no action. It seems improbable that Ibn Saud in his present financial straits, would embark on an adventure in the extreme south, though the temptation may ultimately be too strong for him, and there has been nothing to show that the measures which the Imam has almost certainly taken on his own side of the Asir frontier are more than defensive.

commit His Majesty's Government to recognition of the absorption of Asir into Ibn Saud's dominions, or to take any action implying such recognition without further consideration. It was pointed out that the treaty of 1917, which would justify such intervention, and on the 24th February Sir A. Ryan was directed to take no action. It seems improbable that Ibn Saud in his present financial straits, would embark on an adventure in the extreme south, though the temptation may ultimately be too strong for him, and there has been nothing to show that the measures which the Imam has almost certainly taken on his own side of the Asir frontier are more than defensive.

III RELATIONS WITH STATES OUTSIDE ARABIA

British Empire

His Majesty the King telegraphed congratulations to Ibn Saud on the occasion of the anniversary of the latter's accession, and a suitable reply was received. The Hejaz-Nejd Minister in London postponed his reception in honour of Ibn Saud's accession until after the Court had gone out of mourning. The deferred reception was held at the Hyde Park Hotel on the 20th February.

Consuls at Bombay and Singapore

32. The question of the proposed appointment of Hejaz-Nejd consuls at Bombay and Singapore was discussed by Sir A. Ryan and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin on the 6th February, after it had been decided that the consuls should be appointed to safeguard pilgrims and trade. Sir A. Ryan had been authorised to handle the matter on the lines suggested in his telegram of the 20th December. He obtained from the sheikh an admission that such appointments must be the subject of international agreement. He emphasised the readiness of His Majesty's Government to agree to the appointments in principle, but pointed out the necessity for safeguards for pilgrims, and asked the sheikh to prepare to receive British consuls in his dominions. Both points were clearly unpalatable to the sheikh, who promised to submit the matter to the King, but did not return to the subject up to the end of February.

Money Order Agreement with India

33. The Indian Posts and Telegraphs Department intimated to the Hejaz-Nejd Government that it was ready to accept the proposed claim in the Money Order Agreement regarding interest on outstanding balances. It was pointed out, however, that the agreement was still unconcluded owing to difficulties of pure form.

Hejaz Railway

34. On the 6th February Sheikh Yusuf Yasin expressed a wish to discuss on some future occasion the question of the Hejaz Railway, which had been in discussion for some time. It was pointed out that the subject was still under consideration, and that the Hejaz-Nejd Government were not anxious to pursue this subject unless it was forced upon them. It was also pointed out that the Hejaz-Nejd Government were not certain how far he really wished to raise the question or merely allows it to be played with for the edification of Moslems.

Ibn Saud's Buying Proposals

35. The King's request that His Majesty's Government should act as his intermediary for purchases in Great Britain (July-August report, section 4 (e)) was discussed by Sir A. Ryan and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin on the 6th February. The conclusions reached were embodied in a Foreign Office despatch of the 15th January prescribing the reply to be returned. Ibn Saud was to be

informed that His Majesty's Government could not act as buyers on his behalf but they expressed willingness to give advice in connexion with particular transactions of importance, as they had done in the case of the Marconi wireless contract (September-November report, section 5). Sir A. Ryan was to urge upon the King the desirability of doing business through established houses. He was to suggest to the King that the King should instruct Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co., an old established firm with wide connexions, and to impress on the King the importance of following sound methods as regards punctual payment, &c., if his Government wished to do business with British firms on favourable terms. Owing to pressure of other affairs, these instructions had not been carried out up to the 28th February.

France

36. The negotiations for a treaty between France and Hejaz-Nejd were resumed early in January. Progress appears to have been made, but both sides have been reticent. It is partly clear that France will not insist on the slavery article (December report, section 11). The French consulate hoped to find some way round the difficulty over the Algerians at Medina, which is apparently not disposed of by the new Law on Nationality (paragraph 58).

Italy

37. The negotiations for a treaty between Italy and Hejaz-Nejd were also resumed early in January. The Italian consul spoke to Sir A. Ryan vaguely of obtaining some substitute for it in the form of a declaration by Ibn Saud but gave no indication of what exactly he had in view, if anything. Otherwise there has been much reticence about these, as about the French negotiations.

Germany

38. The German Government apparently decided some little time ago to make Herr de Haas (September report, section 10) its representative in Hejaz-Nejd but he had not up to the time of writing made any communication to his future foreign colleagues. He is without official experience, and may be having difficulties in getting his position clear with the Hejazi Government. There are two versions of the matter. One is that he has been appointed as a private secretary to the King, the other that he has applied for and is awaiting an exequatur. Meanwhile he appears to be a somewhat enterprising business man, and has been first favourite of the German Consul, the German Consul-General, and the German Consul, Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. on behalf of Shell, but not renewed for 1931.

Egypt

General

39. The Egyptian consul is understood to have continued his conversations with a view to the return of the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Jeddah (December report, section 12). The Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs denied in an interview given to a Cairo paper that the consul had been instructed to carry on negotiations, although it was admitted that M. Achmouni had brought back a letter from King Fuad to Ibn Saud in reply to one from the latter.

Aida Incident

40. A small incident which might have complicated relations between Hejaz-Nejd and Egypt occurred on the 7th-9th February. Admiral Tomlin and the Egyptian Consul General, Mr. El-Husseini, were on a cruise of inspection in the administration's vessel "Aida". He had informed the Egyptian Government of the necessary arrangements, arrived in Jeddah on the 7th February. The Egyptian Government had in fact done nothing, although a belated

telegram reached the Egyptian consul more or less simultaneously with the "Aida's" arrival. The Hejazi Government took great offence. On the 8th February they addressed oral enquiries to Sir A. Ryan, who, though he had actually heard of the impending visit from Suez on the 6th February, naturally disclaimed any concern in the matter. Later in the morning the Egyptian consul called at the Legation in a state of great agitation, as he had arranged for Admiral Tomlin to call on the Acting Governor of Jeddah, and had learnt that the latter had been instructed not to return the call. As the matter threatened to be disagreeable and to involve a British officer in the Egyptian service, His Majesty's Minister offered to use his good offices as a friend of both parties, and was able to put the matter in such a way that the Hejazi Government relented. The "Aida" was sent on board the "Aida". The impression left by the incident was that, although Ibn Saud had mounted his high horse, not without reason, he was pleased enough to ride out of the affair on a friendly British intervention.

Other Forces

41. There is nothing of importance to record. The Persian Legation remained closed during the two months (December report, section 14). The Netherlands Charge d'Affaires was absent from Jeddah on a tour in the Sudan for two or three weeks, and left again on the 25th February to visit Aden, Kassarau, the Yemen, and if possible Hudramaut, between which country and Java there is said to be much intercourse.

Hejaz Air Force

42. The deplorable situation in this force (December report, section 15), became more deplorable in January. The four remaining mechanics resigned about the end of December and left on the 11th February, the other two having already gone. This reduced the force to three pilots, one of whom, Mr. Lowe, was not on speaking terms with his colleagues, engaged apparently in intrigues with certain local officers and boycotted the Legation. Sir A. Ryan doubted whether he could usefully intervene, but His Majesty's Government still hoped at the end of January that the elimination of Mr. Lowe would do good. On the 2nd February, acting under instructions, he discussed the situation with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin and strongly advised the discharge of Mr. Lowe. The ins and outs of the matter are too complicated to be stated briefly. The position at the end of February was that the other two pilots had threatened some time before to resign, if Mr. Lowe were not dismissed, but all three were still employed.

43. Late in January His Majesty's Government furnished material for a reply to the Hejazi Government's request for assistance in connexion with the spare parts for the aeroplanes (September-November report, section 21). The Legation entered the Legation on the 25th February, but action on the despatch was delayed by the Transjordan frontier crisis.

The Legation succeeded after long efforts in recovering a balance of £14 7s. due in respect of travelling expenses back to Iraq of the pilot lent by the Royal Air Force when the Hejaz Air Force was transferred to Jeddah. This trifle is placed on record, as it was the one solid diplomatic triumph achieved during the period under review. The gift was taken off the Minister's gingerbread when the Command Accountant before he started and which he had apparently overlooked. Sir A. Ryan, having, as he thought, disposed of the matter financially on the basis of the earlier claim, suggested that, if a further claim were to be made it should be submitted to the Air Ministry to be dealt with in consultation with the Foreign Office.

Arabian Air Route

44. The question was raised in February whether a renewed effort should be made this year to obtain Ibn Saud's consent to British aircraft flying over the Haza coast (see report for July-August, section 24). The Legation was

order to discourage the tendency to obstruct, the Legation telegraphed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Mecca, with the result that orders were given in time for the man to be embarked according to plan, but only after the Legation had, by considerable use of the telephone, tracked the progress of its own telegram through all stages.

Reuter Service

55 No progress appears to have been made

Law on Nationality

56. The "Umm al-Qura" of the 13th February published the text of a regulation amending the Regulation on Hejazi Nationality promulgated in 1926. In view of the importance of these enactments an attempt has been made in the appendix to this report to produce a consolidated English text giving the combined effect. The law of 1926 was much criticised by foreign Powers. In 1927 His Majesty's Government sought to establish certain principles which they hoped might be embodied in an exchange of notes. Negotiations in 1928 led to no result, and, as the law was not in practice giving rise to much difficulty, the matter was allowed to stand over until the summer of 1930, when it was thought desirable to reopen it in order to facilitate the settlement of certain particular questions affected by it. Little progress was then made beyond ascertaining that the Hejaz Government were disposed to satisfy His Majesty's Government by way of legislation of their own. On the other hand the Legation found it necessary to seek further guidance from His Majesty's Government on various matters, a final decision on which was not taken until the 6th February, when instructions were sent to Sir A. Ryan.

57. Before those instructions reached Jeddah, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin had intimated that the Hejaz Government were anxious to get on with the new law and expressed a wish to discuss the matter unofficially. This led to a conversation on the 4th February, to which Sir A. Ryan consented rather than run the risk of meeting an unsatisfactory new law promulgated without previous discussion. It appeared from Sheikh Yusuf Yasin's explanations that the Hejaz Government proposed to meet the views of His Majesty's Government on two important points, viz., the wording of article 3, which originally asserted the Hejazi nationality of all persons born in the Hejaz without right of subsequent option, and the words

in the Hejaz who was not in possession of documents proving his nationality would be deemed a Hejazi as from the date of the law. The amending regulation promulgated shortly after the above conversation provides more satisfactory texts of those two articles; although His Majesty's Government would have preferred article 3 to be given such a form that Hejazi nationality acquired by birth did not take effect until the child had attained his majority, subject then to a right of

option. The new law would have been promulgated in the "Umm al-Qura" on the 11th February, but it was omitted from the issue of the 13th February.

58. The Legation has been asked to consider the acquisition of Hejazi nationality by British parents as necessarily intervening in certain circumstances. He had in mind such a case as that of the technically Hejazi minor daughter of a British subject being abducted, in which case it should be possible to intervene at the instance of the injured father.

59. It is important to note that the law has now been expressly extended to the whole of Ibn Saud's dominions, though without any express mention of Asir.

Beacons at Yanbo

60. Two beacons were swept away by storms in December and January thus increasing the danger of approaching this always difficult port. As it is principally frequented by Khedivial steamers the Legation strongly urged that the beacons should be restored without delay. This work had not been completed by the 26th February, but the prospect of its being done was good, helped perhaps by a personal conversation which Mr Hope-Gill had with the Emir of Yanbo on his voyage to Suaz at the end of January. The Khedivial Company themselves estimate the cost at over £100 each, but the Hejazi authorities found this beyond their means and preferred to undertake the essential work themselves.

Approach to Jeddah

61. Sir A. Ryan had some general conversation with the Emir Feisal, during the latter's formal visit on the 1st February, about the desirability of port improvements. The Emir assured him that the whole subject was receiving earnest consideration. Inshallah!

Indian Visitors

62. Three members of the Round Table Conference, on their return from intention of paying short visits to the Hejaz on their return. Two of them, including Sir Akbar Hydari, abandoned the visits. The third, Nawab Mir Jang, Foreign Minister of the Nizam of Hyderabad, arrived with his family on the 10th February and left on the 15th February after visiting Mecca and Medina. The Legation had asked for ordinary facilities. The result was that Ibn Saud took complete possession of the Nawab and himself made all arrangements as for a Royal guest.

Yacht "Sister Anne"

63. The yacht "Sister Anne," having on board the owner, the Hon. Mrs. R. Fellowes (a French lady *née* Decarou), and two other ladies, visited Jeddah in February. She called at Yanbo on her way north, with the assent of the Hejazi Government, intending merely to lie off for the night. In the event the ladies were very hospitably welcomed on shore by the local authorities.

Legation Staff

64. Mr Wikeley returned from sick leave on the 20th January after undergoing an operation for appendicitis in Egypt. Mr Hope-Gill went on long leave on the 30th January.

Book on Stamps

65. The Legation has been asked to consider the acquisition of Hejazi stamps since 1926. His Majesty's Minister has asked unofficially on his behalf for facilities and permission to dedicate the book to Ibn Saud. Sheikh Yusuf's reaction in February was favourable.

Meteorological

66. After the middle of January the climate was unusually element until the end of February, not much hotter than in a really warm English summer, minus the rain, of which there was very little. Owing to Mr Hope-Gill's absence the Legation has not been able to collect the figures for the first six months of 1931 and then, if possible, to give the figures for the first six months of 1931.

APPENDIX

Nationality Law

February 1931 on the original Regulation on Hejazi Nationality of Rubi-al Awwal, 1345 (the 28th September, 1926) which is not expressly changed, are nevertheless affected by the extension of the Regulation to Nejd as well as the Hejaz

REGULATION OF HEJAZ NEJD NATIONALITY

Article 1. The title of which is thus altered, shall apply to subjects of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its dependencies. Article 4 provides that "All dealings and acts done in the promulgation of this amendment shall be deemed lawful, effective and valid."

Article 1. Persons of Hejaz origin or residence, who were Ottoman subjects before the Great War, are considered Hejazis.

Art. 2. Persons born of Hejazi parents, or whose father is a Hejazi, are Hejazis.

Art. 3 (modified throughout).—Every person born in the territories of the Hejaz or Nejd will be deemed a Hejazi or Nejdî national, subject to the provision that persons born in those territories of foreign parents shall have the right to opt for the nationality of their parents at the age of 18, and if they fail to notify the Hejaz Nejd authorities of their choice before that date.

Art. 4. Any Moslem who is not a minor and has resided in the Hejaz for three consecutive years is entitled to adopt Hejaz nationality after applying to the authorities either directly or indirectly.

Art. 5. Hejaz nationality may be granted by a special Royal irada to any Moslem, when such appears to the advantage of the Hejaz.

Art. 6. A Hejazi cannot adopt foreign nationality, either in the Hejaz or abroad, without proper authorisation from the Hejaz Government, which can only be by Royal irada.

(Article 6 of the Amending Regulation adds the further provision that "Hejazi or Nejdî nationals who renounce their nationality and become naturalised as nationals of a foreign State without permission of the Hejaz Nejd Government will not be allowed to reside in or return to the Hejaz or Nejd.")

Art. 7. Hejazis who accept military service under a foreign Government without previous authority from the Hejaz Government may lose their Hejaz nationality. Such persons may also be prohibited from returning to or residing in the Hejaz.

Art. 8. A woman of alien nationality who marries a Hejazi becomes a Hejazi. If she marries an alien, she must adopt his nationality. A Hejazi woman who marries an alien resumes her Hejaz nationality on termination of the marriage.

Art. 9. When a Hejazi adopts a foreign nationality, his young (minor) children do not assume that nationality while they are resident in the Hejaz.

If their residence is in a place other than the territories of the Hejaz or Nejd and the nationality regulation of the country in which their father has been naturalised does not entitle them to adopt that nationality, they will remain Hejazis or Nejdîs but if such regulation of the country in which their father has been naturalised entitles them to adopt that nationality they will have the right to resort to Hejazi or Nejdî nationality when they reach the age of 18 if they choose to do so.

¹ Printed in italics.

Art. 10 (modified throughout).—Every person who was resident in the territories of the Hejaz or Nejd at the date of the promulgation of the Regulation on Nationality of Rubi-al Awwal 1345 shall be deemed Hejazi or Nejdî unless his foreign nationality is proved by official documents.

Art. 11. This regulation is to be considered effective as from the date of promulgation.

Our Viceroy is charged with the application of this law.

(Article 9 of the Amending Regulation empowers the Viceroy to issue instructions relative to the application of the provisions of both regulations. Article 10 brings the Amending Regulation into force from the date of promulgation.)

E 2222 2222 25

No 92

Sir A. Ryan to Mr A. Henderson (Received April 20)

No. 123.)

Sir,

Jidda, April 2, 1931

WITH reference to my despatch No. 5 of 8th January last, I have the honour to state that, in the course of general conversation with Sheikh Yusef Yusef on the 29th March, I remarked that I saw by the "Near East" of the 12th February that he was making good progress with the negotiations with France and Italy. The sheikh seemed to think that I was getting at him in some way. He said that he had not seen the "Near East," and would have preferred that nothing should be published until all was settled. I told him that I was only interested in the matter in a general way, just as the Hejaz Nejd Minister in London might be interested in the recent naval negotiations. I had much too much business of my own to concern myself otherwise.

2. This elicited a very slight burst of confidence. The sheikh said that the negotiations with France and Italy were getting on, but that the attitude of Great Britain had created some difficulty. I expressed surprise, and asked what he meant. He explained that he was not referring to interference, but to the fact that France and Italy wanted certain things that had been conceded to His Majesty's Government, notably an article on slavery, which the Hejaz Government were not prepared to agree to. I said nothing further about the French and Italian position in this matter, but observed that slavery was, of course, a very important question. It interested my own Government greatly, and it was an international question which interested all Powers belonging to the League of Nations. I referred to my conversation with Fund Bey Hamza last summer (see my despatch No. 157 of the 23rd July, 1930).

3. Sheikh Yusef was emphatic that Ibn Saud had taken the most stringent measures to prevent the importation of slaves. He had also taken measures to prevent persons being sold into slavery in the interior of his dominions, e.g., by persons coming on pilgrimage.

4. The most interesting points in what the sheikh said were his admission that the pilgrimage might be an occasional means of bringing slaves on to the market, and a remark that it was contrary to religious law that people should be sold into slavery in this way.

5. I have no means of ascertaining to what extent any prohibition of import of slaves is enforced. It is obvious that so long as there is a supply and a demand, such measures can be easily circumvented, either with the connivance of competent local authorities or by landing slaves from dhows away from seaports. It is at least satisfactory that Ibn Saud, while unwilling to commit himself to other Powers and entirely recalcitrant to any idea of suppressing slavery as an institution, is conscious of his commitment to His Majesty's Government. It is useful to remind him of it from time to time, as opportunities occur.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN

[E 2225 387 25]

No. 93

Sir A. Ryan to Mr A. Henderson - (Received April 29,

No. 120)

Sir,

Jedda, April 2, 1931

I HAVE the honour to state that Sheikh Yusuf Yasin called on me on the 1st April to talk over privately the general state of the relations between His Majesty's Government and Ibn Saud. He had proposed this visit, without indicating its object, at the end of a personal letter informing me of the settlement of the question of the arrears due to the Eastern Telegraph Company. When he came, he explained that he had hung his request to see me on to that matter, because there was a connexion between it and the matter now had in view. He had thought of putting what he had to say in writing, but the King had preferred that he should do it by word of mouth.

2. The Sheikh expatiated, in the kind of large unaccustomed, on Ibn Saud's desire for sincere friendship with Great Britain. From a general statement, of which this was the first, he extracted four points, which, after hearing it, I enumerated for the purposes of my reply. They were as follows:-

- (1) The King and his Government had of late been reduced to a state of perplexity by the severe attitude in the recent past of His Majesty's Government and myself. They were anxious that this attitude should reflect a change of policy towards this country.
- (2) The severity in question had been exhibited more particularly in connexion with the Transjordan frontier question. (In this part of his statement, the Sheikh spoke of the frontier question as one in which his Government regarded themselves as being the injured party.)
- (3) Similar severity had marked my representations in connexion with the Eastern Telegraph Company claim.
- (4) The Sheikh hinted, rather than said, that my own recent language had been peculiarly stiff and rigorous and had contributed to the disquietude of the King and the Hejazi Government.

myself to personal expressions of opinion. The general tenor of the conversation passed, except in brief outline.

4. Having isolated Sheikh Yusuf's points as above, I took them in reverse order. I explained my personal position as being that of a Minister who had been appointed here in rather unusual circumstances in order to promote the growth

Fuad Bey Haniza that frankness, even if it sometimes entailed disagreeably strong disadvantages, despite my interest in my work and the kindness which I had received.

5. Turning to particular questions, I reminded Sheikh Yusuf that I had the two he had named were the only two which had given rise to serious trouble. The others had not all been settled, but some of them had been disposed of at the rest were following a normal course.

6. I had, I said, taken a strong line on the question of the Eastern Telegraph Company, simply because it had gone on for years and had become a scandal, owing to the failure of the Hejazi Postal Administration to carry out its obligations under the agreement.

7. I recapitulated the history of the Transjordan frontier question throughout the period during which I had dealt with it. My ultimate conversation with the King, however, His Majesty's Government had been strongly impressed by a report from Captain Glubb, whose views were endorsed by all other competent observers in Transjordan. They considered it necessary to make the strongest possible representations and after mature consideration of every material factor,

including my latest conversation, they had decided that it was imperative to take a strong line.

8. I told Sheikh Yusuf that I was a talkative man. He would have noticed that, except for two passing references, I had kept complete silence on this question since my audience on the 2nd March. The reason for that was that His Majesty's Government were themselves dealing with the matter. I had no authority to discuss it further. If I were to express my personal opinion, it would be that the recent communications from the Hejazi Government had been unsatisfactory. The matter was, however, out of my hands and I could not say what its outcome would be.

9. I then took Sheikh Yusuf's first point. I said that there was no general change in His Majesty's Government towards Ibn Saud. Nevertheless, particular questions might affect the relations of States, if they were of sufficient importance. The Eastern Telegraph Company question was not of that importance. The Transjordan question might be. Even so, it was the practice of His Majesty's Government to deal as far as possible with all questions, even the most important, on their individual merits. They had not, for instance, allowed the Transjordan question to stand in the way of Nuri Pasha's visit as they might have done even if they were no longer directly concerned in the negotiations for which he was coming. They had, like the Hejazi Government, given no publicity to the existence of an acute controversy. Had they let it be known Ibn Saud might have sustained damage, e.g., it would have affected the Indian pilgrimage (the only element in the whole of this year's pilgrimage which seemed likely to be up to last year's strength).

10. As for myself, I said, I had continued to discuss other questions which were already in hand. The only change I had made was that I had delayed certain communications pending a settlement of the one capital question. I had been at pains to avoid any fresh cause of quarrel, e.g., I had in one case acted with great restraint over a new non-political question, that of the Government chauffeurs. We then had some conversation on that subject, on which I have reported separately.

11. My main object throughout this conversation was to impress Sheikh Yusuf with the extreme importance of the Transjordan frontier question, with it involving myself in any discussion of its recent phases. Though perturbed over it, he gave me the impression of thinking that it had ceased to be acute, as, for instance, when he said that he had waited until things were easier to make his general communication. When he was leaving I asked him to convey my respects to the King and to assure His Majesty that I was always striving for a good understanding, but I added that there was one cloud, and that that cloud had not been dispersed.

12. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Jerusalem and Bagdad and to the Government of India, Foreign and Political Department.

I have, &c.
ANDREW RYAN

[E 2230 2 25]

No. 94

Sir A. Ryan to Mr A. Henderson - (Received April 29,

No. 140)

Sir,

Jedda, April 13, 1931

WITH reference to my telegram No. 81 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to inform you that I have just received a letter from the Minister for Iraq to this country. Although it may be some little time before I can send this despatch, I think it will conduce to clarity if I embody in it all that I know of what passed while Nuri Pasha was actually here and reserve for a further report anything that I may hear from the other side in due course.

Nuri Pasha arrived in Jedda by Khedivial steamer from Suez on the morning of Easter Sunday, the 5th April, accompanied by three other delegates, namely Taha Pasha El Hashimi, Muwaffaq Bey El Abousi and Ahmed Bey Mansafi. Considering it appropriate in the circumstances to show special courtesy although the mission were the guests of the Hejazi Government, I sent

Mr. Wikeley to present compliments to Nuri Pasha on board and myself met him on the quay.

From what the Pasha told Mr. Wikeley, it appeared that he expected to find Ibn Saud in Jedda. As a matter of fact, not only the King but our nominal Minister for Foreign Affairs sat tight in Mecca. Minor officials greeted Nuri Pasha on board, and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, with the Governor of Jedda and others, received him on the quay. A respectable guard was turned out and there were plenty of cars, but the reception otherwise was, perhaps, hardly adequate to the principal visitor's rank, according to oriental ideas.

I had understood that Nuri Pasha would be accommodated at the villa outside Jedda usually assigned to official European visitors of high rank, and had supposed that the main negotiations would take place in Jedda. It was, in fact,

first night, and that Yusuf Yasin should give a dinner, to which I was to be bidden. This plan was upset, apparently by Nuri Pasha himself, and the mission

an objection on the Pasha's part to being put off with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin but I cannot affirm this now. The Pasha had expected to arrive on the 4th April and to leave on the 11th. The Khedivial time table did not allow of his getting here before the 5th and necessitated his leaving on the 5th or 9th. Expedition was therefore essential and it was certainly a more practical plan, as Ibn Saud elected to remain in Mecca, to mobilise everybody concerned there as soon as possible.

5. The same need for haste probably accounted for the fact that the Pasha did not call on me after his arrival, although he sent a card. Nothing in our subsequent intercourse could justify me in supposing that he wished to ignore me or come the Premier over a British representative of inferior rank. When I met him he hailed me as an old friend, for he had come to see me in 1913 or 1914 when he was a young officer in Constantinople for some political purpose. I

thereafterwards that it had to do with the events which led to the arrest by the Turkish Government of the well known El Maari and the intervention of the British Embassy to prevent his being put to death.

6. So the mission and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin hurried off to Mecca on the afternoon of the 5th April. I heard nothing further until the 7th, when the telephone wires buzzed with enquiries about steamers to take Taha Pasha and Muwaffaq Bey to Hodeidah and Nuri Pasha himself to Suez. I received the same day a reply to a suggestion I had broached just after the mission arrived that they should dine at the Legation any night that would fit in with the official programme. I had not pursued this further after the mission's departure for Mecca, but I received a spontaneous intimation on the 7th that they and Yusuf Yasin would dine with us next evening, but that the Emir Feisal could not leave Mecca. There was still no news of the progress of the negotiations.

7. On the afternoon of the 9th Sheikh Yusuf Yasin telephoned to ask whether we should mind if he and Nuri Pasha were late for dinner. He added, on Nuri Pasha's behalf and his own, that things were going well and that everything was nearly settled. I replied that, if they brought news of a complete agreement on all important matters, it would be a happy evening for me as well as for them. This little bit of encouragement was my only intervention in the

Later, I heard that all the important questions had been

difficulty, and when the Pasha and the Sheikh arrived late

tion they were extremely pleased both with themselves and with each other. Nuri Pasha, Ahmed Bey, Sheikh Yusuf, with other local notables, selected members of the British community and the representatives of countries bordering on Iraq.

8. I have related these individually trivial incidents in detail, as they show

background but not looking to them for guidance. The event has proved me wrong in my forecast that they would be unable to agree without British mediation. It almost looks as though both sides wished to show how well Arabs could get on if left to themselves, but it is only fair to add that, when I warmly congratulated Nuri Pasha and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin on the outcome, they acknowledged handsomely how much they owed to Great Britain and her representatives.

9. As regards the actual negotiations, I can add little material to what I telegraphed. Sheikh Yusuf said that he hoped to see me in two or three days after a necessary return to Mecca. Meanwhile I have only the information which Nuri Pasha gave me on the evening of the 8th April. He expressed spontaneously a wish to tell me something about what had passed. We talked privately for over an hour after dinner, but I confined myself to asking only such

of my own, namely, whether he had disposed of the Ibn Mashhur affair. He replied to this question affirmatively but without going into detail.

10. Nuri Pasha did not dwell on the question of the desert posts, but it appeared from his rather vague statement that it had once more been agreed to have recourse to arbitration after a further attempt to settle the matter amicably. He had had difficulty in getting the 'Bon Voisinage' Agreement actually signed. The Hejazis raised all sorts of points of detail, and it was evident from what

'Bon Voisinage' without

I did not gather what form had been finally given to the cause on political offenders in the text of the Extradition Agreement. Nuri Pasha spoke more of the play which he had made with the Iraqi law on raiding and of the letter in agreed terms which it was finally settled that he should write on

had wished to discuss, such as wells near the frontier, the collection of taxes in the neutral zone and Wakis, but said that the King had accepted his view that these matters could be settled best in later correspondence. He left Mecca without having actually signed the Extradition Agreement, but the text signed

Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 8th April was brought to Jedda. and Nuri Pasha signed it here on the morning of the 9th April. It is interesting to note that the Prince-Minister apparently played no rôle except as a signatory of texts.

11. Nuri Pasha seemed to be confident of putting both the agreements through the Iraqi Parliament before the end of the present session.

12. I was struck by the Pasha's eagerness to get the question of Sultan Al Atrash and his followers settled on the basis of their being received in Iraq. That must be my justification for troubling you with a separate subject with which I have not had occasion to deal previously, although I

owed the correspondence with them.

Nuri Pasha said that he had been anxious to explain to the King his

here. To me he explained that Taha Pasha had been employed as Chief of Staff. I did not gather when or by what Government, in the Yemen and knew the Imam

11. He was therefore peculiarly qualified to explore a situation of which little was known. He believed that His Majesty's Government themselves had only scanty information. Taha Pasha and his colleagues were unable to catch a south-bound steamer leaving here on the 24th April and stayed behind in Mecca when Nuri Pasha came here.

14. The Pasha mentioned one matter not recorded in my telegrams, namely,

friendly message from His Majesty to deliver to that gentleman.

15. Nuri Pasha left Jedda on the 9th August by the Khedivial steamer which had brought him and which delayed its return to Suez twenty-four hours.

received him, except that I think Sheikh Yusuf Yasin went on board. The Turkish and Persian representatives Mr. Wikeley and I also went to the quay.

16. Altogether the mission has been a greater success than I had dared to anticipate. Both sides have shown qualities of statesmanship. They will doubtless quarrel a great deal in the future, but the present agreement with them marks a notable advance along the road which His Majesty's Government wish to see the Arab States follow in their relations with each other. If Nuri Pasha has a fault it is, perhaps, that he exaggerates his personal success with

European in externals and too little of a practising Moslem to appeal to them

others, however different their outlook. He seems to have a gift for remembering people. Changes of hair and headdress make recognition difficult in the Near East of to-day, but it was delightful to see the Prime Minister of Iraq twice

the former discovered an old colleague in the latter; and the Pasha and the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires were with difficulty parted at 1 A.M. after they had located a common past.

17 I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioners for Iraq and Transjordan.

I have, &c
ANDREW RYAN

E 2181/387 25]

No 95

Mr A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda)

No. 76

(Telegraphic) R

Foreign Office, April 30, 1931

YOR telegram No. 110 of 26th April. Raiding situation on the Transjordan-Hejaz Nejd frontier

al restoration of loot. Their failure to do so, if deliberate, is most unsatisfactory, and they should in any case be pressed to accept proposal of His Majesty's Government, and to agree that restitution should take place in every case as soon as sanction of Government is received

2. Conditions attached by Hejazi Government to attendance of sheikhs seem likely to render their presence purposeless. His Majesty's Government desire that in cases where Government representatives think it advisable, repre-

possessed of full knowledge of facts, should be enabled to give evidence to the representative of either Government. If you think fit you may say that restrictive conditions which Hejazi Government seek to impose on this point threaten to defeat chief object of meeting and can only convey impression that Hejazi Government are not genuinely anxious to reach satisfactory settlement

3. His Majesty's Government propose that pronouncement against raiding should be made on same date by both sides. Please urge Hejazi Government to agree and to propose early date for simultaneous publication in terms proposed

4. Please take action on above lines as soon as you learn that High Commissioner for Transjordan has no objection. I leave manner, form and force of your representations on each point to your discretion in light of your appreciation of Hejazi attitude

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 55)

E 2181 387 25]

No 96

Acting High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies - (Received in Foreign Office May 1)

No. 40)

(Telegraphic)

May 5, 1931

FOLLOWING addressed to Jedda, telegram No. 30 --

* Secretary of State's telegram No. 55 of 30th April, paragraph 4. I have no objection

E 2417 387 25]

No. 97.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr A. Henderson - (Received May 7)

No. 125

(Telegraphic) R

Jedda May 7, 1931.

TRANSJORDAN telegram No. 39 to me, repeated to Colonial Office, No. 40

As all Hejaz personages concerned are at Mecca, I took following action on 6th May --

I addressed note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs consisting of formal preamble and numbered paragraphs stating points in your telegram No. 76

Paragraph 1 is based on your paragraph 3 with addition of request for information as to manner in which Hejaz Government propose to give necessary publicity to announcement.

omission, but restating desideratum in express terms

Paragraph 3 closely follows your paragraph 2, omitting words "can any [sic] only convey" to the end

Concluding paragraph states that these points are put forward with the sole object of making meeting the means of arriving at settlement whereby frontier situation may be on sound basis, and recommends them to the earnest attention of the King and Government

I addressed simultaneously to Fuad personal letter, of which the following is a very condensed summary --

"Correspondence up to date has produced two results, viz., agreement on preliminary meeting and agreement on further meeting as soon as details of procedure are settled to dispose of recent raids. I need not now say anything further about the former, except to repeat what I said to Yusuf Yasin as to importance of elasticity. I cannot conceal unfavourable impression made on His Majesty's Government by restrictions with which Hejaz Government have sought to surround the other meeting. Please read note to-day in the light of this statement, which I prefer to make personally in view of our joint desire to bring matters to successful issue. His Majesty's Government having reluctantly agreed to decisions being *ad referendum*, it is all the more

are sanctioned. His Majesty's Government have also agreed that sheikhs should be summoned only when essential. Surely they should then be at the disposal of both representatives acting in agreement. I should have

delay in official correspondence as His Majesty's Government desire earliest possible settlement, but if we could meet within two or three days it would contribute to the attainment of our common object."

Repeated to Transjordan, No. 144)

E 2418 387 25]

No 98

Sir A. Ryan to Mr A. Henderson - (Received May 7)

(No. 124)

(Telegraphic)

Jedda May 7, 1931

MY immediately preceding telegram.

While using latitude kindly allowed me as regards form, I have followed your instructions as closely as possible, adding only request for information on method of public announcement. I consider it important in local conditions to obtain explicit statement on this point. I do not think any answer returned can be of such a nature as to embarrass Transjordan authorities. Personal letter has two objects. First is to emphasise distinction between the two meetings, which memorandum of Hejaz Government ignored and which may be important if discussion of procedure at second meeting is further prolonged; second object

(6131)

1 2

is to play upon Fuad's probable wish to get credit of overcoming such difficulties as may be attributed to Yusuf Yasin, while acting for him. If he comes to Jedda in the near future I will follow letter up in conversation.

I trust I may receive earliest possible information regarding final arrangements and, of course, of preliminary meeting.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 145.)

E 2421 1110 25]

No. 99.

Mr A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda), No. 143, and to Mr R. I. Campbell (Washington), No. 648, mutatis mutandis

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 9, 1931.

I HAVE to inform you that a member of the United States Embassy in London called at this Department on the 7th May in order to convey the information that, under instructions from the State Department, the United States Ambassador had, on the 2nd May, formally notified the Minister of the Hejaz and Nejd that the United States Government officially recognised King Ibn Saud.

2 The United States Embassy had no information as to whether the United States Government proposed to send a diplomatic or consular officer to Jedda, but appeared to consider it unlikely that any such step would be taken in the immediate future.

3 A similar despatch is being addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington.

I am, &c

ARTHUR R. HENDERSON

E 2399 1098 25]

No. 100.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir R. Graham (Rome)

(No. 354)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 11, 1931.

As you are aware from the enclosure in my despatch No. 192 of the 10th February, regarding the absorption of Asir into the dominions of King Ibn Saud, it was proposed to instruct His Majesty's Minister at Jedda not to commit His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to the recognition of this change in the status of Asir, nor, in the absence of further instructions, to take any action which could be regarded as implying such recognition.

2 Before the concurrence of the interested Departments in this course of action could be obtained, the situation was, however, changed by the receipt from Sir A. Ryan of the telegram of which a copy is enclosed. As Sir A. Ryan pointed out, the request contained in the Hejazi Government's note assumed the

with the result that any reply returned to that note would imply such recognition, unless the contrary were explicitly stated.

3 Your Excellency will remember that in 1927, at the time of the Rome conversations regarding the interests of His Majesty's Government and of the Italian Government in the Red Sea, an undertaking was given to the Italian Government to the effect that His Majesty's Government would not volunteer recognition of the Treaty of Mecca, by which King Ibn Saud's original protectorate over Asir was established and that, while it might be impossible to defer this recognition indefinitely, they would in any case withhold recognition of the territorial provisions and implications of that treaty. It seems clear that this undertaking would *a fortiori* preclude recognition of the new status of Asir

and the Idriat by which Asir is now for practical purposes ceded to King Ibn

that it would be difficult to abstain from returning an answer to the

(2) From Jedda, Nos. 42-3, Telegraphic, March 14.

Hejazi Government's note of the 11th March, and to other communications affecting Asir which may be received in the future, and that it would be undesirable to refuse explicitly to recognise what must in their opinion now be regarded as the *de facto* and *de jure* status of Asir.

4. I shall be glad if in the light of these considerations, you will now ~~out to them~~ that the situation has materially changed since the date of the undertaking given by yourself and the late Sir G. Clayton at Rome in 1927, that, as the result of the complete surrender by the Idriat of all his powers of

can now only be regarded, from the standpoint of international law, as a part of King Ibn Saud's dominions, and that there are considerable practical obstacles

Asir, as exemplified by the present case. In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government propose, subject to any observations which the Italian Government may wish to offer, forthwith officially to recognise the effects of the new arrangement made between Ibn Saud and the Idriat and the new status of Asir.

5. I trust that the Italian Government will be ready to return a favourable reply on this subject at an early date, more especially as the complete absorption of Asir into Ibn Saud's dominions is a fact which they will themselves almost certainly be obliged to accept, if they conclude with the Hejazi Government the treaty which they are at present in process of negotiating.

I am, &c

ARTHUR R. HENDERSON

E 2424 283 25]

No. 101.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr A. Henderson - (Received May 12)

N. 149)

Jedda, April 17, 1931

WITH reference to my telegram No. 10 of the 2nd February, I have the honour to state that Fuad Bey Hamza returned to Jedda on the 13th April and

dution, i.e., those of Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

2 Although Fuad Bey's illness in December and January was undoubtedly ~~mine~~ many people thought him unlikely to return to the Hejaz. Now that he has come back it remains to be seen what his place will be established between him and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, whose position with the King is strong and who has since the beginning of February been thrust into close contact with the foreign

will spend in Jedda, either as a visiting representative of the Minister for

3 It has been evident during the last two or three months that the Emir Feisal himself plays no effective rôle as Minister for Foreign Affairs. He does not appear to have had anything to do with the recent negotiations with Iraq except when texts had to be signed. I doubt whether he has even followed the correspondence about Transjordan. On one occasion when I met Sheikh Yusuf Yasin that certain British protected persons on whose

conversation. It did not occur to the Sheikh to include in his list the Minister whose Acting Under Secretary he theoretically was at the time.

4. I am sending 2 copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioners for Iraq and Transjordan, the Honourable the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department.

I have, &c

ANDREW RYAN

Enclosure 3 in No. 104

Translation of Letter from King Faisal to King Ibn Saud

My dear Brother,

IT is a cause of great pleasure for us to seize the opportunity of the dispatch of our loyal and trusted Prime Minister, Nuri Pasha Al Said, on a mission to the court of our brother to convey to him our most sincere greetings and good wishes, together with our deep thanks for the noble sentiments he has expressed in his last telegram.

dear self and the good understanding and friendship which, thanks to God, were achieved at that meeting. I felt more and more confident that the bonds of friendship which developed at the said meeting would prove most happily effective in cementing the relations of amity and brotherhood between our two kingdoms. It is now most gratifying to me to find that that friendship has borne fruit in our common interest and that of the whole Arab nation, whom we trust God will help us to serve and enhance the position thereof.

The object of the deputation of Nuri Pasha Al Said, who admires the high character of our brother, and who longs for the honour of attending on his magnificent person, is, firstly, to sign the Agreement of "Bon Voisinage," strengthen all the various other relations and connexions normally of interest to friendly sister countries, and submit our views on the question of the extradition of criminals between our sister kingdom, which, but for the fact that it affects our relations with other States, would have been settled a long time ago. Our dear brother may feel assured that we shall spare no effort for the realisation of our common aspirations in this connexion.

to help us both to repulse external (foreign) ambitions and strengthen the have confided to Nuri Pasha Al Said the contemplations of our mind on the subject, and I beg my dear brother to be so good as to lend his special and careful attention to him (Nuri Pasha's) representations.

Finally, I wish my dear brother perfect health and prosperity, and his people every success and happiness.

Done at Bagdad this 23rd day of Ramadan, 1349, corresponding with the 11th February, 1931

FEISAL

Enclosure 4 in No. 104.

Translation of Letter from King Faisal to King Fuad of Egypt

My dear Brother,

PEACE be upon you and the mercy of God.

I take the occasion of the departure of my Prime Minister, Nuri Pasha Al Said, for the capital of your Majesty's kingdom for the signing of the Treaty

attending to your person, expressing my great respect to your noble self and renewing the pledge of friendship and amity.

I pray God to keep you and the great Royal household in health, prosperity and happiness.

Done at Bagdad, this 29th day of Ramadan, 1349, corresponding with the 17th day of February, 1931

Enclosure 5 in No. 104

Translation of Letter from King Faisal to Imam Yahia of Yemen

My dear Brother,

PEACE be upon you and the mercy of God and his blessing.

I pray God that this may find you enjoying perfect health, happiness and prosperity.

The motive for the submission of this message is the desire to resume the continue to be among those who admire your Majesty's brilliant achievements, your good intentions, and your continuous efforts for the maintenance and enhancement of the prestige of the ideal faith, and the protection and improvement of that country (of yours) in order that it should continue to be, as it was at the time of your illustrious grandfathers, the most precious gem and the most impregnable stronghold among all the countries of Arabia.

We have pleasure in introducing to you the bearer of this our message, who enjoys our confidence, Al Fariq Taha Pasha Al Husami, Chief of Staff of our army and one of our loyal subjects, who had spent long years in your prosperous

express to you the feelings of friendship and amity we cherish towards your Majesty and make representations concerning the increase of the old relations of friendship and pledges of amity, in the hope that God (may He be praised) may make of this initial step the beginning of an early evening era of common welfare for us and for all Arabian countries.

His Majesty my brother King Ali seizes this occasion to desire me to submit to your Majesty an expression of his friendship, together with his brotherly

Finally, we pray the Almighty God to lengthen your life and grant you and your country happiness, prosperity and glory.

Done in our palace at Bagdad, this 26th day of Ramadan, 1349, corresponding with the 16th day of February, 1931

Enclosure 6 in No. 104

Translation of Letter from King Faisal to Amir Abdullah of Transjordan

My dear Brother,

I HAVE great pleasure in deputing my Prime Minister, Nuri Pasha to you, my lord and brother, my respect and cordial greetings.

I have confided to Nuri Pasha full instructions in regard to all matters affecting the common interests of our two countries, and charged him to explain my views on the Arab alliance idea, advising him to be guided with your views in this connexion.

with your help, we shall be able to work for the enhancement of the standing of our nation among the nations (of the world). May God help us to do what is right. He is the source of success.

Done in Bagdad this 29th day of Ramadan 1349, corresponding with the 17th day of February, 1931

E 2528 387 25

No. 105

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda)

(No. 82)

(Telegraphic) R

Foreign Office May 14 1931

YOUR telegram No. 109 of 26th April. Reciprocal undertaking by Transjordan and Hejazi Governments regarding expulsion of raiding criminals fleeing into territory of the other.

I agree to both your suggestions. Please now submit formula to Hejazi Government in manner proposed in final paragraph of Colonial Office telegram No. 52 of 24th April to Transjordan, repeated to you as No. 74.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 80)

E 2608 387 25

No. 106

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson (Received May 16)

(Nos. 137 and 138)

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, May 16, 1931

(R) YOUR telegram No. 82.

I have submitted formula as enclosure to note describing it as proposal of His Majesty's Government made after considering matter "in consultation with the authorities concerned in Transjordan."

I take it that words "if possible" refer to physical possibility and have no reference to legal difficulties. I would propose to explain this orally if necessary.

If Hejaz Government agree I presume I may proceed with exchange of notes. Should I, in that case, give undertaking in the name of His Majesty's Government only, or should I mention the Amir or otherwise refer to Transjordan authorities? (End of R)

Last point is important in view of constant insistence by Hejaz Government of sole responsibility of His Majesty's Government.

(Repeated to Transjordan Nos. 182 and 183)

E 2513/387 25

No. 107

Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

No. 84)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, May 16, 1931

YOUR telegram No. 101 of 12th May and my telegram No. 52 of 14th May. Transjordan-Hejaz Nejd frontier situation.

If just reply regarding restitution of loot seems, on the whole, acceptable. If you agree, question of attendance and evidence of sheikhs alone remains outstanding.

His Majesty's Government remain strongly of opinion, which High Commissioner for Transjordan appears to share (see Transjordan telegram No. 26 of 23rd March to Colonial Office) that satisfactory investigation and settlement of claims by Captain Glubb and Ibn Zeid will be impracticable unless they can summon and cross-examine sheikhs concerned. Before decision on this question is taken, please telegraph (a) real reason of Ibn Saud's reluctance to accept proposal, (b) whether there is hope of his giving way as a result of further representations, (c) if so, on what lines they should be made.

If question of sheikhs is pursued, Hejazi request for undertaking regarding refusal of asylum to fugitive witnesses (see last sentence of penultimate paragraph of your telegram) might be met by application to these cases of formula referred to in my telegram No. 82 of 14th May, subject, of course, to views of Transjordan authorities.

(Addressed to Jedda. Repeated to Transjordan, No. 82)

[E 2630 387 25]

No. 108

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson. (Received May 16.)

(No. 139)

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, May 17, 1931

YOUR telegram No. 84.

Paragraph 1. I concur. Difficulty will be to agree on decisions rather than to secure their subsequent execution.

Paragraph 2. Reply to (a) can only be conjectural. In my opinion objections stated in paragraph 3 of Hejaz Government's note of 11th May are genuine so far as they go, but rest on more fundamental considerations, viz., intense Majesty's Government and myself. These feelings are almost certainly stimulated by certain features of correspondence since February, e.g., violent explosion on part of His Majesty's Government after Ibn Saud has at last shown

to bring article 3 of Hadda Agreement into operation, "offer" of military assistance in his territory, and adoption by Transjordan of fixed formula "Send victims of raids to Glubb." His internal situation is none too secure, and he has to reckon with possibility of trouble in area south-east of frontier if it should grow worse. All these are reasons why he should not do anything to risk his prestige with his tribes or to promote direct contact between them and Transjordan authorities, who might, in his view, seek to seduce them.

In these circumstances I think answer to (b) is negative, especially as my personal influence with the King is at low ebb, except in so far as he may be afraid of me and of influence he supposes me to use with His Majesty's Government to his disadvantage.

As regards (c), I might attempt compromise with Ibn Saud on basis indicated in last sentence of paragraph 3 of my telegram No. 130 if Transjordan authorities are prepared to give undertaking regarding fugitive witnesses in form you suggested or any other shape. Prospects of success are however small. It may therefore be better to let meeting take place without further discussion and see what comes of it. Alternatively, would it be possible to say that unless representatives are authorised to hear sheikhs jointly as investigators, not as tribunal using judicial forms like oath, we must drop present proposal and request formation of tribunal under article 6 of Hadda Agreement to deal with raids since 1st August?

I am not sure whether that article is now regarded as dead letter for all purposes.

It would help me to know (a) for my own information position regarding award to be based on MacDonnell investigation, (b) whether as Ibn Saud thinks preliminary meeting has taken place and if so with what result.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 104)

E 2693 387 25

No. 109

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda)

(No. 87)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, May 21, 1931

YOUR telegrams Nos. 137 and 138 of 16th May. Formula for mutual surrender of fugitive raiders between Transjordan and the Hejaz.

It would be preferable to avoid defining phrase "if possible" more closely, as cases might conceivably arise where, although it might be physically possible to surrender criminals, such surrender would be inadmissible on other grounds, such as nationality, &c. You should therefore try to avoid discussion of precise implications of phrase, which is one in general use and is obviously not intended to bear any meaning which would vitiate main purpose of agreement.

Undertaking should be given, not in the name of His Majesty's Government, but in name of the Transjordan Government.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 85)

[E 2731/387/25]

No. 110

Sir A. Ryan to Mr A. Henderson.—(Received May 22)

(Nos. 145 and 146)

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, May 21, 1931

MY telegram No. 187

In reply dated 18th May, Hejaz Government express satisfaction at result which may be an important factor in pacification. Desiring that proposed solution should be permanent and not liable to creation of misinterpretation, they feel bound to make the following observations:

- (1) Phrases containing words "if possible" and "use the best endeavours" are likely to produce uncertainty and disputes as to interpretation. Hejaz Government desire to substitute words which will not be elastic or susceptible to different interpretations.
- (2) They wish undertaking to include not only prevention of entry and expulsion, but also surrender by respective Governments of persons fleeing into this territory.
- (3) They wish prevention of entry, expulsion and surrender to apply not only to persons raiding *ixia*, but it looks as though word should be one similar in form which means "fleeing" into territories of the other party, but also to all persons raiding into territories of the other party or attacking that party's subjects, wherever they may be.
- (4) It is understood that expulsion from each side will be in direction of territories of the other party and not into third country.

Note ends with expression of hope that His Majesty's Government will agree to the above points being embodied in communications to be exchanged.

Points obviously require close scrutiny and elucidation, such as could only be obtained in oral discussion of text. I might suggest such discussion when Fudl comes to Jedda with the King, if I were furnished with instructions as to general lines on which it should be conducted with a view to producing revised formula for submission to you.

Any formula which introduces criterion of nationality is bound to lead to the case of frontier tribes. Apart from more obvious objections to the case of frontier tribes, it is obscurely worded, but is susceptible of interpretation that any Nejd raiding in Transjordan, or attacking other Nejd in there, should be driven back into or surrendered to Nejd. If this were agreed to I anticipate Ibn Saud would claim all sorts of persons as Nejd, and some of determining their nationality would lie on Transjordan authorities, in whose territory they were. Some difficult arises in connexion with your own formula, but would not be so acute, as it contemplates expulsion, &c., of persons who have (a) conducted raid in Transjordan, and (b) taken refuge in Nejd, thereby themselves supplying *prima facie* evidence of their Nejd allegiance.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 172)

[E 2772 2752 25]

No. 111

Sir A. Ryan to Mr A. Henderson.—(Received May 27)

(No. 162)

Sir

Jedda, May 4, 1931

In paragraph 1 of my despatch No. 61 of the 6th March, relative to Mr. R. Crane's mission to Jedda, I mentioned that after what he had made to Ibn Saud to arrange for the engineer whom he employs in the Yemen to visit this country to look into water possibilities.

2. The engineer in question is a United States citizen, Mr. T. W. Crane, who is engaged on the construction of the new motor road, which is being made under

Mr. Crane's auspices from Hodeida to Sana via Hajaa. He arrived in Jedda on or about the 17th April with his wife, an Englishwoman, and was received by Ibn Saud on the 20th April. Since that date he and Mrs. Twitchell have made two journeys inland. I have not been able to discover their range, but doubt whether they have been far from Jedda.

3. On the 24th April the Mecca newspaper "Umm-al-Qura" produced a leading article headed "Two Great Projects." The writer, after rebutting, with the support of a citation from an Italian orientalist, the common belief in the barrenness of the Arabian Peninsula, refers to Ibn Saud's efforts to improve the country in all directions. He speaks, in particular, of two out of many schemes, namely, the sinking of artesian wells and prospecting for minerals, and says that for the former purposes the King has now brought an expert, who is making experiments in the vicinity of Jedda. This obviously refers to Mr. Twitchell, whose visit is mentioned in the news columns of the same issue of the "Umm-al-Qura."

4. I have little doubt that a systematic survey for water would produce appreciable results in various parts of the country. I doubt, however, the King's ability for directing it with the necessary comprehension and perseverance, and still more his willingness to give any foreign expert a sufficiently free hand to

"Umm-al-Qura" article appeared I had heard of no definite scheme, but when the Commissioner of Port Sudan was visiting here early in March Mr. Philby told him that the King had decided on a geological survey of the country, with a view, I gathered, to concessions being eventually given subject to suitable safeguards.

5. If Ibn Saud knows little about how to set about applying modern contrivances to the development of latent water resources, he is probably infinitely more ignorant of the difficulties surrounding the location and exploitation of minerals in a country like this. In my opinion, the chief interest at present of the matters mentioned in this despatch is the indication they afford of

development. However little grasp he may have of the conditions necessary to achieve real success in that direction, he is quite intelligent enough to realise the need for some new basis of prosperity if the country is to hold its own. So far as the Hejaz is concerned, its almost complete dependence on the pilgrimage as its sole industry is a patent source of weakness, and the weakness has never in recent years been so patent as during the present season, which has brought only some 40,000 pilgrims from overseas to Mecca.

who is interested in Mr. Twitchell, and to the Department of Overseas Trade

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN

[E 2795 2/25]

No. 112

High Commissioner for Iraq to Lord Passfield (Communicated to Foreign Office, May 28)

(Confidential)

My Lord,

Bagdad, May 6, 1931

I HAVE the honour to transmit copies in translation of correspondence between King Ibn Saud and the British Consul at Mecca, Nuri Pasha (1) and also the texts of the "Bon Voisinage" Treaty, Arbitration Protocol and Extradition Treaty, signed at Mecca on the 7th and 8th April, 1931.

2. Nuri Pasha has not yet issued a report on his tour, as the secretary to the mission has not yet returned to Bagdad. Nuri Pasha has, however, told me the gist of his discussions at Mecca, and, in any case, the results of his mission are sufficiently illustrated by the instruments that he negotiated and signed.

(1) Not printed

3 Before he left Bagdad Nuri Pasha discussed with me in detail the questions that he proposed to raise with the Hejaz Nejd Government. These were—

- (i) The "Bon-Voisinage" Treaty and Arbitration Protocol
- (ii) Extradition
- (iii) Ibn Mashhur
- (iv) The payment by the Hejaz Nejd Government of the balance of £23,000 outstanding on account of Iraq tribal claims.

Nuri Pasha told me that he had no intention of discussing the project of a pan Arab alliance, except in so far as measures for the removal of customs and passport barriers, which he intended to propose, could be said to further this

1 I learned of his intention to send Taha-al Hashimi the chief of the General Staff on a mission to the Imam of Yemen, and undertook on my suggestion, to acquaint King Ibn Saud with his intention first, and to ensure that His Majesty had no objection.

Finally, in view of Sir John Shuckburgh's semi-official letter, dated the 12th November 1930 I asked Nuri Pasha to ascertain whether King Ibn Saud still harboured any resentment in regard to the appointment of Dr Abdullah Damaji as Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs.

4 As regards the instruments signed by Nuri Pasha at Mecca, your Lordship will observe that the texts of the "Bon Voisinage" Treaty and Arbitration Protocol correspond closely to the texts initialled in Bagdad a year ago. Such amendments as have been made conform generally to advice tendered by this High Commission. The exceptions are the incorporation in the preamble

to exert every possible effort to compose the affairs of the Arab nation and unite her word, and the insertion in article 13 of the words "or nationals of the two contracting parties". The former amendment, which seems innocuous, may be attributable to a desire on the part of Nuri Pasha to justify the declaration made before his departure of his intention to promote the cause of Arab unity. The second amendment which extends to Iraq and Nejd nationals the restrictions which in the original draft were applicable only to foreigners, appears, at first sight, to conflict with article 8, which provides for complete freedom of movement of tribes for grazing purposes. I am advised however that the specific obligation involved in article 8 would be considered as overriding the general prohibition contained in article 13.

5 The Extradition Treaty provides in article 3 that the surrender of political offenders shall not be permissible. At the same time, as your Lordship will observe from the notes exchanged between Nuri Pasha and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Hejaz Nejd Government, the former has given an assurance that offences normally committed by Bedouin tribesmen fall within the category of extraditable offences and cannot be described as political. I see no objection to the nature of the assurance given by Nuri Pasha, and I consider that he is to be congratulated on having settled this vexed question which has disturbed relations between Iraq and Nejd for many years.

6 As regards the Ibn Mashhur affair, Nuri Pasha informs me that King Ibn Saud is now quite satisfied, and that with the surrender of his family and property the affair will be considered closed. This is confirmed by His Majesty's letter to myself.

7 In regard to the balance of £23,000 outstanding in respect of the mission to be paid by the Hejaz Nejd Government for the Iraq tribes, Nuri Pasha informed me that King Ibn Saud did not attempt to deny the obligation to pay the amount in full. His Majesty explained, however, that owing to a temporary lack of ready money it would be necessary for him to borrow the money if he was to pay it to Nuri Pasha before the latter's departure. Nuri Pasha replied that, in the circumstances, he would not press for immediate payment, and asked that the balance due might be remitted to Bagdad in the course of the next two months.

8 I understand that the matter of customs and passport procedure was discussed with satisfactory results, of which further information will, no doubt, be furnished in the official report. Nuri Pasha informed me also, that King Ibn Saud welcomed the proposed mission to the Yemen, and that, in regard to

Dr Abdullah Damaji, His Majesty was quite reconciled to the appointment of his former Minister to the Iraq Foreign Office and did not desire to raise any

9 So far as I am able to judge at present, Nuri Pasha's visit to the Hejaz seems to have been an unqualified success, and augurs well for the Iraqi Government's ability to control their relations with neighbouring States. I lost no time on the return of Nuri Pasha to Bagdad in conveying to him the message of congratulation from His Majesty's Government contained in your Lordship's telegram No. 148 dated the 19th April 1931 a message which, as I have already reported to your Lordship, he greatly appreciated.

10 I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister Jeddah the High Commissioner, Jerusalem, and the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS

High Commissioner for Iraq

Enclosure I in No. 112

Treaty of Friendship and "Bon Voisinage" between Iraq and Hejaz and Nejd and Dependencies

(Translation)

In the name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate

HIS Majesty King Faisal the First of Iraq, son of King Hussein, of the one part, and King Ibn Saud, of the other part, of Hejaz and Nejd and Dependencies, of the other part.

in the month of Ramadhan of the year 1350 of the Hijrah (corresponding with the 22nd and 23rd days of February, 1930, A.D.).

Having regard to the preliminary discussions which took place at the time of a Treaty of Friendship and "Bon Voisinage" between the Kingdom of Iraq and the Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd and Dependencies, and to the suitable bases over which agreement was reached.

In view of the desire avinced by the two Governments for a final date

in view of the desire of their Majesties to exert every possible effort to compose the affairs of the Arab nation and unite her word

It is agreed that

His Majesty King Faisal the First of Iraq, son of King Hussein

Is Excellency Nuri Pasha Al Said, Prime Minister

His Majesty King Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman al Faisal al Saud of

His Royal Highness Emir Faisal His Majesty's Viceroy and Minister for Foreign Affairs,

who, having communicated their powers, found in good and due order, have agreed as follows —

ARTICLE 1

There shall reign inviolable permanent peace and true friendship between the Kingdom of Iraq and the Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd and Dependencies. The two high contracting parties undertake to exercise their utmost to preserve the same, and settle in a spirit of peacefulness and friendliness all disputes and differences likely to arise between them.

ARTICLE 2

Relations of diplomatic and consular representation shall forthwith be established between the two kingdoms, in accordance with the procedure obtaining under public international law

ARTICLE 3

Each of the two parties undertakes to preserve friendly relations with the other party, and to endeavour by all the means available to him to prevent his ~~territories~~ ~~being~~ ~~used~~ ~~as~~ ~~a~~ ~~base~~ ~~for~~ ~~operations~~ ~~aimed~~ ~~against~~ ~~peace~~ ~~and~~ ~~security~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~country~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~other~~ ~~party~~

ARTICLE 4

As soon as information reaches the competent authorities prescribed in article 8 of preparation being conducted in their territories by one or more armed individuals with the intention of committing highway robbery or ~~other~~ ~~unlawful~~ ~~acts~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~zone~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~neighbourhood~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~frontier~~ ~~kingdoms~~, these authorities shall mutually inform one another, or the officials or tribes of the other, of the same without delay.

ARTICLE 5

In the event of either of the two high contracting parties receiving information in his territories, he shall have the right to notify the other party with a view to adopting the necessary measures for the punishment of the aggressors after their return to his country if they be of his subjects and to prevent them crossing the frontier if they be subjects of the informant or other Government

ARTICLE 6

Notwithstanding the provisions of the first clause of article 3 of the Bahra Agreement, the tribes of both parties shall have complete freedom of movement ~~for~~ ~~the~~ ~~purpose~~ ~~of~~ ~~grazing~~ ~~or~~ ~~"muabala"~~ ~~(purchase~~ ~~of~~ ~~provisions)~~ ~~and~~ ~~each~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~high~~ ~~contracting~~ ~~parties~~ ~~undertakes~~ ~~not~~ ~~to~~ ~~place~~ ~~the~~ ~~least~~ ~~obstacle~~ ~~in~~ ~~this~~ ~~respect~~

ARTICLE 7

Neither of the two parties shall coerce the subjects of the other party, when within his territory, to join his forces, regular or otherwise, to suppress a rebellion or take part in military operations

ARTICLE 8

The competent authorities charged with the organisation of general co-operation ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~provisions~~ ~~of~~ ~~this~~ ~~treaty~~ ~~are~~ ~~—~~

On the Iraq side: the highest administrative official in the desert or the person acting for him

On the Hejaz Nejd side: the highest administrative official in the desert or the person acting for him

Only these officials shall have the right to correspond with each other for the purpose of co-operation and solution of disputes arising on the frontiers and between the tribes from time to time. They shall exchange forthwith information pertaining to incidents occurring in the region of either of them of a nature affecting the safety or security in the region of the other

ARTICLE 9

In order to facilitate the execution of the provisions of this treaty and, in general, the maintenance of good neighbourly relations, there shall be set up a permanent frontier commission composed of four officials selected from time to time for this purpose, half by the Iraq Government and the other half by the Hejaz-Nejd Government. This commission shall meet once every six months or more often if circumstances so require

ARTICLE 10

The commission mentioned in article 9 shall meet for the first time in the neutral zone and thereafter by rotation in Iraq or in Nejd or in the neutral zone in a place appointed by it before the end of each meeting. The duties of the commission shall be to attempt, with the object of giving effect to the provisions of this treaty and of ensuring good neighbourly relations, the amicable settlement of all such questions concerning the application of the provisions of this treaty, relating to grazing, migrations (or movements) of tribes, tribal disputes, assessment of minor losses and other matters concerning frontier affairs, on which no agreement could be reached between the local frontier officials concerned. Any decision agreed upon by the commission should be enforced within three months by both Governments, each in so far as concerns it. In the event of difference arising between the members of the commission on any of the matters within the commission's competence, such difference shall be referred by the members to "their Government" (i.e. their respective Governments) for decision, except in the case of matters within the competence of the court provided for in article 2 of the Bahra Agreement, which shall be referred to the said court for consideration in accordance with the terms of the said agreement

ARTICLE 11

The two high contracting parties undertake to enforce any decision that may be passed by the tribunal set up under article 2 of the Bahra Agreement, within a period not exceeding six months commencing from the date of its issue

ARTICLE 12

The two high contracting parties mutually undertake to prevent officials under them crossing the frontiers and mingling with the tribes or chiefs of tribes of the other party, whether they be pedlars, horsemen, in cars or aeroplanes. The Government whose territory such persons shall have crossed shall be responsible for their safety should such crossing take place without its permission, subject to the exception of officials crossing the frontiers in execution of the provisions of article 4 of this treaty

ARTICLE 13

The two high contracting parties mutually undertake to adopt the necessary measures to prevent foreigners residing in or coming from their "country" ~~to~~ ~~cross~~ ~~the~~ ~~frontier~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~other~~ ~~party's~~ ~~country~~ ~~for~~ ~~the~~ ~~purpose~~ ~~of~~ ~~touring~~ ~~, exploration~~ ~~, shooting~~ ~~or~~ ~~any~~ ~~other~~ ~~purpose~~ ~~, without~~ ~~obtaining~~ ~~previous~~ ~~permission~~ ~~either~~ ~~from~~ ~~the~~ ~~consulates~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~party~~ ~~concerned~~ ~~or~~ ~~from~~ ~~the~~ ~~authorities~~ ~~of~~ ~~such~~ ~~party~~ ~~referred~~ ~~to~~ ~~in~~ ~~article~~ ~~8~~. Subject to the provisions of the Bahra Agreement and other agreements concluded between the two parties concerning tribes and their migrations, the Government whose territories such persons cross shall not be responsible for their safety if their crossing is not done by its permission

ARTICLE 14

~~At~~ ~~the~~ ~~same~~ ~~time~~ ~~as~~ ~~the~~ ~~provisions~~ ~~of~~ ~~this~~ ~~treaty~~ ~~are~~ ~~being~~ ~~applied~~ ~~the~~ ~~parties~~ ~~shall~~ ~~have~~ ~~the~~ ~~opportunity~~ ~~into~~ ~~negotiations~~ ~~for~~ ~~the~~ ~~conclusion~~ ~~of~~ ~~special~~ ~~agreements~~ ~~concerning~~ ~~economic~~ ~~, consular~~ ~~, residence~~ ~~and~~ ~~nationality~~ ~~affairs~~.

ARTICLE 15

Any difference that may arise between the two high contracting parties in matters concluded between the two kingdoms before the date of the present treaty, and any difference that may arise after the date thereof as a result of the provisions of the new treaties and agreements concluded between them, shall be referred to arbitration, which shall be conducted in accordance with the protocol accompanying the present treaty.

ARTICLE 16

The two high contracting parties, exchange to be effected in a place to be agreed upon between them.

Done at Mecca on the 20th Dhul Qi'dah, 1349, of the Hijrah, corresponding with the 7th April, 1931, A.D.

NURI AL SAID
FEISAL ABUL AZIZ

Enclosure 2 in No. 112

Protocol on Arbitration

In the name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate!

In the name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate!

In pursuance of the desire expressed by the two high contracting parties in article 15 of the Treaty of Friendship and "Bon Voisinage" concluded on the 20th Dhul Qi'dah, 1349 (corresponding with the 7th April, 1931), between the Kingdom of Iraq and the Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd and Dependencies concerning the settlement of such disputes arising from the provisions of the treaties and agreements "ratified" between them as may prove impossible of settlement by diplomatic means —

We, the undersigned, *Nuri al-Said*, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Iraq, and *Feisal Abul Aziz*, His Majesty the King of Hejaz and Nejd and Dependencies, respectively, having agreed to refer to arbitration any dispute arising from the provisions of the Protocol to the above said Treaty of Friendship and "Bon Voisinage," and have signed the following —

ARTICLE 1

Arbitration shall be conducted by arbitrators not to exceed six in number to be nominated equally by the two high contracting parties under the presidency of a person to be nominated from time to time in agreement between the said two parties.

ARTICLE 2

If either of the two high contracting parties wishes to refer to arbitration any of the cases which should be referred under the provisions of this protocol, he shall thereupon notify his desire to the other party, stating the names of his arbitrators, and the other party shall also state the names of his arbitrators to the first party. The meeting (of arbitrators) shall take place within six months from the date of notification by the first party of his desire to go to arbitration.

ARTICLE 3

The president of the board of arbitration shall be nominated in agreement between the two parties within the period mentioned in article 2 of this protocol.

ARTICLE 4

Each of the two high contracting parties shall forward to the other party and to the president of the board of arbitration a memorandum explaining his point of view on the question under dispute. The memorandum is forwarded may reply thereto provided that he shall do so within the period of six months laid down in article 2 above.

ARTICLE 5

The arbitrators shall meet at such place as may be agreed upon between the two Governments, and the board of arbitration shall issue their decision within three months.

ARTICLE 6

The two high contracting parties undertake to afford the board of arbitration all the facilities and assistance that the board may ask for for the execution of its task.

ARTICLE 7

Each of the two high contracting parties shall nominate one or more individuals to expound before the board of arbitration his point of view on the question under dispute.

ARTICLE 8

The board of arbitration shall give effect to such decision as the arbitrators shall issue on the question referred to them. The arbitrators may, if necessary, issue their decision by a majority of votes.

ARTICLE 9

Each of the two Governments shall pay the salaries and expenses of the arbitrators nominated by it and half the salary and expenses of the president of the board of arbitration.

ARTICLE 10

This protocol shall come into force with effect from the date of exchange of copies thereof ratified by the two parties.

Done at Mecca this 20th day of Dhul Qi'dah, 1349, corresponding with the 7th day of April, 1931.

NURI AL SAID
Prime Minister of the Iraq Government

FEISAL ABUL AZIZ
Viceroy and Minister for Foreign Affairs of His Majesty the King of Hejaz and Nejd and Dependencies

Enclosure 3 in No. 112.

Extradition Treaty between Iraq and Nejd and Hejaz

(Translation.)

In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate

HIS Majesty the King of Iraq of the one part and
 HIS Majesty the King of Hejaz and Nejd and Dependencies, of the other
 part.

Desirous of concluding a treaty relative to the surrender of offenders,
 and Dependencies into the Kingdom of Iraq
 Have appointed as their plenipotentiaries

His Majesty the King of Iraq

His Excellency Nuri Pasha Al Saad Prime Minister

His Majesty the King of Hejaz and Nejd and Dependencies

His Royal Highness Emir Faisal bin Abdul Aziz
 Rahman al Saud, Viceroy and Minister for Foreign Affairs,

who, having communicated their powers, found in good and due form, have
 agreed as follows —

ARTICLE 1

The Government of Hejaz and Nejd and Dependencies undertakes to
 within the frontiers of Iraq any of the offenders mentioned in article 3 of this
 treaty, are found within the frontiers of the Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd and
 Dependencies

ARTICLE 2

The Iraq Government undertakes to surrender to the Government of Hejaz
 and Nejd and Dependencies any nationals of the Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd and
 Dependencies who, having committed within the Kingdom of Hejaz and
 Dependencies any of the offences mentioned in article 3 of this treaty, are
 found within the frontiers of the Kingdom of Iraq

The surrender of political offenders shall not be permissible. The offences
 in respect of which offenders should be surrendered (and which are not to be
 wounding, raiding "or" (1 and) severe assault, whether the offender be an
 individual or a group (of individuals) and whether the offence be directed against
 an individual or a group (of individuals).

Any attempt against the person of either of their Majesties or against any
 member of their respective families shall not be deemed a political offence

ARTICLE 4

A demand for extradition made by the Iraq Government shall be addressed
 to the competent authority of the Government of Hejaz and Nejd and
 Dependencies, and should be accompanied by the following documents, —

- (a) Description sheet of the offender and any information available for his
 identification.
- (b) Short summary of the offence committed by the offender.
- Copy of any court judgment
 has already been convicted.

All the above documents shall bear the seal of the competent authorities.

ARTICLE 5

A demand for extradition made by the Government of Hejaz and Nejd and
 Dependencies should be addressed to the competent authority of the Iraq
 Government and should be accompanied by the documents mentioned in article 4.
 all the said documents to bear the seal of the competent authorities

ARTICLE 6

No person shall be surrendered under this treaty for any offence committed
 previously to the date of its coming into force

ARTICLE 7

An offender surrendered under this treaty shall not be tried for any offence
 other than the one in respect of which his surrender was applied for. An
 offender shall not be tried for an offence committed by him previously to the date
 been made, unless he has first been given a reasonable opportunity to leave the
 country and has failed to avail himself thereof

ARTICLE 8

This treaty is drawn up in Arabic in duplicate. It shall come into force
 with effect from the date of exchange of ratifications thereof by the two parties,
 exchange to take place at the place to be agreed upon between them. It shall
 the other—three months before its expiry—of his desire for its substitution or
 revision, shall remain in force for a further period of three years

Done in Mecca on the 21st of Dhul Qi dat, 1349, A H., corresponding with the
 5th April, 1931. A D

NURI PASHA
 F. ISAL ABUL AZIZ

Enclosure 4 in No. 112

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN NURI PASHA AND EMIR FISAAL

(1)

Nuri Pasha Al Saad to His Royal Highness Emir Faisal al-Saud

(Translation)

21st Dhul Qi dat 1349

Your Royal Highness,

(4 April 1931)

AS our efforts for the conclusion of an Extradition Treaty have been crowned
 with success, and in view of the desire expressed by His Majesty the King in the
 course of conversation between us on the morning of the 20th Dhul Qi dat 1349,

I have the honour to submit to your Highness that offences normally
 committed by bedouins are bound to come within the acts of assault with violence,
 robbery, plunder, highway robbery, theft of the various kinds, wounding or
 murder, committed by one or more individuals against an individual or a group.

for the prevention of raids and plunder are considered ordinary offences in
 "construct" as political offences.

I trust that this, my letter, will fully satisfy the desire of His Majesty the
 King.

Please accept, &c

Hejaz-Nejd Minister for Foreign Affairs to Nuri Pasha Al Said

(Translation)

Your Excellency,

21st Dhul Q'adat, 1349

(April 9, 1931)

I HAVE received your Excellency's letter dated the 21st Dhul Q'adat, 1349, corresponding with the 8th April, 1931, and I have noted your statement in regard to offences committed by bedouins, who know only offences of raiding, robbery and plunder, &c., which are very far from being described as political offences. I would like you to feel sure that what you have stated in your letter will be scrupulously executed by us on the principle of reciprocity. I trust that, so long as mutual goodwill and confidence exist between the two countries, co-operation will have the best effects which tend to strengthen the good relations between the two parties.

I leave accept, &c.

E 2835 387 25

No 113

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson (Received May 20)

No. 152

(Telegraphic) R.

Jedda, May 20, 1931

Y. R. ... We ... various points in recent correspondence. Upshot of conversation was as follows:-

(a) Proclamations against raids.—Referring to note from me stating that Transjordanian proclamation would be issued on 30th May, Fuad asked reasons for the delay. He accepted my explanation that it was due to difficulty concerning simultaneous action, but contended that if anything untoward happened during the next few days, he would be held responsible. Subject to this, we agreed that matter was now settled.

(b) Arrangements for restitution of loot.—We agreed that this also might be regarded as settled.

(c) Residence of the tribal sheikhs.—Fuad stated that the two parts of ... intention was to agree to representatives hearing sheikhs jointly in cases where their evidence was required, subject to undertaking that witnesses taking refuge in territory of the other side would be turned back. I said we had been considering extension of formula regarding raiding criminals to cover this case. Fuad suggested that ... in simple terms that any witnesses fleeing during or soon after meeting should be surrendered. He is to give me written draft.

(d) Formula relative to raiding criminals.—Fuad, who now seems anxious to clear the way for meeting, agreed that this was a separate question. I asked for explanation of note summarised in my telegram No. 145. I explained, without giving precise definition, that if words like "if possible" were not used, formula would be ... Ibn Mashhur which His Majesty's Government were determined to avoid. Fuad said that object of providing for surrender as alternative to expulsion was to cover cases in which representative authorities were in the position to arrest and hand over particular criminals as well as cases in which larger bodies could only be driven out by pursuit or other measures, e.g., pressure on their own tribes not to harbour them. He limited point 3 to cases provided for in your draft formula ... attacks in Hejaz-Nejd territory on other persons, whether subjects of either Government or of any third Government. I said that point 4 was expressly covered by your draft subject to words "if possible".

(e) I deprecated language of last Hejaz note on alleged violation of Nejd territory by ... charges which had been subject of reasoned reply without adducing specific facts.

Comments on above —

As regards (c) Fuad's suggestion is not quite in accord with explanation given by Hejaz Minister in London. I agree that question should be kept separate from that of raiding criminals in order to expedite meeting, but I consider in case of witnesses also we should avoid any commitment which we are not certain of being able to fulfil.

As regards (d) Fuad's explanations have reassured me to some extent, although I think we should insist on reasonable elasticity and I still foresee disputes turning on nationality. I asked Fuad whether he would like to produce counter-draft. He preferred to leave it to us to propose revised form of undertaking drawn up in the light of Hejaz Government's observations on original draft.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 179)

E 2731 387 25

No 114

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda)

(No. 93)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office May 20, 1931

YOUR telegram Nos. 145a and 146 of 21st May. Denial of refuge to ...

1. In view of length and nature of frontier and limited range of forces available, it is impracticable for Transjordan authorities to give unqualified undertaking. Moreover, exceptional case might occur where it would be ... for Transjordan authorities to refuse asylum, for example, on legal or ...

No. 97 of 21st May, to attempt to define position more closely, and it is essential that full measure of freedom allowed by present formula should be retained. You may, however, bearing these considerations in mind, discuss with Hejazi Government drafting amendments, which should be submitted to me for consideration of His Majesty's Government and Transjordan authorities.

Point 2 is an extension of original Hejazi request and is open to serious objection. Apart from practical difficulties involved in capture, retention in custody and personal delivery of fugitives to Hejaz-Nejd authorities, possibility that captives thus handed over by British authorities might be subjected to barbarous penalties would be unacceptable to public opinion in this country.

agreed to, emphasising, if necessary, practical difficulties involved.

Point 3. This request is obscure, but appears to amount to wide extension of original proposal. It is unlikely that Transjordan authorities would be willing to undertake to capture and surrender raiders caught red-handed in Transjordan territory and thus sacrifice complete freedom to deal with them as circumstances require. You should inform Hejazi Government that this point is not fully understood, but that in any case it appears to involve so great an extension of request which present formula is designed to meet that it would require mature consideration and should not be allowed to hold up settlement of present formula. Meanwhile you should give no indication of attitude likely to be adopted by Transjordan authorities on this point.

Point 4 appears to be met by terms of second sentence of formula.

(Addressed to Jedda. Repeated to Transjordan, No. 99)

E 2849 387 25]

No 115

Sir A. Ryan to Mr A. Henderson (Received May 30)

(No. 153)

(Telegraphic) R.

Jedda, May 29, 1931

MY telegram No. 152, heading (c)
Following is translation of Fuad's draft -

"The two Governments have agreed that sheikhs shall appear before representatives to give evidence and to make statements on matters in regard to which the two representatives consider it necessary that such evidence and statements should be taken direct, subject to condition that if one of these sheikhs should flee to the other country, whether when called upon to give evidence or during or after meeting, the Government of the country into which he has fled at once takes to hand him over to his Government."

In further discussion to-day I said that I understood "after" to mean within such a time that there would be clear connexion between flight and capture. I said if this were understood between

convenience

Fuad said he must see the King, but promised his support. He returns to Mecca to-morrow. If the King accepts my proposal, may I record agreement on all outstanding points in suitable note?

Fuad begs His Majesty's Government to expedite arbitration on earlier rank. He expresses strong desire that whole ground should be cleared and that when Glubb and Ibn Zeid have met we should draw up results with a view to establishing firm basis for the future before I take leave.

Repeated to Transjordan, No. 180)

E 2850/723/25]

No 116

Sir A. Ryan to Mr A. Henderson (Received May 31)

(No. 154)

(Telegraphic) R.

Jedda, May 30, 1931

YOUR telegram No. 53

I gave Fuad, on 29th May, memorandum for the King's consideration on the lines suggested in my telegram No. 57. I added a reference to the desirability of pilots knowing the situation of any existing or proposed landing grounds, and question

Fuad said that the Government were about to issue a general regulation on landing grounds &c., which would apply to aircraft of all nationalities. I gather, from further conversation on 29th May, that it would mark advance towards more liberal attitude, but would be on the lines of highly centralised control. I said I was anxious to reach good understanding within the scope of any general regulations before going on leave. I intimated that in the present state of aviation more than one landing ground would be necessary for complete security, although I did not anticipate continual use of them.

Unless Fuad reverts to the matter meanwhile I propose to await the regulations and see how they affect the matter.

E 2875 387 25

No 117

A. Ryan to Mr A. Henderson (Received June 1)

(No. 157)

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, May 31, 1931

YOUR telegram No. 53

You will now have received my telegram No. 152. Fuad has returned to Mecca, and owing to uncertainty of internal situation I do not know when I shall see him or the King.

I submit following observations -

Point 1 - In my conversation with Fuad I endeavoured to follow instructions in your telegram No. 57. I avoided precise definition of words "if possible," &c. on the grounds that every contingency could not be foreseen, but I could not avoid all discussion of their meaning. I defended them as being intended to protect Transjordan against obligations of genuine impossibility of fulfilment without defeating main purpose. I gave hypothetical example and (I group omitted) later to possible difficulty of determining nationality. I emphasised fact that

it now appears that words have much wider sense than I supposed, and its conception of law and humanity. Even if they have this effect in general discussion with this reservation in my mind but without giving any indication of it, any subsequent attempt to give effect to it will expose me and perhaps His Majesty's Government to accusation of having been disingenuous.

In my opinion, only safe and defensible alternatives are to use plainer language in the text or to state frankly in discussions that, in spite of what I said, words are, in fact, very elastic and cover wide range of contingencies of all kinds which cannot be indicated beforehand. This would probably render agreement impossible, which might not be a bad thing.

be trusted to treat his own subjects with humanity. I must, however, offer some criminals are to be named persons, explanation based solely on practical difficulties will be more likely to arouse King's suspicions than to convince him.

Point 3 - Extension on lines now proposed by Fuad seems to me reasonable.

Point 4 - I agree.

Without wishing to make difficulties, I recommend my observations on first two points to your most earnest consideration.

It would be better to have no agreement than one productive of future quarrels. I suggest that I should be authorised to conclude main negotiations as suggested in my telegram No. 153, and that you should propose revised formula regarding criminals. We can afford to play somewhat with this question now, need with you as to its separate character. I would propose, if you approve, to tell Fuad that at present stage further oral discussion is desirable, and that I will await his return to Jedda.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 183)

E 2849 387 25

No 118

Mr A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda)

(No. 95)

(Telegraphic) R.

Foreign Office, June 2, 1931

YOUR telegrams Nos. 152 of 29th May and 153 of 29th May. Transjordan frontier situation.

Solutions of points (a) and (b) are satisfactory. Questions dealt with under (c) and (d), and result of Macdonnell investigation, do not concern Glubb-Ibn Zeid meeting, and must be dealt with separately.

As regards (e), formula regarding fugitive witnesses is clearly only intended to be of being called upon to appear or give evidence, and not to classes of fugitives.

falling to be dealt with under other formula now under separate discussion. In those circumstances, three alternatives suggested in Fuad's draft seem inappropriate, and His Majesty's Government would suggest following alternative for last portion: "Subject to condition that if one of these sheikhs should refuse to obey the orders of his Government to appear or to give evidence before the representatives and should attempt to take refuge in the country of which he is not a national, the Government of that country will do everything in its power to apprehend and hand him over to his own Government."

Please propose this alternative to Hejaz Government and make every effort to secure their early acceptance of it, thus enabling main meeting to proceed without further difficulty or delay.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 72)

E 2948 387/25]

No. 119

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson. — (Received June 4.)

(No. 159)

(Telegraphic.)

YOC R telegram No. 93

Jedda, June 4, 1931

I am glad to hear that the King is now in a better mood of mind.

Owing probably to internal difficulties described in other reports he now seems anxious for settlement all along the line which has also been aim pursued by His Majesty's Government during the past year.

King is, however, suspicious and considers certain requirements essential. One of these is that nothing should impair his authority over his own subjects. This underlay his attitude regarding witnesses. He has consented under pressure to their being heard jointly when their evidence is necessary, but in note summarised in my telegram No. 131 he emphasised danger of sheikhs' respect for Government being diminished and suggested that if persons in possession of loot were forced to attend they might flee. Such flights might be resorted to not only to avoid attendance but also after attendance had been ensured by compulsion, if sheikhs thought they were in danger from their own side as result of enquiry.

It may be argued in the latter alternative they would be in similar position to fugitive criminals. This argument is unlikely to satisfy the King. Even if assimilation were complete, agreement regarding surrender of criminals is not yet reached. The King is also anxious to see that nationality in your redraft. I had hoped this might be unnecessary in present case, although it is important in formula regarding criminals which will have more extended application and must therefore be more guarded.

It must be remembered that I am no longer in personal touch with Fuad nor do your instructions allow me any latitude in negotiations. If above considerations appear to you immaterial I will propose redraft in writing, but I feel bound to warn you against danger of further prolongation of discussion which may result.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 188)

E 2948 387 25]

No. 120

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda)

(No. 94)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office June 6, 1931

YOC R telegram No. 159 of 4th June. Transjordan Hejaz Nejd frontier situation.

Formula in my telegram No. 95 of 2nd June, which was carefully devised to meet numerous difficulties from various quarters was intended to cover all cases in which Hejaz Nejd sheikhs might attempt to flout Ibn Saud's authority in evidence. It should therefore meet the King's anxiety lest compliance with His Majesty's Government's desire for attendance of witnesses should impair his

authority over his own subjects. Cases of attempted flight after evidence had been given are not covered by the formula. It was particularly desired to cover as far as possible all such cases connected with meeting, in order that further discussion on general question of fugitive criminals, which has no direct connexion with question of attendance or attempted escape of witnesses, might proceed independently and not cause further delay in main meeting between Captain Glubb and Ibn Zeid. Criterion of nationality seems inevitable, since it would obviously be impossible to surrender or drive back to Nejd sheikhs who could prove that they were of Syrian or Iraqi allegiance. It was adopted in order to avoid vague phrases to which so much exception has been taken, and I trust that you may succeed in getting Hejaz Government to accept it without having to embark on further detailed explanations.

In these circumstances you should present revised formula forthwith unless you feel strongly that it is unworkable when I will at once consider alternative, provided you can devise one which will meet objections from other quarters, as I realise danger of further prolongation of discussion.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 78)

E 2979 387/25

No. 121

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson. — (Received June 8.)

(Nos. 100 and 161)

(Telegraphic)

(R) MY telegram No. 159

Jedda, June 5, 1931

Note from Minister for Foreign Affairs of 3rd June, written without reference to previous correspondence, reproduces sinister information which, if verified, will greatly tend to destroy hopes entertained in connexion with the frontier question.

Minister for Foreign Affairs reminds me of Fuad's observations in recent conversations regarding the unfavourable effect of delay in publishing the Transjordan proclamation and Glubb's delay in meeting Ibn Zeid, but says the effect of these delays, however great, is weak compared with that of the action reported to have been taken by Glubb as follows:

(1) In November or December certain Bent Saad's tribesmen looted 16 camels from Ibn Saadina but returned them. While he was returning with the camels Glubb met and detained him, but he escaped on a camel belonging to Ibn Jazi, whose gun he also took. Glubb later captured a Shararat caravan, including women, consisting of 16 camels carrying salt on the pretext of retaliation for Ibn Jazi's camels and gun.

(2) Musaad al Fag'ir and party were recently moving west towards Hauran to obtain restitution of the camels held in Transjordan. Glubb detained him and the camels by way of compensation for the camels alleged to have been looted by Al Awazi from Al Atwat in the past.

(3) It is also reported that Glubb seized 40 camels from Darnan of Rutla by way of compensation, he said for the camels belonging to Abu Rukab-al Shararat, who resides with Bent Saad.

Incidents at (1) and (2) appear to be connected with those dealt with in Transjordan despatches to me numbered C F 735 28 of 18th April and 9th April action on which I postponed for reasons stated in my telegram to Transjordan.

(End of R)

No. 158. Information contained in them does not suffice to dispose of present accusation. I cannot connect incident at (3) with anything previous.

Ibn Saad's hostility towards Glubb remains unabated. I fear [one group indecipherable] in our general attitude, unless means can be found to expedite main meeting success of which is most doubtful, but which will at least open new phase.

I am sending interim reply of a general nature in order to counteract insinuations of avoidable delay in preamble of Minister for Foreign Affairs' note and convey information regarding message sent by Glubb (see Transjordan telegram to me of 1st June).

(Replied to Transjordan, Nos. 187 and 188.)

E 2589 327 25

No. 122

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson. (Received June 8)

N 103

Telegram to R

YOM R telegram No. 98

Jedda, June 8, 1931

In course of telephone conversation with Fuad on other subjects on 6th June I gathered that the King stood by formula of 28th May regarding witnesses without even the amendment I had personally suggested. Fuad intimated intention of coming to Jedda early this week.

In these circumstances I have thought it best to propound officially the will reject it. If he does it will still afford concrete basis for discussion with Fuad.

My immediately following telegram gives the main points of my note. I will use your further arguments orally. May I, if necessary, amplify reference to explanations furnished by Hejaz Minister in London by saying that they clearly related only to contingency contemplated in your redraft?

(Replied to Transjordan No. 190.)

E 3020 3020 25

No. 123

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson. (Received June 10)

N 112

N 1

Jedda, May 13, 1931

As you are aware, it has become the practice of Ibn Saud to give a banquet for Moslem notables of all nations each year at pilgrimage time. This year it took place on the evening of the 24th April, and was attended by a rather unusual number of Moslems of high standing, if in most cases of no great political importance. The King had on his right ex King Amanullah of Afghanistan, and on his left Sheikh Ahmed en-Sennani. Among others present were Prince Ahmed Teyhid of Turkey, whose visit I have reported separately, the members of Nadir Khan's official delegation, the Afghan Minister in Cairo, Sir Abdul Kerim Ghaznavi, of the Council of the Governor of Bengal, and various minor notabilities.

2. The King delivered the principal speech of the evening and spoke and by the pursuit of false ideals like that of supposing the imitation of Europeans to be the only way to progress. Had any of the exponents of this

No, they imitated the Europeans only in those things contrary to Islam.

3. At this point the King took up a reference by an earlier speaker to an utterance of the Indian leader, Shaukat Ali, during his recent tour about "our brothers the Jews." This drew from Ibn Saud a tirade directed not so much

he said, the means of happiness in this world and the next. He swore a triple oath affirming his wish that all peoples should accept Islam, and declared his preference for the life of one eating herbs on a mountain top and worshipping

God, over all earthly grandeur. God, he said, had divided Moslems into two classes, the warriors ever in readiness to defend their religion, and those others engaged in industry, agriculture, &c. He reproached Moslems with their internal strife. Pointing to the Turkish Prince present, he described how his ancestors had fought those of the prince rather than call themselves servants of the "Commander of the Faithful." They were the servants of God only.

4. The King attenuated the militant tone of his speech by saying towards the end that he did not profess to be fighting against the people of the world and used the courtesy prescribed by Islam unless he was injured in his religion and his country. He ended with a call to all Moslems to turn to the service of God and the good way of their forebears.

5. This speech was rendered into Urdu by the Indian Ismail Ghaznavi. Various other speeches were also delivered in the course of the evening, including one in English by Sir Abdul Kerim Ghaznavi.

6. The above account of the proceedings is based mainly on the authorised report in the "Umm-al Qura" of the 1st May. Although it gives the King's address as a connected whole, he would appear to have in fact spoken both before and after dinner. I understand from private sources that the guest who

seems, to the King's taste, and not all the guests were entirely pleased with His Majesty. My informant describes the function as having ended in an atmosphere of tension. One of the speakers who praised the King was Saif-ur-Rahman, who has been mentioned in other reports as having become the spokesman of the official delegation from Kabul on various occasions. It is said that Amanullah Khan also thought of saying something, but thought better of it.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, and also to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem, in case Ibn Saud's remarks about the Jews should have any echo in Palestine.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN

E 3024 3034/251

No. 4

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson. (Received June 10)

N 117

N 1

Jedda, May 15, 1931

As I wrote my despatch No. 108 of the 23rd March, the exchange situation in this country has gone through various vicissitudes, of which it is now possible to give a more or less connected account, although no account by an outsider can be complete or at all points accurate owing to the amazing difficulty of obtaining coherent information in the conditions which prevail.

2. The arrangements with the Dutch Bank, as the Netherlands Trading Society is popularly called, worked for five or six weeks on the lines described

riyals at 10 to the £ sterling plus a small premium of 1½ current piastres, and charged for the draft a high commission, the normal rate of which was at first 1 per cent., but was afterwards raised to 2 per cent. The currency remained

nickel piastres.

3. About the middle of April, however, the arrangement with the Dutch Bank working on a limit of £10,000 in gold for redemption purposes and threw back on to the market an excessive quantity of the redeemed silver and nickel. At this stage the Government would appear to have relaxed the prohibition of the export of gold though I cannot discover that any public announcement was made, and the bank attempted to carry on by selling drafts for half gold and half down its exchange business. In Jedda it is difficult even to ascertain at any given moment whether a bank is open or closed.

4. In any case, it was now close to the pilgrimage day, which fell on the 27th April and which put a stop to all big business from a day or two before the festival to a day or two after it. The pilgrims had all arrived before the 25th April, and their advent, naturally, brought money to replenish temporarily the Government chest. The demand for currency for retail operations is also naturally greatest at the height of the pilgrimage. These reasons probably account for the fact that, although the rial has been wobbly since the middle of April, there has been no spectacular depreciation. It has stood at rates varying from a little over the legal rate of 10 to a rate of 12 to the £ sterling of a=

5. Shortly before the pilgrimage day on the other hand, the nickel currency came lower from all standards and as it plays an important part in retail business great uneasiness prevailed. It was accentuated by the publication of a communiqué on the 23rd April to the effect that, in view of the frauds which had been practised, the Government had decided to accept nickel at the market rate. This was followed by a considerable dislocation of retail trade, and some days later, there was a further fall in the nickel rate to very low rates, and at one moment all but lost effective value as currency. The Government took stop gap measures in Jeddah to withdraw nickel by collecting supplies of rice &c. and selling in a shop or shops of their own. I do not know what happened at Mecca, except that prices in piastres went up considerably, much to the discomfort of pilgrims.

6. A meeting was held in Mecca on the 1st May to consider the whole situation, and a new communiqué issued in the "Umm al Qura" of the 1st May, which actually appeared on the 3rd May, announced that the Government had opened shops to change nickel for riyals at the legal rate of 22 to the rial. This was a forced loan raised by the Government, although, in theory it is supposed to be worked by committees of representative merchants. The principle of this arrangement appears to be to withdraw from circulation each of them being assessed at a stated amount. The nickel thus collected was to be held by the Ministry of Finance and repayment of the money levied on the public was to be made at a later date. It was further decided about the 7th May to close all the shops of the money changers, who are accused of rigging the currency market.

7. The measures taken have rehabilitated nickel for the time being and, as I have said, the rial has not fallen unduly low. Nevertheless, the situation is obviously precarious, for the crisis has occurred at what should be the period of greatest prosperity. The months between now and the beginning of the next pilgrimage season late in the autumn, when the 1932 pilgrims will begin to arrive, must necessarily be very lean months. The manager of the Dutch Bank was a very disillusioned man towards the end of April, but he was then negotiating a fresh arrangement with the Government. He did not tell me its exact nature, but he said that the Government would have to put up £80,000 in gold to back it. After the festival he did not reopen his bank for exchange business and he was to retire from the country. On the 10th May, however, Mr Jacobs told me that he was still negotiating. He no longer had any doubt that the Government could dispose of any necessary amount of gold up to £80,000, but he said he was awaiting the King's guarantee of the transaction, whatever it might be. He complained bitterly of the changeableness and incapacity of the Government. He put much of the blame on Mr Philby, who, he said, had been dangling before the King the idea that it would be an easy matter to arrange, with his (Mr Philby's) assistance, to introduce another bank, which would give all the help required.

8. The situation is complicated by factors which are even further from my ken than the matters which I have attempted to summarise above in a form more intelligible than most of the reports on which my account is based. There are rumours of inflation by the importation of forged coins have been current and there is the difficulty of popularising in Nejd the use of the silver and nickel coinage current in the Hejaz.

9. You will doubtless be struck by the smallness of the amounts on which these locally important crises turn. It needs at most, it appears, £80,000 in gold to sustain a silver currency which is legal tender to an unlimited amount. Operations in nickel to a total of £80,000 can throw the market into convulsions. As I have observed in at least one previous report, it is characteristic of this country that the Government are reduced to all sorts of shifts to cope with what according to our standards, are quite small liabilities. It is not the first time that Ibn Saud has been in low water but I doubt whether he has ever been so embarrassed or had so little credit. It is just possible that the present financial situation may react on his political future.

10. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.
ANDREW RYAN

E 2975, 387 '25]

No. 125

Mr A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jeddah)

(No. 102)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office June 11, 1931

YOUR telegram No. 157 of 31st May. Denial of refuge to fugitive criminals between Transjordan and the Hejaz.

Scope of discussion regarding raiding criminals has been greatly enlarged (a) by additional points 2 and 3 raised by Hejazi Government, (b) by apparent necessity to define more precisely cases in which undertaking to refuse asylum would not operate. It appears hopeless in these circumstances to try to agree at short notice on comparatively simple formula, and inevitable that negotiations, if pursued, should necessitate lengthy and detailed discussions.

... your reply, ... probable effect on Hejazi Government, to whom, however, you should not mention suggestion, even informally.

E 3123 387 25

No. 126

Sir A. Ryan to Mr A. Henderson. (Received June 13)

(No. 167)

(Telegraphic) R

Jeddah, June 13, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 103

My point was that original request for undertaking could readily cover both alternatives mentioned in last sentence of second paragraph of my telegram No. 159, and that Fuad's draft defined it in that possible sense, whereas your redraft appeared to cover first alternative only.

Matter has, however, lost its importance, as Fuad has come to Jeddah, and I saw him yesterday before I received your telegram under reference. He accepted redraft subject to King's wish to be assured that if, e.g., fugitive Nejd witness set through to Syria and then returned to Transjordan he would be handed over. I said I had no authority to amend redraft, but I reduced my understanding of condition will apply equally to case of any such sheikh taking refuge in a third country if being a Hejaz Nejd national he should subsequently enter Transjordan territory or being Transjordanian national he should subsequently enter Hejaz Nejd territory.

Fuad informed me this morning that the King would accept redraft if above addition were made.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 193)

E 3147 387 25

No 12*

Sir A. Ryan to Mr A. Henderson (Received June 15)

(No. 169)

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, June 15, 1931

YOUR telegram No 102.

Idea that eventual aim should be to broaden the treaty basis of relations between Transjordan and the Hejaz Nejd, as in the case of the Hejaz Nejd and Iraq, has for some time been present to my mind, but I am unaware to what extent such an aim could be made to square with the position and policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to Transjordan. I proposed to discuss this question with your Department while on leave.

The proposal made by the High Commissioner for Transjordan in his telegram to the Colonial Office, No. 26, that a formal extradition treaty should be negotiated involves a move in the direction indicated above. I myself thought of reviving that proposal as a possible solution of the difficulties regarding the proposed formula, when preparing my telegram No. 157. My reasons for not mentioning it were -

- 1 Judicial machinery, use of which any normal kind of extradition treaty would necessitate, would give less speedy results than the administrative action which, owing to disturbed conditions on frontier, were contemplated in the formula.
- 2 Main cases will I imagine, and be those contemplated in original draft of formula, notwithstanding Hejaz desire to widen its scope (see my despatch No. 181). Formula provided for handing over to Ibn Saud of persons who, having originally committed offences within jurisdiction of Transjordan Government, attempted to evade punishment inflicted by Ibn Saud and vice versa. Such cases would not be covered by any normal extradition treaty.

I find it hard to guess what position Ibn Saud would adopt if you now proposed an extradition treaty instead of formula. Normally, he might be expected to raise objections, in substance if not in form, similar to my points 1 and 2 above. He is, however, being compelled by internal difficulties to consider how relations between His Majesty's Government and himself can be improved. Realising that disputes connected with Transjordan must be settled if he is to achieve this, he might be more willing than he would have been a short while ago to drop his own proposal and adopt alternative of extradition treaty.

Since commencement of new series of conversations on 12th June, Fuad has not referred to "criminal formula." I could, if you wished, find an occasion to refer to unexpected difficulties arising from its discussion and sound the ground for alternative proposal discreetly. But before embarking on a tentative, I should require to know whether you contemplated normal extradition treaty or agreement similar in form but especially designed to obviate difficulties suggested above, and I should have to be given some latitude in my conduct of the

E 3123 387 25

No 12*

Mr A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda)

(No. 166)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office June 16, 1931

YOUR telegram No. 167 of the 13th June Transjordan Hejaz-Nejd frontier, formula regarding fugitive witnesses.

His Majesty's Government agree to addition to formula of words proposed in your telegram.

A meeting has now apparently been reached on all points connected with meeting. His Majesty's Government consider that it can best be

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arrangement for meeting. If Hejaz Government agree, they will, on learning that necessary instructions are being given to Ibn Zeid, request High Commissioner for Transjordan to instruct Captain Giubb to make concrete proposals to Ibn Zeid direct.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 83)

E 3227 387 25

No 120

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Acting High Commissioner for Transjordan (Received in Foreign Office, June 16)

(No. 84)

(Telegraphic)

Colonial Office, June 17, 1931

REFERENCE telegram from Jedda to Foreign Office, No. 15, 31st May, repeated to you, on subject of formula regarding raiding criminals. It appears desirable to clarify position. As you will have learned from the telegrams which have passed, I am of opinion that it is essential that the Transjordan authorities should have reasonable measure of attitude. I am also doubtful as to the advisability of undertaking actually to surrender criminals. It may, however, now be necessary more precisely to define the circumstances in which it may be considered impossible to expel fugitive criminals, and the Hejaz Nejd Government will also want some further explanation with regard to our objections to surrendering criminals. As it may be difficult to arrive at an agreement by further telegraphic correspondence, I have been considering, in consultation with Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, possible alternative methods of procedure. Two possibilities have been suggested.

- 1 To abandon the formula and endeavour to negotiate a formal agreement between Transjordan and Hejaz Nejd so framed as to provide for extradition in such cases as those under discussion. Probably this could be best carried through by the despatch to Jedda of a small Transjordan delegation.
- 2 To send a suitable official conversation with frontier conditions from Transjordan to Jedda who could try to reach agreement with the Hejaz Nejd Government on a revised formula.

I remember that in your telegram of the 25th March, No. 26, you recommended the negotiation of a formal treaty, but it may be pointed out in favour of second alternative above that measure of latitude which we desire might be easier to obtain from the Hejaz Nejd Government in a formula than in a formal agreement.

It should be accepted which would have effect of restricting the Transjordan Government's freedom summarily to punish raiders intercepted in Transjordan during the course of a raid. Please furnish your observations as soon as possible, together with any alternative suggestions which you have to offer.

E 3233 2064 25

No 120

Sir A. Ryan to Mr A. Henderson (Received June 20)

(No. 170)

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, June 19, 1931

HAVE discussed outstanding questions with Fuad, and did not, therefore,

intimated to me his desire for some sort of permanent understanding with Great Britain at a long audience on 17th June when he discussed at length our general relations. A full report goes by bag to-morrow. Both Fuad and the King emphasise the serious financial situation which necessitates help from some quarter. The King explained that the exchange situation was in process of

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successful rehabilitation. He also said that he required a bank which would, to help him! He had had offers from other sources, but would prefer a British institution. The matter was urgent, as he must take an early decision. If any British bank were prepared to give the matter consideration, would they send a representative? I undertook to submit the matter for your consideration, but hinted that it was full of difficulties. In my opinion, it would be a very risky experiment for any British bank to undertake the business. I believe that the Eastern Bank has been suggested to the King, and he may have had this in mind. The Egyptian Lutfullah Bank recently sent a representative here who may have negotiations with the Dutch Bank have failed. See also my despatches Nos 177 and 200.

E 3267 1600 25

No 131

Sir A. Ryan to Mr A. Henderson, - (Received June 23)

(No 200. Secret)

Sir,

Jeddah, May 25, 1931

I HAVE had occasion in various recent reports to refer to various indications of a weakening of Ibn Saud's position in this country. Although the available data are meagre and uncertain, I think the time has come to attempt a review of the King's situation on the eve of an absence from the Hejaz which may last several months, if he carries out his intention of going to Nejd as reported in my telegram No. 141 of the 20th May.

2. Ibn Saud imposed himself on the Hejaz by force of arms. He maintains himself by force of personality and by a reserve of material force responding to his personal direction and still capable of being applied with sufficient effect at any particular point to enable him to cope with anything short of a fairly general insurrection of the population of places like Mecca and Jeddah, although their inhabitants would almost certainly welcome a change of régime. The tribes have no such cohesion as to produce of themselves an organised movement in opposition to a King whose name and past exploits inspire respect and fear.

3. So far so good, from Ibn Saud's point of view. Nevertheless, he has to reckon with more remote factors. One hears vaguely but somewhat persistently, of a restive spirit in the north of the Hejaz. Hail and even Medina are potential centres of disaffection. Behind them are the Transjordan frontier and countries ruled by members of the Sheressian family, a family which, though eliminated at present from the Hejazi scheme of things, would be the natural rallying centre for elements bold enough to try conclusions with the present régime. Such elements may emerge in the north, even though it be impossible at present to locate or identify them. They are not equal boldness, but of sympathy, in Mecca and Jeddah, where people chafe under

the King's religious prestige has diminished as his temporal power has. He is too Wahhabi for Hejazi and for the majority of alien Moslems who frequent the Hejaz at pilgrimage time. Native and foreign Moslems react on each other to some extent. The desecration of shrines since the Wahhabi invasion is a cause of widespread feeling shared by foreign pilgrims, who have venerated these from afar, and natives accustomed not only to venerate them but, in some cases, to make money out of them in the past.

5. There are other factors in this nebulously alarming picture like economic depression, maladministration and an almost desperate financial situation. As for economic depression, the Hejaz cannot escape from the repercussion of "world causes." Their effect is manifested in the reduction of the overseas pilgrimage to less than half the numbers for last year. Maladministration is too familiar in a country like this to be in itself a potent cause of discontent. It impresses foreigners more than it is consciously felt by the bulk of the native

population. The dangerous feature in connexion with my present subject is not so much the badness of the administration as the quasi-paralysis which threatens many of those responsible for it, owing to the increasing difficulty of devising shifts to get out of difficulties. Mr. Philby, that most charitable of critics when he is dealing with the affairs of this country dwelt particularly on this aspect of the situation in our last conversation. He convicted the King himself of floundering, of making mistakes through ignorance, and of clinging to authority amid a posse of advisers, all the more capable of whom were worn out with overwork. He remarked on the complete occultation of the Emir Feisal, to whom it was thought last autumn that the King might delegate some of his powers.

6. The crux of the matter is the financial situation. Ibn Saud has no doubt always lived up to his income and a bit beyond it. The trouble now is that he can no longer do so. The most serious embarrassment by cutting his cloth to fit a greatly diminished income, again because of the slump in the pilgrimage, which has been too great to be balanced by increased taxation, and which is hardly likely to be repaired next year, whatever later prospects may be. He and his family are naturally extravagant. The expenditure, for instance, on a move to Riyadh is enormous in comparison with resources. This extravagance in itself causes adverse comment. The most intelligent foreign pilgrim I have met this year remarked on the poorness of the lighting of the sacred precinct at Mecca as contrasted with the installations in royal houses, and was very much inclined to ask generally why Ibn Saud should affect to mismanage his State or other purposes

requirements for other purposes were not so great a drain. The King's strength, to pay, pay, pay.

Dutchman here, not hostile to him, has expressed to me doubt as to whether the King means to go to Nejd at all this summer. His doubt is probably unfounded but his reasons for it are interesting. Custom demands that all who come to the King's threshold in Riyadh should receive food, clothing and gifts. What an excellent plan, then, for His Majesty to put it about that he is going thither, let the expectant Bedouin turn their steps in that direction also, retire to Taif and leave an eldest son to gratify as best he may the hopes of the Bedouins! Mr. Philby again, in the conversation to which I have already referred asked me, with unusual diffidence, what I thought of the financial outlook, and had nothing hopeful to suggest when I said I could not see where any money was to come from until late in the autumn.

7. There is little in this despatch that I have not already adverted to in special connections in other reports. In putting all the facts together in one statement, I may have painted too gloomy a picture. It is not the first time in Ibn Saud's history that he has been confronted with difficulties, nor is there anything in his record to suggest that he would easily relinquish what he has gained. He has often been hard up, and contrived to carry on. His whole position was endangered by the 1929 rebellion and he came out on top. My object is not to suggest that he is now on the point of collapse in the Hejaz, but to show that his position here rests on foundations so unstable that a strong push from any direction might upset it, and that his downfall, if it could be compassed, would not be unwelcome to the population, however incapable the most visible

a hostile witness, unlike Mr. Philby and the Dutchman, was full of the King's

that Ibn Saud's rule in the Hejaz would last seven years from the start. My French colleague tells me that he hears the same tales as myself of unsettled feeling in the Northern Hejaz, and agrees with me in thinking that their importance lies more in their persistency than in the value of particular reports.

8. While drafting this despatch I heard that a council of representatives, in some sense elective, has been convened to meet at Mecca on or about the 1st June, to consider matters affecting the general interests of the country. According to

atives from Mecca, ten each from Medina and Jeddah, and representatives from other towns. This piece of news has an interesting bearing on the subject-matter of the present despatch, which, however, I do not wish to delay. If my information is confirmed, I will report separately anything I may hear regarding the council and its proceedings.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Secretary of the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, His Majesty's High Commissioners at Bagdad and Jerusalem, and His Majesty's Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.
ANDREW RYAN

E 3301 387 25]

No. 132

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson. — (Received June 23)

(No. 174.)

(Telegraphic) R

YOLR telegram No. 100

Jedda, June 23, 1931

I addressed note to Ministry for Foreign Affairs on 15th June intimating your concurrence in proposed addition to formula of final text, which I enclose under reference.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs replied on 21st June Hejaz Government concur and are instructing Ibn Zeid to meet Glubb on receipt of latter's invitation and requests in accompanying personal letter that Glubb should delay his own departure for some days to enable Ibn Zeid to receive mail sent to him by car from Mecca about 15th June. I had again expressed the hope that His Majesty's Government will expedite settlement in regard to raids investigated by MacDonnell.

(Reported to Transjordan, No. 201)

E 3301/723 25

No. 133

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson. — (Received June 30)

(Nos. 175 and 179.)

(Telegraphic)

MY telegram No. 134

Jedda, June 29, 1931

After summarising my memorandum, the Hejazi Government reply that they are in favour of the proposed regulations and that the necessary instructions regarding landing, control of the Hejazi Government wish to enquire on what terms His Majesty's Government would come to a mutual agreement in this respect so that they may study them at the same time.

The object of this reply seems to be to combine considerable vagueness with the proposed regulations are as far advanced as I was led to believe by final.

The meaning of the last sentence is not clear. Since Ibn Saud's attitude towards the proposed regulations is not clear, it may indicate that a proposal to rent the landing grounds would be acceptable. I am not sure, but I think it is probable that the Hejazi Government are not now to do anything before the King leaves for Nejd. For this reason I should be glad to know (1) what attitude I should adopt if he should hint at some financial arrangement, and (2) how important it is to reach a satisfactory solution of the question in view of the situation as regards Persia.

With regard to (1) the Hejazi Government are not now to do anything before the King leaves for Nejd. For this reason I should be glad to know (1) what attitude I should adopt if he should hint at some financial arrangement, and (2) how important it is to reach a satisfactory solution of the question in view of the situation as regards Persia.

With regard to (2) I think that the chances are poor of getting a really favourable settlement, but that, if there were any possibility of a general understanding on the lines given in the conversation alluded to in paragraph 1 of my telegram No. 170 the chances would be better.

CHAPTER II.—SYRIA.

E 356 206 89]

No. 134.

Consul Hole to Mr. A. Henderson. — (Received January 29)

(No. 9)

Sir,

Damascus, January 14, 1931

I HAVE the honour to report that ex King Ali arrived in Damascus on the evening of the 12th January, and proceeded to Bagdad on the 13th.

2. He had passed through Damascus on the 11th, on his way to Beirut, where he dined with M. Ponsot. The French hospitality had aroused a certain interest in Damascus, where the possibility of a Hashimite King of Syria is still canvassed in some quarters.

3. On his arrival Rikabi Pasha called on him with a number of retired military officers, who still cherish the monarchical "idea" and its promise of future employment, and a curious crowd stormed the entry of the hotel where he was staying. So far as I know, no personages of mark called on him and the

resolutely resisted by the Nationalists.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Bagdad and Jerusalem, to the British Resident at Amman and to His Majesty's consul general at Beirut.

I have, &c.

E. C. HOLE

E 656 656 89]

No. 135.

Consul Hole to Mr. A. Henderson. — (Received February 9)

(No. 16)

Sir,

Damascus, January 30, 1931

I HAVE the honour to transmit extracts from two interviews given to the local press by Hashem Beg El Atassi and Janul Beg Mardam Beg. They mark a revival of interest in political questions, which had been dormant since last spring.

2. The promulgation of the Constitution and the subsequent dissolution of the Assembly had long been discounted, and the various manipulations of the one but the new Ministers. Indeed the present Government is so unrepresentative of anything that its evolution recall irresistibly certain passages of "Alice in Wonderland". The Nationalists themselves had applied themselves rather to economic than political matters.

3. The two interviews mark a distinct advance in co-operation between the Nationalists and the High Commission, and hold out some promise of a solution of the present deadlock. The declarations of Hashem-el Atassi are as guarded as those of Janul Mardam are the contrary but both express readiness to swallow the High Commissioner's interpolations in the Constitution and to take part in reference with them, and if there is a real prospect of concluding a treaty on the lines of that between England and Iraq. Janul Mardam Beg is more outspoken. He says that the Nationalists take part in the elections, but the same hope, more discreetly expressed, may be found in the declarations of Hashem-el Atassi.

4. Some Nationalist circles have protested against Mardam's too thorough going emphasising his somewhat perfunctory protest against article 116. On the whole, I am inclined to believe that the two interviews reflect the general trend of the Nationalist opinion.

(* Not printed)

5. As was inevitable in this country, various newspapers at once fixed the dates of the forthcoming elections, on confidential information from the highest sources, and called forth the customary *démarches* from the Bureau de la Presse.

I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Jerusalem and Bagdad, the British Resident at Amman, His Majesty's consul general at Beirut, and His Majesty's consul at Aleppo.

I have, &c.

E C HOLL

E 2339 2339 89]

No. 136.

Consul General Satow to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 5.)

N 41)

Beirut April 23 1931

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of High Commission Decree 3339 regarding real estate. This, although dated the 12th November 1930, was only printed in the "Bulletin officiel" of the 31st January, 1931, which itself was actually distributed only a few weeks ago. The delay in the issue of the decree is I understand largely due to the fact that its application into Arabic took longer than was expected.

2. I am not competent to express an opinion as to the success achieved by this attempt to replace the Turkish legislation on this highly complicated and technical question by something more clear and comprehensible. The matter is one which in the main concerns the natives of the country, but one part of the decree is of direct interest to foreigners. Article 231, after laying down that a foreigner can only inherit real estate from Syrians and Lebanese if his national law allows them the same right, states that the succession, whether intestate or testamentary, to the real estate left by a foreigner is governed by his national law. Article 232 states that in the case of doubt one *inter vivos* the local law is applicable to foreigners. I am asking the French High Commission to let me know what is the local law referred to in this article.

3. One of my colleagues having expressed doubts as to the possibility of applying article 231 without causing grave inconvenience to foreign heirs, I recently convened a meeting of the consular body to consider the matter. The general opinion of the meeting was that although a certain amount of inconvenience and delay must inevitably occur because the local courts will have to apply a variety of foreign laws, the change is on the whole beyond doubt much to the advantage of the foreigner.

4. At some time or other I shall undoubtedly be asked by the local courts for information as to the dispositions of the British law to be applied under article 231. I should be grateful for instructions as to how in such a case I should reply.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW

P.S.—Copies of the decree have been sent to His Majesty's High Commissioners for Iraq and Palestine.

H. E. S.

Enclosure in No. 136.

Extract from Article No. 3339

Titre IX Chapitre II —Des Successions ab intestat et testamentaires en Syrie

Article 231 —Le droit de succession immobilière, ab intestat ou testamentaire, n'est accordé à l'étranger que si sa loi nationale l'accorde aux Syriens et Libanais.

La succession immobilière, ab intestat ou testamentaire, de l'étranger est réglée selon les dispositions de sa loi nationale.

E 2339 656 89

No. 137

Consul HOLL to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 20)

N 51)

Damascus, May 8, 1931

I HAVE the honour to report that a public meeting was held on the 6th May in memory of a number of Arab leaders executed by Kemal Pasha during the war. This anniversary has been celebrated with more and more emphasis during the last few years, and has now reached the full status of an official holiday.

2. The commemoration of the "Martyrs" lends itself to the ventilation of public grievances, and on this occasion the presence of members of the Syrian Government gave an additional savour to the speeches, in which they were vigorously criticised.

3. After a reference by the first speaker to the Italian atrocities in Libya, and an ode contributed by a Transjordan poet denouncing the Government's subservience to French advisers, the chief speech was made by Aref el Nakdy, the late Government Attorney, the circumstances of whose dismissal were reported in paragraph 3 of my despatch No. 44 of the 23rd August 1930. He pointed out first of all how the Syrians had not been allowed by the French to make any progress towards autonomy, and how the Syrian Government and Administration were completely under the heel of the mandatory Power, who allowed them no freedom of action in even the smallest matter.

4. He proceeded to chastise the Nationalist leaders (most of whom were present) for their supineness. Their inactivity was draining the strength of the country. They should unite and provoke a new revolution not by arms, because the French were too strong for them, but by political action, in which they were at least as intelligent. It was quite useless to wait for the French to do anything for them, as they evidently had no intention of doing so.

5. The only indication of the methods of his peaceful revolution that he gave was an injunction to tour the villages regularly and teach the rural population their rights and duties.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Bagdad and Jerusalem, the British Resident at Amman, His Majesty's consul general at Beirut and His Majesty's consul at Aleppo.

I have, &c.

E C HOLL

CHAPTER III. PALESTINE

E 2963 226/65

No 138

Mr A Henderson to Sir R Lindsay (Washington)

(No. 42. Confidential)

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 10, 1931

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 2007 of the 18th December, 1930, regarding the attitude of Zionists in the United States and of the United States Government towards the policy of His Majesty's Government in Palestine.

2. I approve the language which you held to Mr. Cotton, as reported in paragraph 4 of your despatch. I leave any further action to your Excellency's discretion, but it might be as well if you were to take any favourable opportunity that may present itself of impressing on Mr. Cotton the disastrous effect on the United States Government would be produced by any attempt at official representations by the United States Government as a result of Zionist pressure.

I am, &c.

ARTHUR HENDERSON

E 2963 1321 81

No 139

High Commissioner for Palestine to Secretary of State for the Colonies
Received in Foreign Office, June 6

My Lord,

Jerusalem, April 25, 1931

I HAVE the honour to refer to your Lordship's despatch Confidential B of the 27th March, 1931, on the subject of his Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury's visit to Palestine.

2. The archbishop arrived at Jerusalem by car from Tiberias on the afternoon of Wednesday, the 15th April and was my guest at Government House throughout his stay.

In accordance with his Grace's express desire, his engagements were kept to the minimum.

3. On the morning following his arrival the archbishop visited the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, accompanied by the local Government officials and the Anglican bishop and clergy.

The three religious authorities resident in the Holy Places, namely the Orthodox and Armenian Patriarchs and the Apostolic Delegate, were given formal notification of the hour his Grace would arrive at the church.

His Grace was accompanied by the Armenian Patriarch, and was conducted by them to the Tomb and Calvary, the Armenian and Franciscan Chapels and the other commemorative shrines. Afterwards a short service was held in the Orthodox Katholicon, the part of the Church over which the Orthodox Eastern Church exercises complete internal control.

During this service an address of welcome to the archbishop was read in English by the Rev. Canon A. J. ... who was elected to the Palestine Conference last year as the delegate of the Orthodox Eastern Patriarch of Jerusalem.

4. I saw his Grace on the 16th April. He was accompanied only by the Anglican bishop and clergy and my personal staff. The Apostolic Delegate, was absent in Egypt; and his Beatitude the Latin Patriarch Mgr. Barlassina, received his Grace on behalf of the Apostolic Delegate. Mgr. Barlassina gave a cordial welcome to his Grace.

At the Orthodox Patriarchate there was a large gathering of the Orthodox clergy, and including representatives of the Russian, Serbian and Roumanian Orthodox Churches.

His Grace gave a short address in which he touched on the question of the reunion movement between the Anglican and the Orthodox Eastern Churches.

At the Armenian Patriarchate his Grace was received by the *locum tenens* of the patriarchate, Bishop Nisbannan, and a number of the patriarchate clergy.

During the morning Archdeacon Stewart left cards on his Grace's behalf on the heads of the minor religious communities that are represented in Jerusalem.

5. In the afternoon of the 16th April his Grace received the return calls of the religious authorities. He received the return call of the Latin Patriarch at 4 p.m. Notification that his Grace would be at Government House at that hour to receive any of the religious representatives who might desire to return his call was given to the private secretary and to the minor religious representatives by Archdeacon Stewart.

The Latin Patriarch returned his Grace's visit in person, and the Apostolic Delegate's secretary came to express Mgr. Valeri's regret that he was unable to be present in Jerusalem to receive the archbishop.

The Orthodox Patriarchal representative, the *locum tenens* of the Armenian Patriarchate, the Superior, with their attendant clergy, and representatives of the Greek Catholic and Armenian Catholic convents attended as well.

His Grace then visited his Beatitude Damianos, the Orthodox Eastern Patriarch. Despite his infirmity, his Beatitude was able to receive his Grace, and remained in converse with him for some length of time.

6. On Saturday morning his Grace visited the Church of the Nativity at Bethlehem, where he was received by the Orthodox and Armenian representatives in a similar manner as at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, and visited the Grotto of the Nativity and the Latin Grotto of St. Jerome. Another address of welcome was read, to which his Grace replied and gave his blessing.

On Saturday afternoon his Grace, in company with the rest of Mr. Pierpont Morgan's party visited the Harem-esh Sherif, being received by the president of the Supreme Moslem Council.

His Grace also received the return calls of the Chief Rabbi of the Ashkenazic Jews, and Rabbi Sonnenfeld, Chief Rabbi of the Agudath Israel. These calls were duly acknowledged.

During his stay his Grace also visited Hebron and various places of interest in Jerusalem, including Gethsemane and the tomb of the Grand Duchess Elizabeth.

7. No unusual interest was taken locally in the archbishop's visit to Jerusalem, and certainly no serious consideration appeared to be given to the report that his visit had some ulterior political or religious motive.

I have, &c.

J. R. CHANCELLOR

High Commissioner for Palestine.

CHAPTER IV.—IRAQ.

E 1444 5 93

No. 140

*Mr Morgan to Mr A Henderson.—(Received March 23)*N
Sir*Angora, March 18, 1931*

With reference to your despatch No. 142 of the 6th March, regarding oil in Iraq, I have the honour to report that the Turkish press has recently been displaying some quite pardonable curiosity as to the date when Turkey may expect to derive pecuniary profit from the exploitation of the Iraq oil fields.

2. The "Yakit" of the 13th March asks in one of its headlines "Why do not we exploit Mosul oil?" and, underneath, states that the Turkish Government urged the Iraqi Government to take measures for the prompt exploitation of the oil fields. It goes on to allege that the completion of the pipe-line or pipe-lines to the Mediterranean cannot be expected before 1935 and that consequently exploitation of the Iraq oil fields cannot be looked for before that date. Even then exploitation may be indefinitely delayed, as the oil company (55 per cent of which is under British control) is interested in oil fields elsewhere and will find it more profitable to delay exploitation of the Mosul fields in order to prevent a drop in oil prices. Turkey will suffer as she will not receive her share of royalties until the fields are exploited. The Iraqi Government would suffer more, and it was in that Government's interest to adopt suggestion of early exploitation.

3. On the following day the "Yakit" published a leading article on Turkey's share in Mosul oil royalties. In its article the "Yakit" stated that the Iraqi Government were in negotiations with the Anglo-Franco-American Company formed to exploit the Mosul oil fields with a view to securing a yearly advance in respect of its share in the oil fields, and that the company had proposed to advance £400,000 sterling per annum to the Iraqi Government. The Government were inclined to accept the proposal on condition that exploitation should begin within the next five years, but the company wished to make it a condition of the advance that no date should be fixed for beginning exploitation. Turkey must not be left out of consideration in these negotiations. The amount of the advance now proposed makes it reasonable to suppose that when exploitation begins, Iraq's income from the fields will be at least £500,000 sterling and possibly £1 million sterling per annum. It was important, therefore, that exploitation should begin soon and that the temporary policy of the British shareholders of the oil company should be checkmated. The article concluded by reminding the parties to the negotiations that, if an advance is made to the Iraqi Government by the company, one-tenth of the advance belongs to Turkey.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the British High Commissioner at Bagdad.

I have, &c.
JAMES MORGAN

E 1920 38 931

No. 141

Mr A Henderson to General Dore

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, April 22, 1931

I HAVE the honour to invite a reference to Lord Montagu's letter of the 1st March, 1920, to Mr Atherton regarding the proposed new Anglo-Iraqi Judicial Agreement and the position of United States nationals in Iraq in judicial matters.

2. As your Excellency is aware, the position of the nationals of the United States in judicial matters in Iraq is regulated by the convention between the United Kingdom, Iraq and the United States, signed on the 9th January, 1930,

under article 1 of which the application of the Anglo-Iraqi Judicial Agreement of the 25th March, 1924, is extended to United States nationals. Article 6 of the convention further lays down that no modification of the special relations existing between His Britannic Majesty and the King of Iraq, as defined in article 1 (other convention) shall make any change in the rights of the United States as defined in the convention, unless such change has been assented to by the Government of the United States.

3. It was explained in Lord Montagu's letter of the 18th February, 1920, that His Majesty's Government for the reasons set forth in that letter and in the memorandum which accompanied it, had decided in February 1920 to approach the Council of the League of Nations with a request that they should approve in principle the abolition of the Anglo-Iraqi Judicial Agreement of the 25th March 1924, and the institution of a uniform system of justice in its place, and that they should authorise His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to prepare for submission to the Council at a later session, detailed proposals in collaboration with the Iraqi Government. The Council at its meeting on the 9th March 1920, granted to His Majesty's Government the general authorisation required. The draft of a new Judicial Agreement to replace the Agreement of 1924 was accordingly negotiated with the Iraqi Government and was eventually ratified at Bagdad on the 30th June by the representatives of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Iraqi Government, and submitted to the Council of the League at its session of September 1930. The Council referred this draft agreement to the Permanent Mandates Commission for examination at its November session, and that body reported to the Council that it had come to the conclusion that the new agreement, while abolishing the special privileges granted to the nationals of certain foreign States under the agreement of the 25th March, 1924, seemed to offer to all foreigners in Iraq the essential guarantees for the proper dispensation of justice, and also an improvement in criminal procedure in favour of all persons in the country subject to Iraqi criminal jurisdiction. On the 22nd January last the Council of the League approved the new Judicial Agreement in a resolution in the following terms:-

"The Council, considering the opinion submitted to it by the Mandates Commission to the effect that it sees no objection to the approval, subject to the consent of the Powers concerned, of the draft of a new Judicial Agreement between the British Government and the Government of Iraq, initiated at Bagdad on the 30th June, 1930, approves the terms of the agreement of the 30th June, 1930, subject to the consent of the Powers whose nationals enjoyed privileges under the agreement of the 25th March, 1924."

4. The fourteen Powers concerned have now all signified their willingness to accept the new régime, and the Secretary-General of the League of Nations was accordingly informed on the 21st March last that His Majesty's Government had signified their assent. The High Commissioner for Iraq and the Iraqi Prime Minister on the 4th March into force as soon as possible. A copy of the new agreement is enclosed herein.

5. I now have the honour to request that your Excellency will inform your Government that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland desire to obtain the assent of the United States Government to the new agreement, which was signed on the 9th January, 1930, and of which ratifications were exchanged on the 24th February, 1931, to the substitution of the 25th March, 1924, and to the application of the former to United States nationals in Iraq in the place of the existing régime.

6. In making this request to you, I have the honour to enclose herein a copy of an explanatory note in which the extent to which the position of foreigners in judicial matters in Iraq will be affected by the new agreement is explained, together with an extract from a draft law amending the Bagdad Criminal Procedure Regulations, which gives effect to certain provisions in the new agreement and in the note annexed thereto. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government the new agreement will establish the position of nationals of all

foreign States in Iraq in judicial matters, not only on an equal, but also on a firmer and more equitable basis. I desire, in particular, to draw your attention to the fact that, as will be seen from the contents of the explanatory note enclosed herein, no United States national will, in practice, suffer on account of the withdrawal of existing judicial privileges.

I have, &c

ARTHUR HENDERSON

Not post

E 2164 5 93]

No 142

General Huron to Mr A Henderson. (Received April 25)

United States Embassy

London, April 23, 1931

My dear Henderson,

I HAVE just received a cablegram from my Government stating that it is informed unofficially that the Iraq Government and the Iraq Petroleum Company have signed an agreement by which the company obtains a petrole in concession of approximately 38,000 square miles to the east of the Tigris River. According to information received it appears that the Iraq Government is to commence negotiations on the 1st May with the British Oil Development Company which presumably will seek a concession for all or a part of the remaining oil bearing lands in Iraq.

In this relation I am desirous to say to you that in view of the provisions of article 2 of the Tripartite Convention of the 9th January 1930, and the provisions of paragraph No 1 of the protocol signed on the same date, the Government of the United States is confident that the Iraq Government will not grant the concession covering any of the oil lands in question before affording individuals and corporations of American nationality an equal opportunity to bid thereon. In the event that the Iraq Government should attempt to grant a concession without affording American nationals an equal opportunity to bid, the Government of the United States would, of course, rely upon the British Government to intervene to protect American treaty rights.

The views of my Government in this matter are being brought to the attention of the Iraq Government through the American consul at Bagdad.

Yours sincerely

CHARLES G DAWES

E 3276 38 93]

No 143

Mr Atherton to Mr A Henderson. (Received June 23)

United States Embassy

London, June 19, 1931

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to refer to your note of the 22nd April last, a copy of which was transmitted to my Government, regarding the new Anglo-Iraqi Judicial Agreement.

In compliance with the reply which has just been received, I am pleased to inform you, with respect to the specific request contained in paragraph 5 of the note under reference, that under the terms of article 6 of the Tripartite Convention of the 9th January 1930, the Government of the United States consents to the substitution of the Judicial Agreement signed on the 4th March 1931, between the British and Iraqi authorities at Bagdad, for the agreement of the 25th March, 1924, and to the application of the former to nationals of the United States in Iraq upon its entry into force in accordance with its terms.

I have, &c

RAY ATHERTON

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

E 3155, 1 93]

No 144

Mr A. Henderson to Sir R. Graham (Rome).

(No 801 Confidential.)

SIR,

Foreign Office June 27, 1931

I HAVE to inform your Excellency that the Italian Ambassador called at the Foreign Office on the 15th June and discussed with a member of this Department the question of the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations.

2. M. Bordonaro said that his Government had certain misgivings with regard to the procedure to be adopted for the termination of the mandate and the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations. He stated at the outset that his Government were not troubled about the particular case of Iraq, but they felt that the proceedings in connexion with Iraq would create a precedent, which might be followed in the case of other countries where Italian interests were more directly concerned.

3. His Excellency said that the point on which his Government desired to lay particular emphasis was that the League itself should have every means of satisfying itself that the conditions in Iraq permitted of the release of that country from the mandatory regime.

4. M. Bordonaro's attention was drawn, in reply, to the fact that the Council of the League of Nations would be advised in this matter by the Permanent Mandates Commission, a body which had always been found extremely scrupulous in the discharge of its duties. His Majesty's Government were submitting to the commission at its present session a special report covering the whole period of the mandatory regime in Iraq, they had requested the commission to examine this report at its present session, so that if any further information was required the commission might be able to inform His Majesty's Government, who would endeavour to supply the information before the commission's next session—thus enabling it to present in good time to the Council its opinion on the matter.

5. His Excellency said that he was aware of this, but his Government still felt that the League should have some more direct means of informing itself as to the exact situation, and he eventually came out with it, that what he would like to see was a commission to be sent to Iraq.

He said that the Italian Government would propose this course. He had seen in the press that the Italian member of the Permanent Mandates Commission, the Marquis Theodorini, would be prevented by illness from attending the present session in Geneva, and he did not therefore know whether an Italian member would be present, but at some stage his Government intended to make the proposal and he enquired what would be the attitude of His Majesty's Government in regard to any such proposal.

6. M. Bordonaro was informed that His Majesty's Government had examined a proposal of this kind might be made in some quarter. His Majesty's Government had examined the matter carefully, but had come to the conclusion that they could not favour it. In the first place, it seemed doubtful whether a commission sent out for a necessarily short period to Iraq would be able really to reach any valuable or reliable conclusions, or whether it would be able to do so.

7. His Excellency was informed that the proposal was submitted to the Mandates Commission by His Majesty's Government, and which was subjected at Geneva to the closest scrutiny. In the second place, it was foreseen that the arrival of a commission in Iraq itself might give rise to certain difficulties. The Ambassador would readily understand that the arrival of a commission of that kind would be the signal for every malcontent in the country to produce to it his particular grievances. The commission would attract to itself all the discontented elements, and it might be extremely difficult for the commissioner or commissioners, to form a just view of the situation. Moreover the arrival of a commission might give rise to local difficulties. His Excellency was informed that if the proposal were made at the present session of the Permanent Mandates Commission the High Commissioner for Iraq who would be present himself would indicate the misgivings of His Majesty's Government on this point and would be bound to suggest to the commission the objections that His Majesty's Government felt might be entertained to a proposal of the kind.

7 The Ambassador raised one other point, by enquiring whether it would be to the advantage of the Italian Government to endeavour to negotiate with the Iraqi Government an agreement similar to that negotiated by the United States Government. His Excellency was informed in reply that the convention to which he referred between the United States, the United Kingdom and Iraq, regarding the rights of the United States and of its nationals in Iraq had been designed merely to put the United States on a footing of equality with the members of the League of Nations, and that therefore it would be superfluous for the Italian Government to negotiate a similar instrument. His enquiry appeared to be dictated by anxiety in regard to the judicial regime that would exist after Iraq had been admitted to the League. It was explained to his Excellency that so far as His Majesty's Government were aware, it would be for the members of the League themselves to lay down conditions safeguarding the interests of their nationals for the period when Iraq should become a member of the League. His Excellency was also told that there appeared to be some admission, of the judicial regime which had recently been instituted with the consent of the Italian Government.

8. I should be glad if your Excellency will take steps, in whatever manner appears most suitable to you, to discourage and deprecate the Italian Government's suggestion for the despatch of a commission to Iraq to investigate conditions on the spot.

I am, &c.
ARTHUR HENDERSON

CHAPTER V. GENERAL.

E 56 48 89

No 145

Mr A Henderson to Lord Tyrrell (Paris)

(No 49)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, January 7, 1931

I RECEIVED the receipt of Mr Campbell's despatch, No. 1040, of the 17th September, on the subject of the Syria-Iraq and Syria-Transjordan frontier. The Government have and under consideration, in consultation with the Council of Iraq and Transjordan, the various proposals for approaching the League Council with a view to reaching an equitable solution of this question.

2. I have now to request that your Lordship will approach the French Government, and invite their concurrence in the following brief formula which if acceptable to the French Government, would be addressed by each Government to the Secretary General of the League, in order that the question may be placed on the agenda of the sixty third session of the Council to be held in May 1931.

"His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the French Republic, having failed to reach agreement in regard to the frontier between Syria and Iraq and between Syria and Transjordan, have agreed to refer their differences on this subject to the Council of the League of Nations."

"The two Governments accordingly request that 'the question of the frontier between Syria and Iraq and between Syria and Transjordan' may be placed on the agenda of the sixty third session of the Council to be held in May 1931. They propose before that date to submit to the Council separate statements indicating and explaining their respective views on this question."

3. The French Government and His Majesty's Government would accordingly submit to the Council separate statements indicating in detail their views regarding the differences which have arisen between them, and as to the procedure

I am, &c.
ARTHUR HENDERSON

E 238 48 891

No 146

Lord Tyrrell to Mr A Henderson (Received January 10)

(No 43)

HIS Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a note from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs respecting the delimitation of the Syrian Iraq and Syrian Transjordan frontiers.

Paris, January 15, 1931

Enclosure in No 146

Note from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs

PAR une note en date du 9 de ce mois, l'Ambassade d'Angleterre a bien voulu faire savoir au Ministère des Affaires étrangères qu'elle était chargée par son Gouvernement de transmettre au Secrétariat général de la Société des Nations en vue de soumettre au Conseil pour différend relatif à la délimitation de la frontière entre la Syrie, d'une part, l'Irak et la Transjordanie, de l'autre

Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères a l'honneur de faire connaître à l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté que le Gouvernement de la République est tout disposé à adresser, le plus tôt possible au Secrétariat général de la Société des Nations et d'accord avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, une demande tendant à ce que la question de la frontière susvisée soit mise à l'ordre du jour de la 63^e session qui doit se tenir en mai 1931.

Toutefois, il ne lui paraît pas possible que la demande qui serait alors adressée au Secrétariat général ne fasse pas mention de la convention du 23 décembre 1920, qui a déterminé la frontière. Au demeurant, l'article 2 de cette convention, aux termes duquel les conflits qui pourraient résulter de la délimitation de la ligne frontière sur le terrain seraient portés devant le Conseil pendant depuis que la Commission d'Abornement a interrompu ses travaux.

D'autre part, les expressions employées dans le 1^{er} et le 2^e paragraphes de la formule proposée par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, à savoir "la frontière entre la Syrie et l'Irak et entre la Syrie et la Transjordanie" pourraient donner à penser que les deux Gouvernements sont disposés à délimiter séparément chacune de ces frontières. Or, ainsi que s'en souviendra l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté, le Ministère des Affaires étrangères a toujours maintenu, et en particulier dans sa note du 7 juin 1930 que la frontière devait être considérée dans son ensemble du Tigre à El Hammé. L'Ambassade de Sa Majesté avait d'ailleurs, accepté ce point de vue par son mémorandum du 25 juin dernier.

Dans la pensée du Ministère des Affaires étrangères, la formule suggérée par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté devant donc être modifiée de la manière suivante :

"Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique et le Gouvernement de la République française n'ayant pu arriver à se mettre d'accord sur la délimitation des frontières déterminées entre la Syrie, d'une part, l'Irak et la Transjordanie, d'autre part, par la convention du 23 décembre 1920 ont décidé, conformément à l'article 2 de ladite convention, de soumettre leur différend au Conseil de la Société des Nations."

En conséquence, les deux Gouvernements demandent que la question de la frontière entre la Syrie, d'une part, l'Irak et la Transjordanie, d'autre part, soit placée à l'ordre du jour de la 63^e session du Conseil. Ils proposent de soumettre au Conseil des mémoires séparés présentant et exposant leurs points de vue respectifs sur la question.

Le Ministère se voit reconnaissant à l'Ambassade de lui faire savoir si cette formule rencontre l'assentiment du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté.

Ministère des Affaires étrangères,
Paris, le 14 janvier 1931

E 134 134 31]

No 147

Mr A. Henderson to M. de Fleurbaey

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, February 12, 1931

IN my note of the 28th October last, I had the honour to explain the reasons for which His Majesty's Government found it impossible to accept the four conditions, set forth in my note of the 15th July, to which they felt obliged to subject their consent to the reference to judicial decision of the claim of a French group in respect of an alleged concession for the extraction of salts from the Dead Sea. I further explained that it was not possible for His Majesty's Government to accept the proposal of the French Government that this claim should be referred for arbitration to a tribunal other than the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague.

2. I have received no reply to my note of the 28th October, and your Excellency will, I feel sure, appreciate the fact that His Majesty's Government, in the absence of any reply, cannot be expected to accept the reference of the claim to the Permanent Court of International Justice. In these circumstances, I shall be grateful if you will explain to the French Government that

if they cannot see their way to accept the proposals put forward in my note of the 15th July, that the claim to the Permanent Court of International Justice will have to be regarded as having lapsed, and that His Majesty's Government will then be unable to agree to the reference of this claim to any form of international decision.

I have &c

ARTHUR HENDERSON

E 1921 134 31]

No 148

M. de Fleurbaey to Mr A. Henderson.—(Received April 14)

EN se référant à la lettre que son Excellence le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté britannique pour les Affaires étrangères a bien voulu lui adresser à la date du 12 février 1931, M. de Fleurbaey a l'honneur de faire parvenir ci-jointe à Mr Arthur Henderson une note relative à la concession des sels de potasse de la mer Morte, que M. Briand lui a prié de transmettre au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique. Il avertit, &c

Ambassade de France, Londres
le 12 avril 1931

Enclosure in No. 148

Note

1. N'examen attentif de la communication que votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire tenir, le 28 octobre 1930, au sujet de la concession des sels de la mer Morte, et d'une nouvelle communication en date du 12 février 1931, n'a pas permis au Gouvernement français de relever la moindre disposition du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté d'entrer dans les vues exposées par la note française du 4 septembre.

D'une part, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique maintient intégralement les quatre conditions auxquelles il avait subordonné l'acceptation d'un arbitrage par sa note du 15 juillet et il ajoute, pour les justifier, certains arguments de droit et de fait. D'autre part, il écarte la suggestion qu'il

son avis, d'échapper les divergences qui ont surgi quant aux modalités de la procédure à suivre.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique n'a pas entrepris de connaître, d'une manière détaillée, ses vues sur la forme d'arbitrage que lui a proposée en dernier lieu le Gouvernement français. Il a cependant, à l'égard de la proposition française visant une indemnité de dépossession au profit du groupe français. Le Gouvernement français estime que cette critique repose sur un malentendu, car il n'a pas voulu dire, et la formule proposée ne signifie pas, contrairement à ce que paraît croire le Gouvernement britannique, qu'une indemnité serait due au groupe français, même dans le cas où la concession originelle serait déclarée sans valeur par l'arbitre.

De même que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique n'a pas cru devoir exprimer en détail son opinion sur la proposition française, de même le Gouvernement français ne croit pas devoir discuter en détail les arguments de droit et de fait développés dans la note du 28 octobre. Il se bornera à observer que les considérations qui y sont énoncées et qui sont empruntées à des décisions rendues par la Cour permanente de Justice internationale ont une tout autre valeur quand il s'agit pour la cour, saisi d'un litige, de prononcer sur sa propre compétence.

Il s'agit pour deux Gouvernements de s'entendre, en vue de déterminer la forme d'arbitrage la mieux appropriée pour le règlement d'un

présentées par le Gouvernement français, et qui ne sont pas utiles d'en fait.

1. Le Gouvernement français a l'honneur de vous adresser ci-joint, en réponse à votre lettre du 10 mars 1931, un exposé de sa position sur la question de la concession de la zone de la mer Morte. Ce document, qui est le fruit d'une longue et sérieuse réflexion, expose les raisons qui ont conduit le Gouvernement français à refuser la concession proposée par le Gouvernement britannique, et à maintenir la question devant le Tribunal Permanent de la Haye. Il expose également les conditions auxquelles le Gouvernement français est prêt à accepter la concession, et les raisons qui l'ont conduit à refuser la concession proposée par le Gouvernement britannique.

Le 27 mars 1931

E 1921 134 31]

No 149.

Mr A. Henderson to M. de Meurieu

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, April 22, 1931

I NIDR cover of a memorandum dated the 12th April, your Excellency was so good as to communicate to me the reply of the French Government to my notes of the 10th March 1931.

French group in respect of an alleged concession for the extraction of salts from the Dead Sea.

2. The claim is one which His Majesty's Government have refuted in the past and which they are not under any legal obligation to submit to arbitration. But in the desire for conciliation which animates them in all their relations with the French Government, they have been prepared to refer the question to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague subject to the four conditions which were enumerated in my note of the 15th July 1930.

3. These conditions the French Government were reluctant to accept, and accordingly, in my note of the 28th October, 1930, a full and careful exposé was given of the reasons why His Majesty's Government felt obliged to maintain them, and why, also, they could only contemplate reference of the question to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague and could not agree to direct litigation with the private French interests concerned before some other tribunal.

4. His Majesty's Government cannot but feel some surprise that, in the note enclosed in your Excellency's memorandum under reply, the French Government should virtually ignore this full explanation, and should put forward a fresh proposal which is clearly incompatible with it, namely, that the question of the

validity of the original concession should be referred to an unspecified tribunal before which the French claimants, and not the French Government, would appear as parties to the dispute.

5. Nor can His Majesty's Government conceal their disappointment that the French Government's note should be entirely silent on the subject of the settlement of the British claims arising out of the disturbances in Syria in 1925 and 1926. The history of the attempts to settle these claims was described at length in the latter part of my note of the 28th October 1930, and it was the earnest hope of His Majesty's Government that the French Government would in consequence give the matter their serious consideration, and would be able to put forward some acceptable offer of settlement or to agree to arbitration without further delay.

6. In short, His Majesty's Government regret that they are unable to find the note under reply anything to cause them to depart from the attitude taken up in my notes of the 15th July and the 28th October, 1930. They are still prepared to refer the French claim to the arbitration of the Permanent Court of International Justice under the conditions enumerated in the earlier of those notes but, unless the French Government are able to indicate before the 1st May their acceptance of those conditions, His Majesty's Government regret that, as indicated in my note of the 12th February they will have no alternative but to refer the question to the Permanent Court of International Justice, and to give it further consideration.

I have, &c
ARTHUR HENDERSON

[E 2380 250 65]

No 150

High Commissioner for Transjordan to Secretary of State for the Colonies —
(Communicated to Foreign Office, May 6.)

(Confidential.)

My Lord,

April 11, 1931

I HAVE the honour to refer to the correspondence ending with your Lordship's telegram No. 36, dated the 10th March, 1931, on the subject of the Treaty of Friendship between Transjordan and Iraq, and to forward herewith a copy and translation of the Transjordan Iraq Treaty, which was signed at Amman by the plenipotentiaries of the two countries on the 20th March, 1931.

2. In the copy retained by the Iraq representative His Majesty King Feisal and Iraq are mentioned first throughout, while in the copy retained by the Transjordan Government His Highness the Emir and Transjordan are mentioned first.

3. There is a variation in the preamble which was only brought to the notice of the British Resident after the treaty was signed, viz, the word "Kings" had been substituted for the word "Rulers" in the phrase "Arab Kings and Governments".

I have, &c
J. R. CHANCELLOR
High Commissioner for Transjordan

Enclosure in No. 150

Transjordan Iraq Treaty

(Translation)

HIS Highness the Emir Abdullab Amir of Transjordan, and His Majesty King Feisal I, King of Iraq, being desirous of establishing firm and amicable relations between their two countries, and of offering a practical example of the good understanding which it is earnestly desired should exist between Arab

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x 2

Kings and Governments, have resolved to conclude a treaty for this purpose and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries —

His Highness the Amir of Transjordan :

His Excellency Sheikh Abdullah Effendi Siraj, Chief Minister of the Transjordan Government,

His Majesty the King of Iraq

His Excellency Nuri Pascha-Said, Chief Minister of the Iraq Government,

who having communicated to each other their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows

ARTICLE 1

His Highness the Amir of Transjordan recognises the Kingdom of Iraq and His Majesty the King of Iraq recognises the Amirate of Transjordan

ARTICLE 2

The relations between the two Governments of Transjordan and Iraq shall be established on the basis of firm co-operation and intimate friendship.

ARTICLE 3

The Governments of Transjordan and Iraq shall conclude between them, with the least possible delay, commercial, postal, customs, residential, travelling and extradition agreements

ARTICLE 4

Both the Transjordan and Iraq Governments shall co-operate in the control of public order at the boundaries and shall prevent transgressions, and will take reciprocal sanitary measures between the two countries

This treaty shall be ratified in accordance with the provisions of the Constitutions of the two countries and shall come into force upon the exchange of ratifications, which shall take place as soon as possible

In faith whereof the above mentioned plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and have thereunto affixed their seals

and Hejaz and Nejd and Dependencies, and Protocol on Arbitration of the 7th April, 1931, and (d) Extradition Treaty between Iraq and Nejd and Hejaz of the 8th April, 1931, see under Arabia, No. . . . page . . .]

E 2627 294 89]

No. 131

Sir F. Humphrys to Lord Passfield — (Communicated to Foreign Office, May 18)

(Secret "E.")

My Lord,

Bagdad, May 1, 1931

WITH your Lordship's approval I arranged to pay a visit to M. Ponsot, the French High Commissioner, in order to discuss a number of questions which affected the mutual interests of Syria and Iraq

2 I left Bagdad early on the morning of the 10th April, accompanied by a private aeroplane, escorted by two machines of the Royal Air Force, which carried as passengers Mr. Sturges, my political secretary and a wireless operator. The whole journey of 1,500 miles occupied about fourteen hours in the air instead of several days of motor travel by indifferent road trucks.

formation I was received on the aerodrome by M. Solomiac, the délégué of the French High Commissioner, the General Officer Commanding the French Forces in Damascus, Colonel Antoinet, commanding the 39th Regiment of Aviation, Mr. Hole, His Majesty's consul, and a guard of honour. After lunching at the house of M. Solomiac, I proceeded by car to the Residency at Beirut, where I was received by M. Ponsot and his staff and a picturesque guard of honour, which was formed of Bedouin camel sowars. Before dinner I conversed for an hour with Mr. Satow, His Majesty's consul-general in Beirut, who was kind enough to give me much valuable information on the subject of M. Ponsot's views on current questions affecting Iraq. At an official banquet the same evening I was introduced to the principal French civil and military officers in Beirut. The morning of the 20th was spent in conversation with M. Ponsot, and in the

headquarters of aviation at Rayak and the interesting town of Zahlé. At a dinner at the Residency that evening I met M. Debsay, the President of the Lebanese Republic, who seemed to be principally interested in the boycott of the French oil company, which had been carefully organised in order to force the company to reduce its charges

3. At 6 o'clock on the following morning M. Ponsot accompanied me by which skirted the coast of the Lebanon. M. Ponsot showed a marked preference for Tripoli, and it was evident that he looked forward to a time when it would become the principal centre of French activity in the Lebanon. He told me that the town, with its suburb of El Mina, already had a population of about 200,000

Beirut. Its favourable situation at the northern extremity of the Lebanon range to Hama. This railway M. Ponsot informed me, would eventually be extended to Palmyra and Deir-az-Zor on the Euphrates, at an estimated cost of 250 million francs but since it had recently been found that a railway was not necessary to assist the construction of the oil pipe-line, he thought that the extension would have to be deferred for some years. We then motored to Ras-el-Lodas, an insignificant cape 6 kilom. to the north-east of Tripoli, where he informed me that it had been decided that the pipe-line from Iraq should anchorage 1 mile from the shore, where the oil tankers would load. In order to facilitate this operation, it had been decided to build a breakwater connecting the small islands which lay off the promontory of El Mina, which would protect

the tankers would load in safety at all times, with the exception of about fifteen days in the year when northerly winds prevailed. The breakwater would at the

safely land in all weathers. At present there was a service of French flying-boats, which flew once a week both ways between Tripoli and Marseilles via Athens in two days, and it was proposed to eliminate Athens and reduce the period to one day. M. Ponsot told me that the scheme for constructing a harbour at Tripoli for ships of 30 feet draught had been definitely abandoned, partly owing to the large expense involved but chiefly owing to the fact that satisfactory arrangements for the oil tankers to load had been put in hand as described above. M. Ponsot was at pains to impress on me the natural advantages of Ras-el-Lodas as a terminal for a pipe-line

4 We motored back at mid-day to Beirut, where I took leave of M. Ponsot and proceeded by car to Rayak. Here I was joined by my escort, and we were the 39th Regiment of Aviation. In the afternoon we flew from Rayak to Ramleh, frontier, and I spent the night of the 21st and 22nd at Jerusalem as the guest of Sir Haifa Bagdad Railway were discussed with the High Commissioner and Sir Frederick Palmer, who had arrived from England to inspect the alignment. On the 23rd we flew from Palestine to Bagdad in six and a half hours. The whole journey of 1,500 miles occupied about fourteen hours in the air instead of several days of motor travel by indifferent road trucks.

3. I was able to have a conversation with M. Ponsot quite alone, while Mr. Sturges held discussions with his

M. Ponsot professed to take me into his confidence on the question of the future attitude of his Government towards the Syrian mandate. He told me that when

that it had established a close British protectorate over Iraq. When he read between the lines, however, it dawned on him that the treaty, while carefully safeguarding British interests, represented a generous and statesmanlike

When he came to Syria five years ago he formed the opinion that the British Government was proceeding too hastily to the point of preparing for the

preparation would be required before this infant State could be reasonably expected to stand on its own feet. Recent experience, however, had caused him

results, so far as the sacrifices we had made

the personal conclusion

study of the problem. The

probably stay there for five months. During this period he hoped to work out with the French Foreign Office the details of an agreement with Syria which he

therefore, probably be necessary to hold elections on his return to Syria in the

made with a view to

At

the

any proposal that the Throne of Syria should be

of its history since 1860 and of the special position of the

Christian enclave. It was impossible, in his opinion, that it should again become an appanage of a predominantly Moslem State. On the other hand, the French

independence. I thanked M. Ponsot for this interesting forecast, but told him that, if experience of the political mentality of the Iraqis could be said to form

any useful guide, I thought that the Syrians would take strong objection to the

M. Ponsot emphasised that the Alouites and Jebel Druse were at present administered by French Governors, and it was most unlikely that they would consent in the near future to come under the control of Damascus. He agreed, however, that they should be encouraged to join the State of Syria as soon as might be practicable.

6. In the course of our conversation on the subject of oil, M. Ponsot said that he had no complaint to make about the terms of the new convention as

be ratified by the Iraqi Parliament and that the old state of uncertainty and

him on this point. He told me that Syria had no interest in the building of railways towards the Iraq frontier in the zone south and east of a line drawn from Palmyra to Deir-er-Zor, and it was therefore no hardship for her to

He realised that the Iraqi Government regarded the early construction of a Haifa-Bagdad railway as vital to the interests of the country, and he assured me that Syria could take no legitimate objection to such a railway. He gave me to understand, however, that it was his ambition to link up Tripoli with Mosul

and Northern Persia by the Palmyra-Deir-er-Zor route. He said that the Nubia railway to Alexandretta was so exposed to attack from Turkey that it seemed hardly worth developing as an important trade route.

7. After a long discussion on the subject of the frontier M. Ponsot agreed that a commission from the League of Nations should make a local enquiry, preferably next autumn, and should report first of all as to the interpretation of the 1920 Convention line accepted by Lord Curzon and M. Berthelot at San Remo and, at the same time, should recommend, on the principle of equal

considerations on both sides, what divergencies from this line would in the opinion of the commission, be advisable on geographical, tribal and administrative considerations. He suggested that these recommendations, which should cover the Syrian frontier with Transjordan (and therefore part of the Jebel Druse

whose decision should be final. Great Britain and France would have ample opportunity of representing their point of view before the Council gave its decision. I am reporting on this subject separately by telegram.

8. I explained to M. Ponsot that the Iraqi Government were anxious to

this proposal for the sake of improvement of relations. I promised that I would do my best to induce King Feisal to select for this post a suitable Iraqi who would not be likely to indulge in improper activities. M. Ponsot suggested that

M. Ponsot was quite content that he should remain in his present refuge with King Ibn Saud. He would have no objection, however, to his residence in Iraq, provided that he was not permitted to live close to the Syrian frontier, and he suggested his removal to some place east of the Tigris.

9. Other matters, such as the case of the Amarat camels, which M. Ponsot

the tribal conference at Abu Kamal, and the collection of wids, were amicably discussed and disposed of, and I feel that the personal contact which this visit has enabled me to establish with M. Ponsot will be of valuable assistance to me in dealing with any future problems which may arise.

10. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine and to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut.

I have, &c.
F. H. HUMPHRYS,
High Commissioner for Iraq

E 2735/5 931

No. 152

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir J. Shuckburgh (Colonial Office).—(Received in Foreign Office, May 25)

Secret.

My dear Shuckburgh,

Bagdad, May 1, 1931

I SEE that we have not yet sent you the enclosed letter from the French (Chargé d'Affaires here, which gives the guarantee on the subject of railways in East Syria, without which the revised agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company could not have been concluded. I have not yet had a copy communicated to me officially by the Iraqi Government the reason being that they are most anxious for it to be kept absolutely secret for the present, but you will see from my report on my visit to Syria that Ponsot had no objection to this self-denying ordinance.

Yours sincerely
F. H. HUMPHRYS

Enclosure in No. 152

French Chargé d'Affaires to Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs

Consulat de France

Bagdad, le 22 mars 1931

Je me fais un plaisir de faire part à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement de la République française m'a autorisé et spécialement chargé de signer en son nom ainsi qu'au nom du Gouvernement syrien l'engagement—engagement que j'ai l'honneur de donner officiellement à votre Excellence par cette présente lettre—de ne pas construire pendant vingt-cinq ans, sans accord préalable et formel avec le Gouvernement de l'Irak, de voies ferrées de Palmyre à Rutbah ou en direction de Rutbah, de Palmyre à Abou-Kemal ou en direction d'Abou-Kemal de Deir-es-Zor à Abou-Kemal ou en direction d'Abou-Kemal.

Veuillez agréer, &c.
Le Chargé d'Affaires de France en Irak,
PAUL LEPISSIER

E 2861/48 891

No. 153

Sir F. Humphrys to Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office, June 1)

Sir,

Bagdad, May 15, 1931

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you, for information, a copy of a note addressed to the French High Commissioner, Beirut, on the subject of the Syrian Railway.

2. Copies have also been sent to the Acting High Commissioner, Jerusalem and His Majesty's consul general, Beirut.

I have &c.
F. H. HUMPHRYS

Enclosure in No. 153

Sir F. Humphrys to French High Commissioner, Beirut

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

Bagdad, May 15, 1931

AS a result of conversations that took place during my recent visit to Beirut, I have the honour to inform you that the discussions that have passed between the British and French Governments on the subject of the reference of the Syrian Railway to the League of Nations have been attended with a certain amount of misunderstanding. Wherein it appears that the French

Government were under the mistaken impression that the British Government were anxious that the frontier question should be settled by the League without reference to the Franco-British Convention of the 23rd December, 1920, the British Government had been led to believe that the French Government were not

modification of the boundary defined in the convention. It is easy to see how this misunderstanding prevented agreement being reached on a combined draft formula referring the question to the League of Nations. I understood, however, from what passed at Beirut, that your Excellency did not, in fact, object to the frontier defined in the convention being modified in accordance with geographical, tribal and administrative considerations, your Excellency stating only that in order to ensure that such modifications should be made as far as possible on a reciprocal basis, it was necessary to provide that any commission sent to conduct investigations on the spot should first come to some conclusion regarding the interpretation of article 1 of the convention. If the foregoing is a correct interpretation of your Excellency's attitude, I feel sure that it would not be a difficult matter for your Excellency and myself to agree on a draft combined formula referring the question to the League, which we could recommend to our respective Governments, and with this object in view the enclosed draft has been prepared.

2. It will be seen that the draft is based on the draft prepared by the Quai d'Orsay last September, amended in such a way as to make it clear that the difficulties which have arisen are connected both with the interpretation of article 1 of the convention and with the recomputation of the frontier defined in that article with local conditions, and that the British Government have no objection to the frontier recommended by the commission being based upon the conclusions reached by them regarding the interpretation of article 1, provided that the French Government, for their part, agree that the commission should be empowered to incorporate in the frontier recommended by them such modifications of the convention frontier as they consider that local geographical, tribal and administrative conditions require. An attempt has been made in the enclosed draft to present both these aspects of the problem without emphasis, either at the expense of the other, and I hope that your Excellency will find it possible to accept it.

I have the honour to request that you will be good enough to forward the draft by the Royal Air Force to Ravak to send the draft by my political secretary, Mr. Sturges, in the hope that your Excellency will agree that it should be discussed at the Residency with the object of agreement being reached in time for the combined reference to be represented to the Council of the League of Nations before the September session.

I am, &c.
F. H. HUMPHRYS,
High Commissioner for Iraq

E 3129 48 891

No. 154

Sir F. Humphrys to the Colonial Office.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, June 15)

Secret.

The Residency, Bagdad, May 26, 1931

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you, for information, a copy of a note addressed to the French High Commissioner, Beirut, on the subject of the Syrian Railway.

2. Copies have also been sent to His Majesty's Acting High Commissioner, Jerusalem, and His Majesty's consul general, Beirut.

I have, &c.
F. H. HUMPHRYS

Sir F. Humphrys to Nuri Pasha

My dear Prime Minister, *The Residency, Bagdad, May 24, 1931*
YOUR Excellency will remember that on the evening of the 15th May, I showed your Excellency a draft of a combined communication by the British and French Governments to the Council of the League referring the Syrio-Iraqi frontier question to the Council for a decision. Your Excellency stated that the draft correctly reflected the views of the Iraqi Government and that your Excellency welcomed the suggestion that I should attempt to secure M. Ponsot's acceptance of a combined communication drafted on these lines.

I am glad to be able to inform your Excellency as a result of negotiations undertaken with the French High Commission by Mr. Sturges who visited Beirut specially for the purpose the draft has been accepted by M. Ponsot with certain minor amendments which do not affect its essential features. I enclose at the earliest possible moment your Excellency's formal approval of the action that has been taken.

The renewed prospect of this question being referred to the League of Nations is a matter of great importance. I refer to my letter dated the 27th August, 1930, to his Excellency Jafar Pasha. I understand that the French authorities in Syria agree that arrangements should now be made to carry out a joint survey of the frontier zone as soon as possible, and I should, therefore, be obliged if your Excellency would consider the question raised in Mr. Sturges's letter without delay and acquaint me with the views of the Iraqi Government.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Ruz of the Royal Diwan

Yours sincerely,

F. H. HUMPHRYS

Enclosure 2 in No. 154

Secretariat of the Council of Ministers to the Political Secretary to the High Commissioner for Iraq, Bagdad

Bagdad, May 27, 1931

REFERENCE has been made to the High Commissioner's letter dated the 24th May, 1931, regarding the Iraqi-Syrian frontier.

I am directed to inform you that the Iraqi Government agree to the draft combined communication proposed for submission by the British and French Governments to the Council of the League of Nations regarding the reference of the Syrio-Iraqi frontier question to the said Council for a decision.

In regard to the question of carrying out combined arrangements for the survey of the frontier zone, you will be addressed later in this connexion.

'ABDI L. QADIR RASHID

Secretary to the Council of Ministers

E 3209 134 31)

No. 155.

Memorandum communicated by the French Embassy, June 17, 1931

PAR sa lettre du 22 avril dernier, son Excellence le Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires étrangères avait bien voulu faire savoir à l'Ambassadeur de France que le Gouvernement britannique, estimant n'être pas légalement dans l'obligation de soumettre à l'arbitrage les réclamations du groupe français intéressé à la concession accordée avant la guerre pour l'exploitation des gisements de sels de potasse de la mer Morte, maintenait entièrement les conditions auxquelles il a antérieurement subordonné son consentement à porter ces réclamations devant la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, cette communication ajoutant que, si les conditions énumérées dans la note britannique du 15 juillet 1930 n'étaient pas acceptées par le Gouvernement français avant le 1^{er} mai, le Gouvernement

britannique serait dans l'impossibilité de donner son accord à la soumission de cette affaire à une forme quelconque de décision internationale ou même de la prendre en considération.

Le Gouvernement français a éprouvé la plus grande surprise à apprendre que le Gouvernement britannique entendait mettre fin aussi sommairement à cette

La validité est contestée, et ils en sont évincés. Que leur prétention soit ou non fondée, ils ont à tout le moins droit à trouver un juge. Le Gouvernement français a le devoir de protéger ses nationaux. Il ne peut donc admettre qu'à la date du 1^{er} mai, son droit d'intervention ait pris fin.

Le Gouvernement français n'avait pas manqué d'examiner avec le plus grand soin les motifs déterminants pour accepter les conditions énoncées par le Gouvernement britannique, il n'avait pas cru nécessaire d'entrer à ce sujet dans les détails d'une controverse juridique. Il avait, cependant, pris soin de se conformer aux décisions de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, que ces considérations ont une tout autre valeur pour une cour statuant sur sa propre compétence que pour une cour d'arbitrage le mieux appropriée au règlement d'un différend.

Ces explications ayant été jugées trop brèves, le Gouvernement français ajoute que, de toutes les décisions de la cour auxquelles la note britannique a été référée, une seule, celle concernant les emprunts serbes, concerne une affaire qui ait été portée devant la cour par voie de compromis. C'est également par voie de compromis que l'affaire des potasses de la mer Morte pourrait être portée soit devant la cour soit devant un tribunal spécial. Or, dans l'affaire des emprunts serbes, la cour n'a pas eu à dire si tel acte de la Serbie était ou non contraire au droit international mais uniquement à dire quel mode de paiement était conforme par la Serbie envers les porteurs. De même, aujourd'hui, il s'agit de déterminer si le groupe français a bien les droits qu'il réclame.

En conséquence, le Gouvernement français s'estime fondé à ne pas accepter présentant au juge le litige dans des termes ne correspondant pas à la réalité, justice ni à l'équité.

Le Gouvernement de la République en présence des conditions posées par le Gouvernement britannique et qu'il jugeait ne pouvoir adopter, avait cherché une issue pratique en suggérant une autre forme d'arbitrage que celle qui avait été tout d'abord considérée. Cette forme, comme il l'a indiqué dans sa note du 28 octobre 1930, aurait rendu admissible la disposition relative au paiement des frais par la partie perdante qu'a proposée le Gouvernement britannique. Le Gouvernement de la République a eu le regret de constater que ses suggestions à cet égard, formulées en octobre 1930 et, sous une forme modifiée, en avril 1931 n'avaient pas reçu un accueil favorable.

Quant à la question des réclamations britanniques se rattachant aux désordres de Syrie en 1925 et 1926, si le mémorandum du 12 avril 1930 l'a passée sous silence, c'est que la position du Gouvernement français à cet égard avait été déterminée par la Cour permanente de Justice internationale. L'affaire des sels de potasse de la mer Morte et les réclamations relatives aux troubles de Syrie, le Gouvernement de la République ne peut donc admettre qu'elles soient liées l'une à l'autre.

Le Gouvernement français se refuse à penser que les divergences qui se sont affirmées touchant les modalités d'un règlement arbitral du présent litige doivent conduire à laisser celui-ci sans solution et il est persuadé que le désir de conciliation qui, comme l'a rappelé le Gouvernement britannique, anime ce dernier dans ses relations avec le Gouvernement français, lui fera partager ce sentiment. Il suggère, dans ces conditions, d'utiliser la voie qu'offre aux deux parties le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux. Conformément à l'article 17 de la Convention de La Haye de 1907 pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux, les questions d'établir un compromis par lequel seraient déférées à ce tribunal les questions

litigieuses relatives à la concession pour l'extraction du sel de la mer Morte et la procédure sommaire réglée par le titre IV, chapitre IV, de la Convention de La Jave du 18 octobre 1900.

Le Gouvernement de la République est prêt, quant à lui, à entrer dans cette voie et il attend avec confiance que le Gouvernement britannique veuille bien lui faire connaître s'il lui paraît possible de se rallier à cette suggestion.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 17 juin 1931

[E 3220 5 93]

No 156.

Commt General Satow to Mr A Henderson (Received June 20)

(No. 84)

Sir,

Beirut, June 10, 1931

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the supplement to the Lebanese "Official Journal," No. 2500, of the 3th June, containing the 1931, between the Lebanese Government and the Iraq Petroleum Company (Limited). I am sending copies of this to His Majesty's High Commissioners for Palestine and Iraq.

2 The supplement also contains an agreement between the Lebanese Government and the Iraq Petroleum Company (Limited) for the construction of a pipeline in the vicinity of this frontier. Reference is made in article 4 of the agreement and in its preamble to the projected construction of the pipe-line in the vicinity of this frontier.

I have, &c

A E SATOW

Enclosure in No 156

"Journal officiel," Supplément du No. 2500 du Vendredi 3 Juin 1931

Laissant Approbation d'une Convention conclue entre la République libanaise et l'Iraq Petroleum Company (Limited).

LA Chambre des Députés a voté.

Le Président de la République promulgue la loi dont la teneur suit.

Article 1^{er} Est approuvée la convention conclue à Beyrouth, le 25 mars 1931, entre le représentant de la République libanaise et M. John Skiros, agissant pour le compte du Gouvernement britannique, d'une part, et John Skiros, agissant pour le compte de la compagnie à travers l'Etat du Liban.

Art. 2 Est approuvé l'accord conclu à Beyrouth, le 12 mai 1931, entre la République libanaise et le Gouvernement de Lattaquieh au sujet de la fixation de leur commune frontière et de l'établissement d'un régime spécial en ce qui touche les grandes voies de communication qui longent ou traversent cette frontière.

CHARLES DEBBAS

Beyrouth, le 23 mai 1931

Par le Président de la République

Le Président du Conseil, Ministre des
Finances et de l'Agriculture,
Auguste ADIB

(2)

Convention de Transit des Pétroles de l'Iraq Petroleum Company (Limited), à travers l'Etat du Liban.

Cette Convention passée le 25 mars 1931 entre les soussignés son Excellence Auguste Pacha Adib, Président du Conseil des Ministres de la République libanaise, agissant pour le compte du Gouvernement libanais (ci après désigné "le Gouvernement"), d'une part, et John Skiros, agissant pour le compte de

l'Iraq Petroleum Company (Limited), dont le siège social se trouve à Londres, King William Street House, Arthur Street, ci après dénommée "la compagnie"

compagnie elle-même, mais ses mandataires ou toute compagnie filiale ou associée dûment constituée, ou toute autre société qui serait reconnue conformément aux dispositions de l'article 26 ci après comme étant constituée ou utilisée par la compagnie dans le but de construire, entretenir ou exploiter les conduites, les raffineries et les travaux y afférents aux termes de cette convention), d'autre part.

Il a été exposé ce qui suit.

Attendu que la compagnie a été constituée le 31 janvier 1911 sous le régime de la Loi sur les Sociétés, Compagnies (Consolidation Act) de 1908, sous la raison sociale "African and Eastern Concessions (Limited)," et qu'à la date du 23 octobre 1912, cette raison sociale a été modifiée et est devenue "Turkish Petroleum Company (Limited)," et

Attendu qu'en date du 14 mars 1926, un acte de concession (ci après désigné "Concession d'Irak," expression qui comportera toute prolongation ou modification qui pourrait y être apportée) est intervenu entre le Gouvernement d'Irak d'une part et la compagnie d'autre part, aux termes duquel le Gouvernement a accordé à la compagnie le droit exclusif d'explorer, prospecter, forer, extraire et préparer pour le commerce pétrole, naphte, gaz naturel, ozokerite, conditions et proscriptions contenus et énumérés dans ladite Concession d'Irak, et

désire construire une ou plusieurs conduites de l'Irak à un point terminus situé sur la Méditerranée, la conduite traversant de ce fait le territoire de la République libanaise (ci après désigné "le territoire de l'Etat"), et construire et entretenir dans ce territoire des bureaux, stations de pompage, ateliers, entrepôts, réservoirs, fer et de tramways, câbles ou transporteurs aériens ou souterrains, bars, transports par route, par eau ou par air, aérodromes, câbles électriques aériens, télégraphes et radiotélégraphes, raffineries, parcs de réservoirs, hôpitaux, stations de force motrice, conduites de pétrole, gaz et eau pressurée, enterrées ou immergées et autres travaux (qu'ils soient de la nature de ceux qui sont énumérés ci-dessus ou non) connexes ou similaires y afférents (toutes ces opérations sont ci après collectivement incluses dans l'expression "l'entreprise"), et

Attendu que le Gouvernement en vue des avantages que le pays en retirera désire faciliter, par les moyens prévus par la présente convention, les opérations de la compagnie se rapportant à l'entreprise.

Il a été convenu et arrêté entre le Gouvernement et la compagnie ce qui

ARTICLE 1^{er}

Droits accordés à la Compagnie

Le Gouvernement, par ces présentes, confère à la compagnie dans le territoire de l'Etat le droit (ci après désigné "la concession") de construire, entretenir et exploiter une ou plusieurs conduites et tous travaux auxiliaires y afférents et de faire tout ce qui pourrait être nécessaire pour l'entreprise, aux conditions

ARTICLE 2

Durée de la Concession

La durée de la concession sera de soixante-dix ans à partir de la date de la signature de la présente convention.

Soumission des Plans

Avant de commencer la pose de la conduite, la compagnie soumettra au Gouvernement des plans indiquant les terrains dans lesquels la conduite sera posée, et les terrains sur lesquels des stations de pompage, raffineries ou autres

Sous réserve des droits existants et sans pouvoir s'opposer à l'octroi par le Gouvernement de nouvelles concessions de port, la compagnie aura la faculté d'utiliser dans le port ses propres allèges, chaloupes et autres bateaux pour les besoins de ses propres affaires et d'emmagasiner ses cargaisons dans ses propres magasins et hangars.

Tous bateaux appartenant à la compagnie, ou spécialement affrétés par elle, seront tenus de payer les droits de port suivant un barème de prix à établir entre les autorités du port et de la compagnie, mais ces droits de port ne seront, en aucun cas, supérieurs aux droits payables par d'autres personnes utilisant le port et ils seront établis en partant du coût des services rendus.

La compagnie paiera les taxes pour l'emploi des appareils de levage, la mise à quai, l'allègement et les autres droits de port, d'après un barème de prix à établir entre les autorités compétentes et la compagnie, mais ces droits ne seront, en aucun cas, supérieurs aux droits payables par d'autres personnes utilisant les mêmes services et seront de même fixés en partant du coût des services rendus.

ARTICLE 7

Construction d'un Port par la Compagnie

Dans la zone d'aboutissement de la conduite et pour les besoins de l'entreprise, à l'exclusion de ceux du commerce général, le Gouvernement accordera toutes facilités pour la construction et l'entretien par la compagnie, si elle le désire, en un ou plusieurs points fixés d'accord avec le Gouvernement, de tous ports ou ports nécessaires à son exploitation et au chargement des bateaux.

Dans la limite du port ou des ports, qui seraient construits conformément à l'annexe, b) de l'annexe, le Gouvernement accordera toutes facilités pour la construction et l'entretien par la compagnie, si elle le désire, en un ou plusieurs points fixés d'accord avec le Gouvernement, de tous ports ou ports nécessaires à son exploitation et au chargement des bateaux.

Les plans pour la construction de ce port ou de ces ports seront soumis à l'approbation du Gouvernement, cette approbation ne devra pas être retardée ou refusée sans motif raisonnable.

Le droit d'entrée ou d'accès à ce ou ces ports sera à la discrétion de la compagnie.

Les bateaux utilisant les installations maritimes de la compagnie ne seront soumis de ce fait à aucune taxation gouvernementale.

Le barème des taxes que la compagnie percevra du fait de l'utilisation de ses installations maritimes fera l'objet d'un accord entre le Gouvernement et la compagnie.

Rien dans cet article n'exempte des droits de phare les bateaux qui entreront dans le ou les ports de la compagnie ou en sortiront.

Les services compétents du Gouvernement, suivant des modalités déterminées d'accord avec la compagnie, assureront les services de douane, de quarantaine d'immigration et de surveillance de police. Pour ces services et tous autres services spéciaux rendus par le Gouvernement, la compagnie ou les bateaux qui utiliseront les ports de la compagnie paieront suivant un tarif à débattre, établi en partant du coût des services rendus.

L'amarrage dans le voisinage des pontons de la compagnie et des conduites de chargement sous marines, ainsi qu'au voisinage des conduites immergées au point de traversée des rivières, sera interdit par les soins du Gouvernement.

ARTICLE 8

Tarif des Chemins de Fer.

Pour les besoins de la construction et de l'exploitation de l'entreprise, la compagnie pourra utiliser le chemin de fer de Tripoli à Homs et prolongement vers l'est suivant un tarif à fixer entre la compagnie et les autorités des chemins de fer. Le Gouvernement usera de son influence pour que la compagnie puisse

obtenir des autorités des chemins de fer à des termes et à des conditions à fixer d'accord avec ces autorités, et en tenant compte des obligations internationales existantes, des tarifs spéciaux réduits, en raison de l'importance considérable du tonnage des marchandises et du trafic de voyageurs de la compagnie, et le droit pour la compagnie pendant les périodes de construction de fournir son propre matériel de transport si l'Administration des Chemins de fer n'est pas en mesure de fournir du matériel roulant convenable ou d'assurer les transports de la compagnie sans délais excessifs.

ARTICLE 9

Construction de Chemin de Fer par la Compagnie

Le Gouvernement accordera à la compagnie le droit de construire toute voie ferrée nécessaire pour le service de l'entreprise, au cas où les chemins de fer existants ou en projet ne satisferaient pas aux besoins de la compagnie.

La compagnie s'engage, avant de procéder à toute construction de cette nature autre que la construction d'une voie de chantier, à soumettre à l'approbation du Gouvernement un plan de construction, d'entretien et d'exploitation du chemin de fer, cette ligne ne sera pas utilisée pour le transport public de passagers, d'animaux ou de marchandises et la compagnie ne jouira pas des droits ni ne sera soumise aux obligations d'une entreprise de transports publics en ce qui concerne le chemin de fer, mais les marchandises et le personnel du Gouvernement pourront être transportés suivant des dispositions et aux termes et conditions à fixer d'accord avec le Gouvernement.

Le Gouvernement aura le droit, si l'intérêt public l'exige, d'acheter, à un prix à convenir d'un commun accord ou, à défaut d'accord à fixer, suivant les termes de l'article 25 de la présente convention, toute voie ferrée construite par la compagnie dont la largeur entre les rails excéderait 0,762 mètre, mais, en cas d'achat par le Gouvernement d'une voie ferrée, le Gouvernement aura l'obligation de transporter les marchandises et les voyageurs de la compagnie à des conditions à fixer en partant du coût des services rendus.

ARTICLE 10

Utilisation des Routes par la Compagnie

La compagnie aura les mêmes droits que le public en ce qui concerne l'usage du réseau routier construit.

Construction de Routes par la Compagnie

La compagnie ne pourra prétendre à aucune contribution de revenus publics ou à l'usage de terres ou d'autres ressources de l'Etat pour la construction ou l'entretien des routes nécessaires à la compagnie pour les besoins de l'entreprise.

ARTICLE 11

Matière d'Œuvre

La compagnie s'engage à utiliser la main d'œuvre locale pour les besoins de l'entreprise sur le territoire de l'Etat.

En cas d'insuffisance de main d'œuvre locale appropriée, le Gouvernement s'engage à accorder les facilités spéciales qui seraient nécessaires à l'entrée sur le territoire de l'Etat de main d'œuvre étrangère pour les besoins de l'entreprise.

Au cas où les importations de main d'œuvre répondraient à un besoin temporaire de la compagnie pour une tâche déterminée, la compagnie s'engage cette tâche accomplie, à rapatrier toute personne admise dans ces conditions et qui ne serait pas autorisée par le Gouvernement à demeurer sur le territoire de l'Etat.

La compagnie aura le droit d'organiser ses équipes de travail de telle sorte que la construction, l'entretien et l'exploitation de l'entreprise puissent se poursuivre sans interruption de jour, de nuit et pendant les jours fériés, sous réserve des conventions internationales relatives à la réglementation du travail.

Pendant les travaux spéciaux de construction et de réparation qui exigeraient temporairement une main d'œuvre abondante, le Gouvernement

accordera des facilités spéciales pour la libre et facile circulation des employés de la compagnie, de ses véhicules et matériaux, de jour et de nuit, à certains points de frontière à fixer d'accord.

Passages de Frontière.

Tenant compte des besoins spéciaux de l'entreprise qui exigent un travail ininterrompu, le Gouvernement accordera à tout moment toutes facilités pour la circulation du personnel dirigeant de la compagnie, de ses employés et ses matériaux aux points convenus pour la traversée de la frontière et accueillera favorablement et, si possible, adoptera toutes mesures de réciprocité à cet égard que la compagnie pourra obtenir avec les Gouvernements des territoires voisins.

Tous frais exceptionnellement encourus par le Gouvernement en facilitant ainsi la circulation aux points de passage convenus des frontières seront d'abord convenus entre le Gouvernement et la compagnie, et seront supportés par la compagnie.

Restrictions.

Le Gouvernement pourra interdire, dans l'intérêt de la sécurité publique, à toute personne employée par la compagnie, de pénétrer ou de séjourner dans une région déterminée.

ARTICLE 12.

Taxation.

Pour les opérations de l'entreprise, la compagnie ne sera soumise à aucun impôt foncier, aucun impôt sur le revenu, ni à aucune perception ou charge fiscale de quelque nature que ce soit, que ces taxes s'appliquent sur ses biens, son revenu, son chiffre d'affaires ou sur l'importance de son personnel.

La compagnie restera soumise au droit commun pour ce qui concerne son activité sur le marché local, comme pour les dividendes qui seraient distribués à des contribuables dans le pays ou les salaires payés aux ouvriers et employés, pour autant qu'ils soient imposables dans le territoire de l'Etat.

Aucun droit de timbre ne sera prélevé sur la présente convention, ni sur les documents y annexés, ni sur aucune autre convention complémentaire, plans, spécifications, ou pièces semblables exécutées pour le Gouvernement et soumis à son approbation; cette exemption ne s'étend pas aux transactions autres que celles qui sont spécifiées dans le présent article.

Au cas où dans la mesure où la compagnie acquiescerait à ses frais, dans les limites des terrains acquis pour ses ports, raffineries, stations de stockage, stations de pompage, etc., des services appropriés se rattachant ou destinés à l'éducation, à la police, à l'hygiène, à l'alimentation en eau, à l'éclairage et à d'autres services de caractère municipal, la compagnie serait dégagée de l'obligation de payer les taxes se rapportant aux services ainsi organisés, mais rien, dans les présentes, n'impose à la compagnie une obligation quelconque d'organiser de tels services, ni ne l'autorise à les étendre au delà de ses besoins exclusifs.

Par contre, toutes les installations de la compagnie dans le territoire de l'Etat ou toutes les opérations qu'elle effectuera dans le territoire de l'Etat qui ne seraient pas destinées au fonctionnement de l'entreprise ou ne seraient pas justifiées par l'exploitation de cette entreprise, entreront dans le droit commun et seront passibles de toutes les taxes applicables suivant les lois en vigueur.

ARTICLE 13.

Communications.

La compagnie aura le droit d'installer, d'entretenir et d'utiliser, pour les seuls besoins de l'entreprise et sous la surveillance du Gouvernement, des lignes télégraphiques ou téléphoniques aériennes ou souterraines, ainsi que toutes installations de radiotélégraphie ou radiotéléphonie, en se conformant à la réglementation locale et internationale en vigueur, de manière à ne pas entraver les services officiels ou autres qui pourraient exister.

En cas de besoin, il sera permis aux fonctionnaires du Gouvernement chargés de la sécurité publique de faire un emploi raisonnable de ces installations.

La compagnie aura le droit d'utiliser pour l'entreprise tous services publics qui pourraient exister dans le territoire de l'Etat, même non spécialement mentionnés dans la présente convention, moyennant le paiement éventuel des sommes qui seraient imposées à d'autres entreprises industrielles pour l'utilisation de ces mêmes services.

ARTICLE 14.

Transports.

La compagnie aura le droit d'utiliser tout moyen de transport par terre, par eau ou par air pour la circulation de ses employés ou de ses matériaux, tout en observant les lois et règlements régissant l'utilisation de ces moyens de transport.

ARTICLE 15.

Matériel de Construction.

La compagnie aura le droit, sous réserve des droits existants, d'employer pour les besoins de l'entreprise toute terre, argile, ballast, chaux, gypse, pierre et autres matériaux appartenant au Gouvernement et sans autre charge que le paiement des droits de licence en vigueur pour l'exploitation des carrières.

Les arbres, bois et broussailles nécessaires à l'entreprise pourront être coupés dans les forêts du Gouvernement, sous réserve des droits existants et compte tenu de la nécessité de préserver les forêts, aux termes et conditions des règlements y afférents.

ARTICLE 16.

En accord avec le Gouvernement, la compagnie aura le droit, sous réserve des droits existants, de creuser des puits, de construire des barrages, de capter et d'emmagasiner les eaux de surface et de prendre toutes mesures utiles pour se procurer l'eau nécessaire aux besoins de l'entreprise, sans autre redevance ni charge que le prix du terrain acquis à cet effet conformément aux dispositions de l'article 17 ci-après.

La compagnie aura le droit, avec le consentement du Gouvernement, de prélever sur les rivières et les lacs telles quantités d'eau qui seraient d'un commun accord considérées comme nécessaires pour les besoins de l'entreprise, sous réserve que les droits acquis ou préalablement accordés soient d'abord satisfaits et que la compagnie ne privera en aucun cas la population locale d'une quantité d'eau raisonnable et qui serait nécessaire à cette population pour ses besoins domestiques, industriels et agricoles et pour l'abreuvement des troupeaux et l'irrigation des terres.

Les eaux sur lesquelles des droits d'usage spéciaux ont été acquis ou accordés seront, si le Gouvernement estime que ces eaux sont nécessaires pour les besoins de l'entreprise, expropriées dans les formes prévues par la loi et aux frais de la compagnie, étant entendu qu'une expropriation de cette nature ne privera en aucun cas la population locale d'une quantité d'eau raisonnable et qui lui serait nécessaire pour ses besoins domestiques, industriels et agricoles et pour l'abreuvement des troupeaux et l'irrigation des terres.

La compagnie prendra toutes mesures raisonnables pour rendre disponible pour l'utilisation locale l'eau usée provenant de ses établissements industriels.

Aucune disposition de la présente convention n'exempte la compagnie du paiement de redevances pour l'eau qui serait fournie à la compagnie par les autorités locales.

ARTICLE 17.

Terrains d'Etat.

Le Gouvernement accordera à la compagnie pour une durée qui ne sera pas supérieure à la durée de la présente convention, moyennant un loyer nominal, les locations des terrains d'Etat qui seront nécessaires pour les besoins de l'entreprise. En ce qui concerne les propriétés d'Etat qui seraient cultivées ou bâties situées à l'intérieur ou à proximité des villes et qui seraient nécessaires pour les besoins de l'entreprise, la compagnie paiera au Gouvernement un loyer annuel équitable et calculé sur la base de la valeur locative de ces propriétés.

Il sera payé une compensation raisonnable aux occupants des terrains cultivés en cas d'éviction.

Terrains prêtés.

Les terrains nécessaires à l'entreprise qui n'appartiennent pas au Gouvernement seront acquis à l'amiable entre la compagnie et le propriétaire intéressé. A défaut d'accord, si le Gouvernement considère l'acquisition de ces terrains comme nécessaire pour les besoins de l'entreprise, il les acquerra aux termes de la loi d'expropriation en vigueur à ce moment, mais tous les frais resteront à la charge de la compagnie.

Toutefois, il est entendu que, dans l'estimation de la valeur de ces terrains, l'emploi auquel la compagnie les destine ne sera pas pris en considération et qu'il ne sera tenu compte que du prix moyen des terrains de même nature dans le voisinage immédiat et que les terrains ainsi acquis par le Gouvernement et enregistrés à son nom seront mis, moyennant un loyer nominal, à la disposition de la compagnie pour une durée qui ne sera pas supérieure à la durée de la présente convention.

ARTICLE 18.

Sécurité.

Le Gouvernement prendra les mesures appropriées pour assurer la protection normale de l'entreprise et les employés de la compagnie.

La compagnie s'engage à construire à ses propres frais les logements nécessaires pour la police dans les localités où le Gouvernement et la compagnie s'accorderaient à reconnaître que de telles constructions constituent une mesure nécessaire de protection en raison de l'absence ou de l'insuffisance des forces de police en ces points.

Pendant les périodes de construction, le Gouvernement prendra, d'accord avec la compagnie et avec son concours, les mesures exceptionnelles de protection qui apparaîtraient nécessaires.

ARTICLE 19.

Participation en Actions.

Lorsqu'une émission en actions sera offerte au public par la compagnie pour les besoins de l'entreprise, des listes de souscription seront ouvertes sur le territoire de l'Etat en même temps que les listes seront ouvertes ailleurs.

ARTICLE 20.

La compagnie devra, dans les trois mois à partir de la date de cette convention, ouvrir un bureau à Beyrouth et désigner un représentant local ayant pouvoir de traiter toutes questions relatives à l'exploitation de l'entreprise et à l'exécution de la présente convention.

ARTICLE 21.

Exécution de la Convention.

La compagnie prendra toutes mesures raisonnables en vue de l'exécution des objets de la présente convention.

Si, à l'expiration d'un délai de trois ans à partir de la date d'entrée en vigueur de la présente convention, la compagnie n'est pas en situation d'assurer cette exécution, ou si, sous réserve des dispositions de l'article 23 ci-après (Force majeure) la compagnie n'a pas achevé, à l'expiration d'un délai de huit ans à partir de cette même date, la pose de la ou des conduites portées sur les plans soumis au Gouvernement conformément aux dispositions de l'article 2 ci-dessus, le Gouvernement aura toute liberté et pouvoir de résilier la présente convention.

Protection accordée par le Gouvernement.

Le Gouvernement prendra toutes mesures raisonnables pour faciliter l'exécution des objets de la présente convention et lorsque, dans la sphère d'action de l'entreprise, le Gouvernement accordera un contrat, une licence ou une concession autre que celle-ci, il sera tenu de sauvegarder les droits acquis par la compagnie en vertu de la présente convention.

La compagnie s'engage à prendre toutes précautions nécessaires pour éviter la pollution des éléments (air, eau, etc.) au voisinage de ses installations. Mais le Gouvernement reconnaît que des circonstances existent où certaine pollution des éléments est inévitable du fait des opérations de l'industrie du pétrole et il ne demandera pas à la compagnie, pour éviter cet inconvénient, des mesures qui ne soient pas raisonnables.

ARTICLE 22.

Droit de Réquisition des Propriétés de la Compagnie par le Gouvernement.

Au cas où le Gouvernement se trouverait en état de guerre avec un autre pays, le Gouvernement aura le droit de réquisitionner et d'utiliser les chemins de fer, les ponts, les quais, les télégraphes et les téléphones de la compagnie dans le territoire de l'Etat moyennant paiement d'une compensation suivant les lois en vigueur.

ARTICLE 23.

Dommages-intérêts.

La sanction, en cas de rupture de cette convention, sera établie sous forme de dommages-intérêts, dont le montant sera fixé d'un commun accord ou d'après les termes de l'article 25.

ARTICLE 24.

Force majeure.

Aucun manquement ou omission, soit de la part de la compagnie, soit de la part du Gouvernement, d'observer ou de remplir quelque stipulation, accord ou condition contenus dans la présente convention, et dont l'observation et l'exécution incombent soit à la compagnie, soit au Gouvernement, ne donnera lieu à une plainte ou réclamation contre l'une des parties, ne déterminera un préjudice quelconque pour cette partie, ni ne sera considéré comme une rupture de la présente convention, s'il est démontré à la satisfaction raisonnable de l'autre partie que la faute provient de l'une des causes suivantes : force majeure, révoltes, émeutes, guerres, grèves, machinations ou lock-out de la main d'œuvre, ou autres circonstances exceptionnelles ou imprévues qui devraient être considérées comme étant en dehors du contrôle de la compagnie ou du Gouvernement.

ARTICLE 25.

Au cas où, pendant la durée de cette convention ou après, un doute, un différend ou une contestation viendrait à s'élever entre le Gouvernement et la compagnie, au sujet de l'interprétation ou de l'exécution de la présente convention, ou sur un autre point y contenu ou y afférent, ou au sujet des droits et obligations de l'une ou l'autre des parties, le différend, à défaut d'accord réalisé entre les parties d'une autre manière, sera soumis à deux arbitres choisis chacun par l'une des parties et à un tiers arbitre qui sera choisi par les deux premiers arbitres eux-mêmes avant de procéder à l'arbitrage. Chaque partie nommera l'arbitre de son choix dans les trente jours qui suivront la requête écrite qu'elle en aura reçue de l'autre partie. Si les arbitres ne peuvent se mettre d'accord sur le choix du tiers arbitre, le Gouvernement et la compagnie, en accord mutuel, nommeront un tiers arbitre et, au cas où ils ne réussiraient pas à se mettre d'accord, ils demanderont au président de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale de nommer le tiers arbitre. La décision des arbitres, ou, s'il se produit un désaccord entre eux, la décision du tiers arbitre, sera décisive. L'arbitrage aura lieu à tel endroit que les parties pourront décider; en cas de désaccord, il aura lieu à Paris.

ARTICLE 26.

Réserve relative aux Actes internationaux, Privilèges ou Accords existants.

La présente convention ne peut être interprétée comme imposant au Gouvernement aucune obligation contraire à toute autre obligation qui lui incomberait du fait d'un acte international.

La présente convention, non plus qu'aucune des dispositions qui y sont inscrites, ne peut être interprétée comme portant atteinte ou dérogation à aucun droit ou privilège établi par une concession existante ou par un accord engageant le Gouvernement.

ARTICLE 27.

Délégation par la Compagnie des Droits qui lui sont conférés par la Convention.

La compagnie pourra confier à un mandataire le soin d'exécuter la présente convention ou autrement disposer de la présente convention ou de tous intérêts ou pouvoirs qu'elle tient de la présente convention, sous la réserve de l'obtention préalable du consentement du Gouvernement donné par écrit. Ce consentement ne pourra être refusé ou retardé sans motif raisonnable.

ARTICLE 28.

Les annotations portées en marge de la présente convention n'y sont portées que pour faciliter les références, et ne peuvent affecter le sens et l'interprétation de la convention.

ARTICLE 29.

Pour tout ce qui touche à l'exécution de la présente convention, les rapports entre le Gouvernement et la compagnie s'établiront, pendant la durée du mandat, par l'entremise du Haut-Commissaire de la République française en Syrie et au Liban.

ARTICLE 30.

La présente convention deviendra exécutoire par l'accomplissement des formalités prévues par les textes constitutionnels en vigueur à la date de la signature de la présente convention, et après approbation du Haut-Commissaire de la République française en Syrie et au Liban.

ARTICLE 31.

Le Texte français fait foi.

En cas de divergence entre les interprétations des textes français et arabe, le texte français fera seul foi.

Fait à Beyrouth, le 25 mars 1931.

Pour le Gouvernement :
Le Président du Conseil des Ministres,
AUG. ADIB.

En présence de :

A. POUPON,
Délégué p. i. du Haut-Commissaire
auprès de la République libanaise.

Pour la Compagnie :
J. SKLIROS.

En présence de :
JOHN S. ROCKES,
Iraq Petroleum Company (Limited).

(3)

Accord entre la République du Liban et le Gouvernement de Lattaquieh relatif à la Fixation de leur commune Frontière et à l'Établissement d'un Régime spécial en ce qui touche les grandes Voies de Communication qui longent ou traversent cette Frontière.

PRÉAMBULE.

Le Gouvernement de la République libanaise et le Gouvernement de Lattaquieh.

Vu l'arrêté du Haut-Commissaire No. 3607 du 29 décembre 1925, qui fixe leurs frontières respectives;

Désireux de procéder à la clôture définitive des travaux destinés à fixer sur le terrain cette frontière en tenant compte des conditions économiques spéciales à cette région;

Désireux, en particulier, d'éviter les complications et les difficultés d'ordres divers qui résultent de ce que les grandes voies de communication entre Homs et Tripoli se trouvent à plusieurs reprises sectionnées par la ligne frontière;

Désireux enfin de faciliter l'établissement, l'exploitation et la surveillance des canalisations de pétrole qui doivent traverser cette même zone,

Ont convenu ce qui suit :

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

Entre le pont d'Aridah et le pont de Djisr-el-Akmar, la frontière suivra le lit du Nahr-el-Kébir, tel qu'il a été déterminé par la Commission mixte de Délimitation le 25 août 1890, dont les conclusions sont consignées au procès-verbal annexé au présent accord.

ARTICLE 2.

Le Gouvernement libanais aura la charge exclusive de l'exploitation et de l'entretien de la grande route depuis la frontière de Syrie jusqu'à Tripoli.

Toutes dépenses afférentes à cet objet seront supportées par l'Etat du Liban.

ARTICLE 3.

Le Gouvernement libanais sera, dans les mêmes conditions, substitué au Gouvernement de Lattaquieh dans l'application de la convention de réadaptation des actes concessionnels de la Société D. H. P. en date du 12 octobre 1925 et de son annexe.

ARTICLE 4.

En prévision de la construction de canalisations de pétrole dans la zone frontière, le Gouvernement de Lattaquieh délègue au Gouvernement de la République libanaise l'exercice des droits et la responsabilité des obligations définies par la convention relative au transit du pétrole d'Irak conclue le 25 mars 1931 entre le Gouvernement de la République libanaise et l'Iraq Petroleum Company.

ARTICLE 5.

En considération des droits et obligations résultant pour lui des trois articles qui précèdent, le Gouvernement libanais concède dans les mêmes conditions au Gouvernement de Lattaquieh le droit d'administration générale sur la zone située dans la boucle du Nahr-el-Kébir au nord de la grande route de Tripoli à Homs entre Djisr-el-Aridah et Djisr-el-Akmar, avec les avantages fiscaux qu'il comporte.

Le Gouvernement de Lattaquieh s'engage à verser chaque année au Gouvernement libanais, par prélèvement sur les recettes fiscales effectuées dans cette zone, une somme forfaitaire de mille livres libano-syriennes.

ARTICLE 6.

Dans la zone dont l'administration lui est concédée en vertu des articles qui précèdent, chacun des deux Gouvernements est délégué par l'autre pour toute la durée du présent accord dans l'exercice de tous les attributs de la souveraineté.

Le périmètre municipal de Tell Kala est excepté de ces dispositions.

ARTICLE 7.

Le Gouvernement de la République libanaise et le Gouvernement de Lattaquieh se font réciproquement abandon, chacun pour ce qui le concerne, des réclamations pour impôts perçus ou dépenses effectuées antérieurement à la signature du présent accord dans les zones affectées par cet accord.

ARTICLE 8.

Le présent accord est conclu pour une durée de soixante-douze ans à compter de sa signature.

ARTICLE 9.

Une carte annexe précise les divers points mentionnés dans cet accord.

ARTICLE 10.

Toute difficulté surgissant à l'occasion de l'interprétation et de l'application du présent accord, et sur le règlement de laquelle les deux Gouvernements intéressés n'auraient pu se mettre d'accord, sera obligatoirement soumise à l'arbitrage d'une commission composée de deux membres désignés par chacun des Gouvernements et d'un président désigné par le représentant du Gouvernement français.

Fait à Beyrouth, en trois exemplaires, le 12 mai 1931.

Pour le Gouvernement de la République libanaise :

Le Président du Conseil des Ministres,
AUGUSTE ADIB.

Pour le Gouvernement de Lattaquié :

Le Gouverneur,
SHEFFLER.

[C 3288/69/25]

No. 157.

Sir J. Chancellor to Lord Passfield. — (Communicated by Colonial Office, June 22.)

(Confidential.)

High Commissioner for Palestine,
Jerusalem, June 11, 1931.

My Lord,

IN confirmation of my telegram No. 51 of the 4th June, I have the honour to inform your lordship that King Hussein died at Amman at 3 a.m. on the 4th June.

During his stay at Amman King Hussein had been visited from time to time by his sons King Faisal, King Aly, the Amir Zeid and other members of his family.

2. As soon as it was known that King Hussein's condition was desperate, King Aly informed Haj Amin Effendi-al-Husseini, the President of the Supreme Moslem Council, who was then at Amman, that it had been the wish of the family that King Hussein should be buried at Mecca, but that since the difficulties in the way of realising that wish were insuperable they desired that he should be buried in the Haram-esh-Sherif at Jerusalem.

3. Haj Amin Effendi welcomed the suggestion, and, on the eve of King Hussein's death, reported the fact to Government with the request that facilities should be accorded by the Palestine Government for the burial of King Hussein with all the honours due to the Arab ruler who had persuaded the Arabs to throw in their lot with the Allied Forces during the Great War.

I caused Haj Amin Effendi to be informed that all proper facilities would be granted for the ceremony.

4. On the 4th June, at 10 a.m., the body of King Hussein left Amman by motor-car.

The cortege was formed of the sons and relatives of King Hussein, including King Aly, the Amir Abdullah, the Amir Zeid, Shakir and Talal. The British Resident, Amman, the Officer Commanding the Arab Legion and many Arab notables were also present. Along the route from Amman to Jerusalem frequent halts were made to enable delegations of villagers to pay their respects to the dead King.

The Amir Abdullah and King Aly were met at the Allenby Bridge on my behalf by Ruhi Bey Abdalhadi, assistant secretary, accompanied by a British police officer. The party was there joined by several delegations of Palestinian Arabs, representing different towns and bodies.

5. At 2.20 p.m. the cortege reached Jerusalem and stopped at Herod's Gate, where Government representatives, members of the consular corps, ecclesiastical dignitaries, Arab notables awaited it. Representatives of the Chief Rabbinate and of the Executive of the Jewish Agency, although they had not been invited, were also in attendance. The Italian consul-general, who was also omitted from the list of invitations, was not present.

6. At Herod's Gate a procession was formed, headed by the band of the Arab Legion. The procession included the mayors of Jerusalem, Haifa, Jaffa and other towns, the consular body, delegations representing various Moslem and Christian societies from many parts of Palestine with their banners, and parties of boy scouts and schoolboys. The procession approached the Haram-esh-Sherif by the Damascus Gate and the old city. The streets and buildings along which it passed were crowded with interested spectators.

I was represented in the procession by my private secretary and aide-de-camp. The acting chief justice, the chief secretary, the Officer Commanding, Transjordan Frontier Force and Heads of Departments were in attendance. Major Hubert Young, councillor of the High Commission for Iraq, who happened to be in Jerusalem, was also present.

A guard of honour was furnished by the Royal Warwickshire Regiment and saluted the coffin as it entered the old city at the Damascus Gate.

7. At 4 p.m. the coffin was carried into the Dome of the Rock, and immediately afterwards the Amir Abdullah and King Aly received the Government representatives, consuls and other non-Moslem notables, who, after expressing their sympathy with the Hashimite family, left the Haram Area.

At 4.30 p.m. the coffin was carried to the Mosque of Al Aqsa where, after the usual religious ceremonies, funeral orations were delivered by the president of the Supreme Moslem Council, Sheikh Abdul Kader-al-Mazaffar, Isaf Effendi-al-Nashashibi and Dr. Khalid-al-Hakin.

At about 5 p.m. the burial took place in a small and beautiful old mosque which abuts on the Haram Area a few yards from the tomb of Mohammad Ali and on its northern side.

A window has been specially opened in the wall of the Haram to connect the tomb with the Haram Area.

8. No untoward incident of any kind occurred during the funeral; and the Amir Abdullah and King Aly expressed to me their deep appreciation of the arrangements made by the Government for the funeral of their father.

Flags were flown at half-mast on Government buildings and at the Royal Air Force and military stations and on the consular offices on the day of the funeral.

9. I invited King Aly and Amir Abdullah to dine and to spend the night at Government House. The King and the Amir expressed their gratitude for this invitation which they accepted.

I have, &c.

J. R. CHANCELLOR,

High Commissioner for Palestine.